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6Introduction
Giving in Transition and Transitions in Giving: Philanthropy in Egypt, Libya 
and Tunisia 2011-2013
The many seasons of the Arab Spring have contributed to shaping, changing and coloring this publication. What started 
in late 2011 as a rapid scan of practices of local philanthropy in three Arab countries, then setting out on hopeful 
political transitions, became a protracted series of shifts in its own right.  As events lurched ahead, forms of giving 
expanded, retrenched or paused depending on the trajectory of political developments and popular sentiment.  Over 
many drafts, we came to realize that capturing important features of emerging philanthropy required us to encounter it 
afresh in a different territory, namely, a study of philanthropy in becoming and in revolution. Within this territory, the 
mega philanthropists, contrary to what would be expected, are not necessarily the people writing the script or defining 
the landscape of giving in the region. Instead, whatever script they had in mind is now somewhat sidelined, made to 
fit within a larger story that has not yet reached its finale. That story is about the ongoing mobilization of millions of 
citizens on a quest for freedom, social justice and dignity, a rapidly changing sociopolitical environment, unwelcome 
regulatory changes, as well as economic uncertainties and restrictions, all in the midst of a general lack of clarity of vision 
–	or	starkly	competing	visions	--	in	the	region.	This	introduction	reflects	on	both	the	process	of	developing	the	scanning	
report as well as some of its content. Much of the analysis provided here is still valid but some has become part of our 
collective memory as new factors have emerged to change that landscape and to alter our perceptions..  By the time this 
reaches print, no doubt further shifts will have become apparent. Still we believe it is useful to try to capture a moving 
and evolving landscape now, in order to better understand what is to come.
Analysis of practices of giving and mobilization of funds typically focus on institutions, taking for granted the fact that 
philanthropy,	in	its	very	essence,	is	about	people	and	their	“desire	to	promote	the	welfare	of	others,	expressed	especially	
by	the	generous	donation	of	money	to	good	causes”	as	defined	by	the	Oxford	Dictionary,	or	as	the	working	definition	
within the field itself is often encapsulated: Philanthropy is private resources mobilized for the public good. In Tunisia, 
Egypt,	and	Libya,	as	people’s	needs	and	impulses	to	give	changed	in	response	to	the	ongoing	revolutionary	fervor,	so	did	
our analysis. 
Philanthropy in the region had gone through a long slumber, when enduring autocracies were in place as well as abiding 
traditions	of	individual	charitable	philanthropy.	This	“comfortably	numb”	landscape	was	shaken	to	its	very	foundations	
by the launch of waves of mass mobilization across the region. As people mobilized, resources and funds were mobilized 
as well, and from then on, a number of shifts in the shape of giving for public benefit took place. Individual and 
informal/non-institutionalized philanthropy spontaneously grew, while many legal frameworks became obsolete and 
some institutional philanthropy faltered. The baggage of years gone-by and a history of restrictions weighed heavily on 
them during the Arab Awakening. Political censorship under the old regimes had been internalized as self-censorship and 
when the Arab Awakening broke out, institutional philanthropy struggled to keep up with the pace of change. Meanwhile, 
informal philanthropy thrived in the uncertain but mobilized atmosphere prevailing post-uprising.
In	2012	we	began	with	the	premise,	“The	Arab	Awakening	was	an	awakening	of	philanthropy	–	but	in	a	more	activist	
mode”	wherein	new	forms	of	philanthropy	were	 linked	 to	citizen	engagement.	While	 the	 link	holds	 true,	 and	many	
citizens are seeking ways to mobilize the resources needed to achieve their aspired social projects, the statement was 
misleading. An awakening of philanthropy in general did not happen; in fact substantial wealth left these countries, few 
new formal foundations have yet emerged, and existing organizations are still engaged in a slow process of adjusting to 
a changed environment.  
The initial popular optimism unleashed when the old regimes fell turned out to be miscalculated The winding paths 
from 2011 to 2013 have witnessed setbacks and disappointments. Many of the hopes and promises that were raised in 
2011 remain unfulfilled and elusive for those who imagined open and dynamic reform of their societies would come 
rapidly. Thus, in this publication we explore how shifts in the sociopolitical environment manifested themselves in 
the philanthropic realm during an uncertain mid-point in the transitions. To what extent have both institutional and 
informal philanthropy evolved to keep up with the pace of escalating needs and expectations of the people? As those 
shifts continue in all three countries, with variations to be explored in each country chapter, the report encourages 
actors in the sector to take bolder steps from diagnostics to action.  The opportunities and dangers of the present 
7moment require larger steps from reactive philanthropy to a philanthropic renaissance guided by new vision. What the 
philanthropic landscape will look like in 2015 is our responsibility and our choice. 
At the Crossroads between the Private and the Public: “Philanthropy” and Definitional Confusion 
Clear	thinking	about	philanthropy	requires	us	to	define	 it—to	specify	the	boundaries	between	
motives, means, and objectives that are truly philanthropic and those that are not. Any proper 
definition	must	pay	attention	to	how	the	term	“philanthropy”	has	been	applied	in	practice,	and	
yet, description alone cannot suffice. 1(Miller 2006: 52) 
Philanthropy is defined in a variety of ways to reflect both motivation and expression/practice.  The main definitional 
tension we found in the three countries is around an understanding of philanthropy as giving money to charity or as a 
variety of forms of strategic social investing.  Both are a necessary part of Arab societies at this development stage; what 
they share in common is the intersection of private intentions to give back to society, and the provision of resources 
(monetary	or	otherwise)	for	the	public	good.	Lester	Salamon	(1992)	defines	philanthropy	as	“the	private	giving	of	
time	or	valuables	(money,	security,	property)	for	public	purposes”	(cited	in	Sulek	201).		The	direction	of	philanthropy	
is thus both inward and outward; it emanates from an inner state of readiness to improve society, while linking the 
individual	or	institution	to	the	“public”	which	can	be	the	community,	the	nation	or	increasingly,		transnational.		
The Arab Awakening followed a similar pattern; it was both private and public. Citizens mobilized within their respective 
communities, at the national level, and as will be demonstrated in this report; across the countries in revolution. For 
example in Libya, Nedaa Al Kheir, an organization established in Benghazi by a Libyan businessman during 2011 first 
opened it offices in Egypt and Tunisia to help bring assistance to Libya, as well as spread the word about violations 
happening in the country. 
The Design and Process of Scanning Philanthropy 
To avoid definitional confusion, we adopted a specific working definition for philanthropy that guided earlier regional 
publications,	“the	institutionalized	pooling	and	distribution	of	private	resources	with	the	goal	of	building	capacity,	
sustainable	financing	and	expertise	for	long-term	societal	benefit”.	2 Individual giving is thus excluded from our analysis, but 
not informal emerging efforts at collective mobilization of assets (through social media, for example) even if not formally 
registered. Emphasis is given to youth initiatives because of the unique role that generation is playing in recent political 
changes in these countries. We also explore informal and time bound philanthropic initiatives, although these may not 
ultimately become institutionalized; in recent years they have grown tremendously and warrant documentation and analysis. 
Data for each country was analyzed at the national level. Authors in each country had to work under uncertain social 
and political circumstances which prolonged the data collection process. They, however, used those uncertainties to 
enrich their scan of the philanthropic realm; realities on the ground were distilled and interwoven in their analysis.  Per 
country, in addition to a review of the literature, a series of in-depth interviews with institutional representatives and 
focus group discussions were conducted with civil society leaders, as well as youth activists, mainly in the period between 
August 2011 and May 2012. (The interviewing in Egypt continued into early 2013 because of the substantially larger 
sector to be sampled.) The interviews addressed the sociopolitical environment within which philanthropic practices 
where shaped as well as actual structural shifts and emerging forms of philanthropic organizations and initiatives. 
Illustrative examples of identified trends are highlighted in the analysis. Ethical and safety considerations were built 
into the study design to ensure that the identities of informants remained confidential and the original recordings of 
interviews were destroyed once the analysis was complete.
The Long Slumber: Propaganda Philanthropy and the Scene before the Arab 
Awakening 
A brief overview of the period leading up to the Arab Awakening reveals an increasingly dysfunctional philanthropic 
landscape that was feeling its way towards change and integration within the global philanthropic realm. Within 
that environment, promising examples of effective institutional giving did appear in some countries, and that period 
witnessed the emergence of a cadre of professionals and philanthropists dedicated to building an infrastructure of 
strategic philanthropy within the region; the birth of the Arab Foundations Forum as a professional membership 
organization in 2007 is a good example.
1	 Cited	 in	Sulek,	Marty.	“On	the	Modern	Meaning	of	Philanthropy.”	Nonprofit	Voluntary	Sector	Quarterly	2010.	Sage:	2009.	Link:	
http://nvs.sagepub.com/content/early/2009/03/11/0899764009333052.full.pdf
2	 See	Ibrahim,	Barbara	and	Dina	Sherif.	From	Charity	to	Social	Change:	Trends	in	Arab	Philanthropy.	Cairo:	American	University	in	
Cairo	Press,	2008.	
8Practices	of	philanthropy	have	always	been	influenced	by	the	political	environment	in	which	they	operate	–	the	more	
restrictive the politics, the more limited the scope for institutional strategic philanthropy to flourish. Under Qaddafi, 
Bourguiba and Nasser in the mid-twentieth century, the historical faith-based philanthropic institution of Waqf was 
nationalized and brought under the control of the state. This was the beginning of a continuing stalemate because with 
state control came lack of trust, disincentives to invest, and a perceived need to stay close to the centers of power in order 
for philanthropies to operate freely.  This clearly led to some compromises in the independence of the sector over several 
decades. At the same time, movements based on religious ideology, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, began to offer their 
own style of social services and charity to those who were left behind as public services declined.  
Since the start of the 21st century a fledgling movement emerged that called for the revival of strategic private 
philanthropy along lines that have been successful in Europe and North America. Voices calling for strategic philanthropy, 
impact investing and sustainable giving were championed among an emerging business sector but the climate of political 
stagnation did not encourage wide expansion. Foundations, along with all others in civil society were heavily restricted 
in Egypt and Tunisia and forbidden in Libya.    
The Wings/TPI report (2011)3  on global institutional philanthropy which covered the Arab region confirms this image. 
According to the report, philanthropy was to a large extent informed by religious and charitable impulses. There were new 
institutional models that sought greater scale and impact but the sector remained small in relation to pervasive individual 
giving through religious channels such as Zakat and Ushur (Muslim and Christian tithing from personal income).  Most 
of the challenges mentioned in that report were related to government restrictions: tax and financial policies, problems 
with registration and regulation, or had bearings on religious traditions.  In all three countries covered in this report, 
institutionalized	philanthropy	was	controlled	by	the	state	in	the	same	way	the	state	sought	to	control	its	citizens	–with	
a few exceptions. It was also part of the symbolic capital that sought to project a progressive image to the world while 
autocracy was expanded at home.  
In	Libya,	Saif	al-Islam’s	emergence	came	hand	in	hand	with	the	establishment	of	the	Gaddafi	International	Foundation	
for Charitable Associations (GIFCA), a foundation that was primarily funded by the state, and under its umbrella, 
many other civil society organizations were born. The Foundation had little impact on the ground in Libya but it was 
through	the	charity,	“that	Saif	al-Islam	was	able	to	broker	a	deal	in	2000	for	the	release	of	the	western	hostages	being	
held by the Abu Sayaf group in the Philippines. Alongside the charity, Saif al-Islam also set up the One Nine Group - an 
investment	group	comprising	a	portfolio	of	companies”	(Pargeter	222).4 In 2009, Saif al-Islam also established a human 
rights organization that spun off GIFCA called the Arab Alliance for Democracy, Development and Human Rights, 
with	a	mandate	that	consisted	of	“tracking	human	rights	abuses	in	the	Middle	East”;	the	first	meeting	that	launched	
the organization was held in Tripoli with Saif al-Islam announced as Chair.5 Philanthropy, thus, was primarily politics 
in Libya; the period witnessing the revolution, however, opened up space for major shifts on that front and a rebirth of 
citizen-led philanthropy.
In Tunisia under Ben Ali, Larbi Sadiki relates how 
…charity,	an	arena	with	lots	of	potential	for	the	growth	of	non-governmental	organizations	(NGOs),	is	taken	over	by	
the State. The regime is taking no chances with welfarism. Thus it has absorbed the lessons of the past, from within 
and without, that State failure in this domain opens up space for not only proactive Islamist-led grassroots social 
engineering, but also for all kinds of other non-State activism (Sadiki 58).6
However, in addition to what we may call propaganda philanthropy (as in Libya); Tunisian civil society did witness a 
pre-uprising	expansion	in	philanthropy	that	had	a	more	cultural	and	artistic	rather	than	rights	or	development	focus	–	
philanthropy that kept to the status quo yet was monitored closely. In this report, Alzidi underscores how development 
organizations did not exceed more than 11% of the number of existing associations in 2010-2011. A percentage of that 
percent was actually run by the first lady, Laila Ben Ali, who also headed the Arab Women Organization and founded the 
Basma	Association	for	the	Promotion	of	Employment	of	the	Disabled	which	was	established	with	the	mission	to	“back	
up	the	state’s	efforts	in	the	integration	of	the	disabled,	particularly	by	contributing	to	enhancing	their	employment”.	
3	 Johnson,	Paula.	Global	Institutional	Philanthropy:	A	Preliminary	Status	Report	(2011).	Complete	report	is	available	at	http://c.ymcdn.
com/sites/www.wingsweb.org/resource/resmgr/files/institutional_phil_parti_ove.pdf
4	 Pargeter,	Alison.	“Libya:	Reforming	the	Impossible?”	Review	of	African	Political	Economy	33	(2006):	pp.	219-235.	Web.
5	 For	more	information	on	Saif	al-Islam	and	the	Arab	Alliance	for	Democracy,	Development	and	Human	Rights,	see	http://www.globalse-
curity.org/military/world/libya/saif-qadhafi.htm
6	 Sadiki,	Larbi.	“Bin	Ali‟s	Tunisia:	Democracy	by	Non-Democratic	Means.”	British	Journal	of	Middle	Eastern	Studies	29.	2002:	
pp.57-78.
9State	control	was	further	enhanced	with	the	establishing	of	the	Tunisian	Union	of	Social	Solidarity	(UTS),	the	state’s	
conduit in controlling community and development work in Tunisia. 
In Egypt, according to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law,7	 while	 Egypt’s	NGO	 law	 “is	 among	 the	
most	restrictive	in	the	world”,	Law	84	of	2002	“is	not	so	much	restrictive	as	discretionary”.	The	law	gave	enormous	
discretionary powers to security forces behind the public face of the Ministry of Social Solidarity.  But in spite of this, 
Egyptian	civil	society	remains	“the	largest	and	the	most	vibrant	in	the	entire	developing	world”.	This	is	because	“the	
full	weight	of	this	authority	is	brought	to	bear	only	against	organizations	and	individuals	that	cross	the	government’s	
‘red	lines’	in	pushing	for	social	reform	and	political	liberalization.”	The	vast	majority	of	civil	society	organizations	
deliberately avoided crossing well-known red lines, were avowedly apolitical and, thus, managed to escape severe 
government interference. For those reasons, human rights organizations, which because of their advocacy mandate were 
overtly political, had to rely almost completely on external funding. Thus, indigenous funding in Egypt was primarily 
directed to developmental, cultural, and charity organizations that flew under the radar of state security and avoided 
confrontation with the regime.
Private philanthropic giving in Egypt is substantial; it was estimated at $ 1 billion annually in 2005 (More than EGP 
5 billion), a majority of which, however, is not channeled through institutions.  Informal transactions such as face to 
face hand-outs remain popular, and are at the same time difficult to measure in terms of impact or effectiveness in 
addressing	core	development	problems.	Mona	Atia	notes	with	regard	to	local	giving	that	“organizations	with	religious	
philosophies have grown much more rapidly than those with secular orientations, yet secular organizations are heavily 
supported by international aid agencies. The increase in social services provided by civil society organizations is part 
of a wider revival of popular religious interest and a commitment to social work. This revival can be observed in 
both	Muslim	and	Christian	communities	in	Egypt.”8(37) Following the institution of neo-liberal policies in Egypt, 
population growth outstripped the static or shrinking public services. Private philanthropy channeled to basic social 
services moved into poor communities where the state withdrew or became mired in corruption. A proliferation of local 
civil society organizations resulted from this process with varying degrees of scale and effectiveness(40).
The 30-year Mubarak era witnessed a number of transformations in the philanthropic realm9 with a rise in corporate 
social responsibility and the emergence of a core group of organizations advocating for more strategic giving. New 
forms of strategic philanthropy were in the making, a mix  that included grant-making foundations, religious charities 
operating at major scale, community foundations, private sector partnerships, corporate and venture philanthropy.10 
Wealthy	business	 leaders	began	opting	for	consolidating	their	giving	in	foundations	called	mo’assasat.	The	Sawiris	
Foundation for Social Development11	is	an	example.	Established	in	2001,	it	is	thought	to	be	“Egypt’s	first	modern	
grant-making	foundation”	according	to	Atia	(47).	The	foundation	supports	social	development	through	job	creation	
and initiatives that include training, education and access to microcredit. Al Orman is an example of a religious charity, 
established at 1993, that rapidly expanded to 16 chapters across 16 governorates, covering 15,000 projects (47). 
Another expansion in philanthropic practices was in age groups involved; Resala is a youth-founded and run organization 
that has more than 60 branches throughout Egypt, and in 2012 included around 100 thousand youth volunteers.
The Path to Awakening: From Humanitarian Aid to Strategic Philanthropy 
The year 2011 marks a watershed moment in the Arab region; it was the culmination of multiple smaller organizing 
efforts for political change across what had formerly been perceived as the most stagnant and change-resistant part 
of the world. This collective tipping point had been building for decades and should most accurately be viewed as a 
continuum that has not yet born its desired fruits: the revolutionary fervor continues in 2013 as well as the grievances 
that set the Arab Awakening in motion.  
At a time of upheaval, mass protests and street violence in 2010-2011, there was a need to leverage resources from 
within and without to respond to escalating needs on the ground; food, medicine and increasing poverty as economies 
faltered. Philanthropy responded in largely unstructured and citizen-led efforts to meet humanitarian needs. Following 
the departure of autocratic regimes, needs changed, and forms of giving shifted toward rebuilding damaged communities 
and lives. As the political struggles became more complicated, philanthropy was one of the locales where political 
7	 More	information	on	Egyptian	Civil	Society	Law	is	available	at	the	International	Center	for	Not-for-Profit	law	website	at	http://www.
icnl.org/research/monitor/egypt.html
8	 See	Ibrahim,	Barbara	and	Dina	Sherif.	From	Charity	to	Social	Change:	Trends	in	Arab	Philanthropy.	Cairo:	American	University	in	
Cairo	P,	2008.
9	 Ibid.
10	 Ibid.
11 http://www.sawirisfoundation.org/sawiris/index.php?option=com_content&view=frontpage&Itemid=1&lang=en
10
powers	 revealed	 themselves	 and	 sought	precedence	–	 the	 fight	over	 civil	 society	 law	and	conflicts	 related	 to	 foreign	
funding in Egypt and Tunisia are two examples discussed in this report. While each country followed a fairly unique 
path in the attempts to consolidate citizen mobilization into more structured institutions, some cross-national patterns 
did emerge from the study.
A number of general trends can be seen in each of the three countries. In Libya, with the absence of an infrastructure for 
institutionalized philanthropy under the old regime, a civil society is currently being forged from a relatively white slate 
and that leads to a number of challenges as well as opportunities for developing new paradigms; in Tunisia, a shift in 
focus from cultural associations to more developmental associations took place as well as an effort to expand and build 
on an already existing civil society. In Egypt, the process was more complicated considering the breadth and history of 
civil society there, but new initiatives emerged and a restructuring of civil society is now embedded within a larger debate 
regarding religion, the constitution and drafting a civil society law that allows for citizen engagement and would release 
philanthropic efforts from former restrictions. What is common across all three countries is the focus on reforming the 
regulatory	environment	and	developing	a	civil	society	law	that	is	in	keeping	with	the	spirit	of	the	Arab	awakening	–	The	
most recent draft of NGO law in Egypt, however, brings civil society further under state control and severely restricts 
foreign funding which may have serious consequences on the future of the sector.12 Another common theme is the pivotal 
role played by youth as major stakeholders in change. The dynamics may be different in each site, but the vision of an 
independent civil society is a shared goal. 
In	Libya,	an	early	effervescence	of	new	forms	of	citizen	mobilization	–including	a	substantial	return	of	Libyans	living	in	
the diaspora --is now developing into more structured organizational forms. Over250 new organizations for examples 
were established in the period during and immediately after the revolution in the eastern half of the country, and those 
numbers have increased one year after the revolution. In a country with a population of six million across a wide expanse 
of land, those numbers are significant and indicate the centrality of civic organizations to the future of a democratic 
Libya.  . At the outset, the main focus of those organizations was humanitarian aid to provide food and shelter as well as 
medical	aid	during	the	war	against	Qaddafi’s	forces	and	the	immediate	aftermath.		Those	groups	are	now	shifting	focus	
and exploring ways to become a more sustainable presence. Media is playing an important role in raising funds as well 
as awareness; radio stations, because they can be fairly easily set up, are particularly popular. In the East, there may be 
multiple radio stations in areas that have a population as small as 1000 people.
In	Tunisia,	 informal	philanthropy	boomed	in	Tunisia	during	the	revolution:	“This	was	manifested	in	the	great	surge	
of	 solidarity	 shown	during	 the	 security	breakdown	afflicting	 the	country’s	 streets.	Popular	committees	were	 formed	
to	protect	neighborhoods.	This	coincided	with	fundraising	campaigns	to	collect	donations	and	food…”	Out	of	this	
solidarity to meet humanitarian needs witnessed during the revolution, around 1044 new associations were established 
from	 January	 to	 end	September	 2011.	Those	 numbers	 are,	 as	Alzidi	 puts	 it,	 a	 “record”	 if	 compared	 to	 the	 annual	
registration of associations in the past 20 years which never exceeded 220 associations annually; this rate had also 
declined significantly to 82 in 2012 from 148 in 2009. Along with the burst in civil society expansion there was  a 
shift	in	focus:	the	new	associations	may	be	divided	as	follows:	“453	cultural	and	arts	associations,	182	charitable	and	
social associations, 129 development associations, 144 advocacy and citizenship associations, 63 cooperatives, 58 sports 
associations	and	15	feminist	associations”.	This	shift	Alzidi	argues	responds	to	escalating	economic	needs	as	well	as	a	
continuation of the citizen mobilization that had unfolded during the revolution. The location of those associations is 
also significant; under Ben Ali, the majority of associations were located in the capital of Tunis, but now a substantial 
increase		in	newly	established	associations	are	found	in	deprived	areas:	“the	bedrock	of	the	Tunisian	revolution,	namely	
the	mid-west	which	includes	the	of	Sidi	Bouzid,	the	north-west	and	the	south-west	regions.”
In Egypt with an old and diverse civil society, extensive informal personal giving and formal/institutionalized philanthropy 
existed side by side.. During and after the 18 intense days of the revolution, citizen mobilization of resources was 
immense both within the country and from its diaspora. On a single day one of the foundations interviewed for this 
report managed to raise over EGP 100,000 for needs in Tahrir Square from Egyptians living abroad. Groups of doctors 
established makeshift hospitals and volunteered their services to treat the injured Social media played a significant role as 
it did in Libya and Tunisia. @TahrirSupplies is an example of a Twitter application that not only helped raise donations 
but also provided information regarding what medical supplies were needed, when and where.
The focus on the regulatory environment and ensuring an autonomous civil society is now front and center. This was 
brought	into	startling	focus		in	February	2012	with	arrests	of	staff	at	both	Egyptian	and	international	NGO’s	operating	
in Cairo  that were implementing election-related training programsand other democracy promotion  programs. Of the 
12	 More	information	is	available	at	http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/egypt.html
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43 people who were referred to a criminal court for trial as part of an investigation into the funding and registration of 
NGOs, there were 14 Egyptians, in addition to US, German and Serbian nationals reported to be staff members of five 
organizations	–	the	US-based	National	Democratic	Institute	(NDI);	the	International	Republican	Institute	(IRI);	the	
International Center for Journalists (ICFJ); Freedom House (FH) and the Germany-based Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. 
This	sparked	a	fierce	national	debate	on	Egypt’s	civil	society	law	which	requires	NGOs	to	register	with	the	Ministry	of	
Solidarity and Social Justice and to receive permission before receiving foreign funding. 
The battle for a progressive civil society law in Egypt continues as this report goes to press. The latest draft has proven to be a 
serious setback to the vision of an autonomous civil society. According to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law; 
Following ratification of the new constitution of Egypt on 26 December 2012, the Shura Council 
(Egypt’s	upper	house	of	parliament)	received	for	the	first	time	the	right	to	initiate	the	drafting	of	
legislation	‘in	case	of	the	dissolution	of	the	House	of	Representatives’	or	lower	house	of	parliament	
(Article 131). Taking advantage of this new authority, the Shura Council has prepared draft laws 
on assembly and association. These draft laws have been heavily criticized by international and 
domestic observers, and President Mohammed Morsi has reportedly vowed not to approve any 
such	 legislation	until	 after	elections	 for	 the	 lower	house	of	parliament	are	held.	….	If	new	 laws	
affecting freedom of assembly and/or freedom of association are passed by the Shura Council, they 
must	be	“presented	to	the	[lower	house]	for	consideration	as	soon	as	it	is	convened”	(Article	131).	
However, even if the Shura Council does not act, it seems clear that a new NGO law and a new law 
governing assemblies will be passed in 2013.
This law contains provisions that would severely limit the ability to fundraise locally or to receive external funding and 
would make the distribution of funds the prerogative of a joint Ministerial and security services committee. Strong 
protests from international, regional and local organizations do not seem to have influenced the Muslim-Brotherhood 
dominated government intentions to move this draft into law. 
The Centrality of Social Justice 
A common denominator across those waves of mass citizen activism was the call for social and economic justice, and the 
success or failure of the Arab transition seems to be heavily dependent on whether or not these aspirations are addressed. 
In Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, the street protests mobilized around calls for social justice as well as the concept of 
karama or dignity, bread, and freedom.  A perceived lack of social justice was a key factor that ignited and continues to 
fuel those uprisings, while even small steps toward realizing basic fairness in public life remain elusive. 
As a concept, social justice has a particular resonance within the region, where the widespread perception is that a 
small group of cronies close to ruling families were reaping the fruits of economic and social progress, while ordinary 
people were subjected to police brutality and arbitrary justice.13 Literature and documentation of most transitions 
suggest a direct connection between achieving social justice aims through progress on democratization. However, that 
link	is	not	apparent	in	public	discourse	in	the	Arab	uprisings.	In	recent	protests	in	Cairo	for	example,	while	“social	
justice”	or	al-’adalah	ijtima’iah,	remains	a	central	theme,	“democracy”	is	hardly	mentioned.		Public	discourse	on	social	
justice is more likely to focus on a number of specific rights such as personal dignity, freedom of expression, official 
transparency and equality before the law. 
The complexity of the term gives way to complexity at the level of practice, particularly as related to philanthropy. 
Social justice philanthropy in the Arab world can be approached at two levels: institutional and informal. The Arab 
Awakening witnessed a restructuring and a spike in informal and non-institutional philanthropy which responded 
to felt needs within communities. Institutional philanthropy in places like Egypt, however, was more likely to 
maintain	its	pre-Arab	Awakening	programs	or	to	‘pause’	while	reassessing	the	new	realities.	Foreign	organizations	
were eager to assist in the nascent process of democratization, through capacity building, advocacy and awareness-
raising programs. They misread the eagerness of some local NGOs for this type of assistance, and a general lack of 
coherent government policy early on as a green light to work freely in the country in advance of early elections in 
Egypt. Indigenous foundations that received and managed funds from these international donors were subsequently 
caught	up	in	a	highly	controversial	“NGO	court	case”,	while	feeding	a	general	mood	of	xenophobia	and	a	perception	
among many citizens and policy-makers that democratic aims such as free and fair elections were being prioritized 
over the escalating social justice demands on the ground. This unfortunate episode has delivered a setback for 
13	 This	section	benefitted	from	discussions	with	youth	researchers	involved	in		a	Gerhart	Center	–	British	Council	tracking	study	on	youth	
perceptions	of	sociopolitical	changes	in	Libya,	Tunisia	and	Egypt	(2012-2013).	The	study	is	to	be	released	in	May	2013.
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public understanding of the role of philanthropic capital during transitions, and has lingering effects on the civil 
society sector working in all fields and locations in Egypt.  In neighboring Libya there is no parallel rejection of 
international assistance, and in Tunisia, while there is a healthy public debate, the presence of international aid 
agencies promoting democratic transitions has not been criminalized. 
By	bringing	the	question	of	al-’adalah	ijtima’iah	to	the	center,	the	Arab	awakening	brought	new	energy	to	practices	
of local philanthropy. Starting from spontaneous neighborhood protection groups and moving on to imaginative 
uses of social media to fundraise, philanthropy as been fueled by waves of citizen engagement. In other words, 
social	justice	philanthropy	followed	the	energy	created	by	people’s	actions	and	mobilization,	and	was	structured	
by tools such as the internet, community solidarity funds, make-shift hospitals and so on. As new nations were 
being	reborn,	philanthropy	was	interchangeable	with	citizen	engagement	–	and	out	of	this	new	paradigms	evolved,	
in structure and content. 
The Arab Awakening has brought to the foreground the nexus between social movements and resource mobilization; 
the mobilization of funds for social justice causes was heavily influenced by the mobilization of citizens from the 
ground up, rather than from the wealthy downward. In form, philanthropy followed the informal structures that 
were developed to meet humanitarian needs for protection, rehabilitation, legal aid, and advocacy for labor rights. 
Creativity and innovation continue to flourish within the informal realm, although we noted a decline in the volume 
of new citizen initiatives when comparing the end of 2011 with early 2013, perhaps related to a rise in more overtly 
political organizing around elections and the constitutional drafting process in each country. 
The Way Forward: Is a Philanthropy Renaissance Possible? 
As this brief overview of shifts in philanthropic practices demonstrates, a number of trends are emerging on the indigenous 
philanthropy scene. Given the informal nature of many initiatives and the difficulties in the legal environment for civic 
organizations, it remains unclear whether these trends will result in a more structured and sustainable sector in the 
future.   Below are some thoughts on interventions that could help to make that transition possible. 
Providing Thought-Leadership and Evidence-based Strategies
The region needs to develop common and locally-owned definitions and terms. There are several intermediary 
groups that network foundations and philanthropists with civil society organizations which could form the basis 
for that process.  Shared definitions would set the stage for a meaningful discussion around the long-term vision 
for the sector. The Gerhart Center at AUC, the Arab Foundations Forum, and Saaned Philanthropy Advisory 
in Amman could jointly provide such a platform. It would provide thought-leadership forthe encouragement of 
strategic, sustainable Arab philanthropy, grounded in the culture and aspirations of the region and actively engaged 
with emerging global philanthropy as well. This is a time of renewal in philanthropic thinking from within the 
private sector as well as western foundations, and much can be learned from an exchange of evidence-based practices 
that work. The critical first step is arriving at definitions anchored within the region to allow new models to 
emerge that are better suited to a shifting Arab context. 
Finding Cultural Brokers and Scanning the Landscape – Informed Social Justice Philanthropy 
Each Arab country has a historical and geographic specificity to be taken into consideration when embarking 
on building an infrastructure of philanthropy. There is also a need for cultural brokers -- people who are 
familiar with local communities as well as the national scene and can play a role in mediating with donors both 
local and cross-border  to make sure that philanthropy is well-connected to  the needs and expectations of 
beneficiaries and potential partners on the ground.   
Policy Advocacy and Self-regulation 
Currently the region lacks vehicles for the regulation of philanthropic practices other than governmental agencies or 
security apparatus.  We are beginning to see the emergence of informal coalitions with the aim of policy lobbying for 
a more conducive environment for civic action and philanthropic giving.  Arab Foundations Forum, Saaned, Gerhart 
Center and the International Center for Non-Profit law are currently developing a policy brief and template law on 
foundations and endowments that can become the basis for regional efforts to improve legislation and oversight of the 
sector.  Without such policy change the growth of more strategic philanthropy will be curtailed.  On the civil society side, 
the current lack of any norms for self-regulation is a primary factor cited whenever the state calls for greater intervention 
and restrictions on civil society. Codes of ethics and measures that ensure transparency, if adopted widely within the 
sector, will form an important element to safeguard future trust and autonomy. 
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Effective Advocacy, Building Platforms and Networking for Impact  
There is much potential for synergies and joint programs that cut across the three budding democracies covered in 
this report.  The initial cross-border citizen support flowing toward their liberation struggles can now shift into 
exchanges of expertise, innovation, and institutional support for capacity development and greater sustainability. 
Universities can become the hubs for this process via peer exchange, rigorous evaluation and diffusion of ideas. 
The	Ma’an	Arab	University	Alliance	for	Civic	Engagement,	a	growing	network	of	universities	dedicated	to	building	
more engaged campuses that conduct learning, research and service jointly with their communities, is an example 
of a platform that can make this possible. The Gerhart Center at AUC also hosts an annual Takaful Conference on 
Arab Philanthropy and Civic Engagement, which  is another attempt to forge such a platform for the exchange of 
knowledge and program innovation. Going forward, stronger lines of communication can be forged as well with key 
stakeholders in the private sector, multinationals, social movements and diaspora communities.  
This report is thus a snapshot of emerging trends, in which a central finding is that spontaneity, citizen innovation, 
and lateral connections are having the largest impact on the philanthropic sector in the wake of revolutionary 
political changes.  We are left with an unanswered question as to whether these impressive steps forward can be 
sufficiently institutionalized that they will survive and grow.  Our bet is on the positive answer to that question, 
and it invites all of those working in the development and civic engagement fields to join forces with them for a 
sustainable future.
        
                         Sherine N. El Taraboulsi 
Projects Manager at the Regional Partnership 
                    on Culture and Development, FHI 360
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1. Introduction
1.1 Mass Mobilization and a Rethinking of Egyptian Philanthropy
Philanthropy	is	deeply	rooted	in	Egypt’s	past.	Much	of	the	trials	and	tribulations	of	Egypt’s	history,	however,	resonated	
within the realm of its philanthropy; its development was closely tied to the politics of the times, and the rise and 
fall of Waqf are instructive in that regard.14 It flourished in times of political liberalization and receded in times of 
autocracy; in 1952 for example, Waqf, mandates of unions, professional syndicates and NGO legislation were changed 
to give the government complete control over the sector. This severely restricted the role of Waqf as a philanthropic 
institution and brought its activities to a halt. Philanthropic giving continued nevertheless in institutional and non-
institutional forms, as will be later evidenced in the chapter. For better or for worse, linkages between politics and 
philanthropy continued to clash at times and to align at others, hindering the sector from organically developing; yet 
in spite of this, it can be argued that  growth has taken place over the past half-century. The January 25 Revolution 
altered the political landscape and, in so doing, provided a space within which philanthropy underwent a restructuring 
and a rethinking of its existence as its role moved from the fringes to the center. 
As philanthropy moved to the center; the traditional gave way to innovative citizen-led approaches. Traditionally, 
giving in Egypt has been largely understood within three distinct modalities: individual philanthropy carried out 
by the wealthy through personal giving or via family foundations; faith-based philanthropy emanating from the 
requirements of Islam (Zakat, Waqf, etc.) and Christianity (Ushur, or tithing); and more recently through Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) programs established by larger private-sector companies, local and international. In light 
of recent waves of awakened citizen mobilization, this scan takes a somewhat broader view, recognizing that newer 
forms of giving are now embedded within patterns of civic and social solidarity. A rethinking of philanthropy was 
necessitated by the Revolution, and a paradigmatic shift from philanthropy as giving and mobilization of resources 
alone is underway, to what we can call activist philanthropy that is deeply rooted in more collective citizen action; 
the lines of demarcation separating practices of philanthropy from those of activism have been blurred, sign a lingo a 
restructuring of philanthropy in a country going through several political, social and economic changes. So while the 
scan focuses mainly on developments within institutionalized philanthropy, attention is also given to civic projects and 
informal philanthropic initiatives that emerged in the scene especially those initiated by youth.15 
1.2 Methodology and Challenges 
The methodology identified by the authors included extensive desk research of national and international country reviews 
and reports with a focus on citizen activism, youth and resource mobilization. Field research included the use of two 
methods of data collection; mainly semi-structured as well as key informant interviews. The semi structured interview 
survey covered organizational issues in established foundations; in both key informant and the semi-structured approach, 
questions were included to gauge perception-based reflections about philanthropy as it is linked to Egyptian society. 
Face to face interviews began in late 2011, with final data collected in spring of 2012. The project was more 
difficult than expected, as many respondents were either distracted by the dramatic ups and downs of former 
regime prosecutions and protracted and often violent protests, or they were reluctant to share information about 
initiatives they saw as still in the formative stages.  While individual and informal/non-institutional philanthropy 
were expanding in new and innovative ways, institutional philanthropy seemed to fall short. Therefore it 
is important to keep in mind the snap-shot nature of this scan at a particular time period during which Egypt 
was undergoing profound societal transformations. 
The scan focuses mainly on initiatives in the large urban centers of Cairo and Alexandria that were accessible to the 
authors.  So while there can be no claims to a nationally-representative sample, we have aimed for a diverse sampling of 
the types of initiatives currently underway in urban areas of Egypt, which are often harbingers of larger societal trends.
2. Institutional Philanthropy, the Regulatory Environment and Definitional Confusion
Regarding institutional philanthropy, we focused on grant making organizations rather than those only operating 
their own projects.  Classifying those organizations was a challenge; the main organizing typology is that put forward 
by the WINGS/TPI report on global institutional philanthropy (2011)16 in an effort to build on existing knowledge 
14	 See	 Khafagy,	 Riham	 and	 Abdallah	 Erfan.	 “Reviving	 Waqf	 in	 Egypt.”	 Cairo:	 John	 D.	 Gerhart	 Center	 for	 Philanthropy	 and	 Civic	
Engagement,	American	University	in	Cairo,	2013.	Link:	http://www.aucegypt.edu/research/gerhart/rprogram/Documents/Waqf.pdf	
15	 Youth	are	defined	here	as	those	between	ages	18	and	35.
16	 WINGs	and	TPI.	“Global	Institutional	Philanthropy:	A	Preliminary	Status	Report.”	2011. 
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.wingsweb.org/resource/resmgr/files/institutional_phil_parti_ove.pdf
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and allow for comparability. The typology includes six broad categories of institutional philanthropy: independent 
foundations, corporate foundations, community foundations, host-controlled funds, government-linked foundations 
and multi-purpose fundraising institutions. In the case of Egypt, this typology was found to loosely fit the different 
institutions on the scene.  This definitional confusion points towards a larger debate on definitions and categories 
within the sector, not only in Egypt but in the Arab region as a whole.  That said; some philanthropic organizations 
can be classified under more than one WINGS category, as will be shown in the report and some do not apply under 
the circumstances.  Government-linked foundations for example are currently on hold, as many foundations linked to 
the old regime have been disbanded or are currently keeping a low profile until there is more clarity within the political 
landscape.  An example of this is the formerly active Future Generation Foundation, which was headed by Gamal 
Mubarak, the son of former president Hosni Mubarak.
An	overview	of	the	changing	regulatory	environment	is	important.	An	existing	gap	between	Egypt’s	civil	society	law	
and existing structures of civil society on the ground can help explain the confusion of terms and categories. There are 
around 24,500 (2007 estimate)17 associations, foundations, non-profit companies, and unions in Egypt. The regulator 
for associations, foundations and unions is the Ministry of Social Solidarity, and for not for profit companies, the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade. According to the Egypt Human Development Report (2008), the total revenue of 
15,150 associations in 2006 was LE 1.928 billion. The expenditure of these associations totaled nearly LE 1.471 
billion18. Employment levels within the sampled associations are estimated to be 100,761 employees. An unknown 
percentage of those are grant-making, others are grant recipients and many are hybrids (give grants and operate 
programs). Other civic organizations are registered as law offices or civic companies to avoid state interference. These 
“creatively”	registered	organizations	benefit	from	multiple	advantages	including	freedom	to	innovate,	responsiveness	
and flexibility in fundraising.  A draft law under consideration in early 2013 would close this avenue of registration and 
criminalize attempts to avoid the Ministry of Social Solidarity. 
That said; there is a gap between how an organization is registered and what it is. Often registration is a matter of 
convenience rather than operation. For example, the number of registered foundations in Egypt has grown rapidly 
over	 the	 past	 decade.	 This,	 however,	 is	 no	 indication	 of	 the	 number	 of	 ‘real’	 foundations19 that exist. Registering as 
a foundation may be more convenient than as an NGO because the board of a foundation has fewer trustees and there 
is neither a requirement for membership in the organization nor an annual membership meeting to ratify activities 
and leadership.  Therefore we estimate that the number of true foundations, which manage significant assets that 
are re-allocated via grants, is probably closer to 150, although this is almost impossible to verify because the mandated 
annual reports submitted to the state are not made public.
There is also another gap between the stipulations of the law and law enforcement. According to the International 
Center for Non-Profit Law (ICNL), civil society in Egypt is governed by the provisions of the Law on Non-
Governmental Societies and Organizations (Law 84 of 2002) and the Executive Statute on Law 84 of 2002 
(Ministry	of	 Insurance	 and	Social	Affairs	 [Now	Ministry	of	Social	Solidarity]	Decree	178	of	2002).	While	 the	
NGO	 law	 is	 “considered	 among	 the	most	 restrictive	 in	 the	 world,”	 Law	 84	 of	 2002	 “is	 not	 so	much	 restrictive	
as	 it	 is	 discretionary.”	 	 While	 the	 law	 gave	 powers	 to	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Social	 Solidarity,	 in	 practice,	 however,	
this	 authority	 was	 “brought	 to	 bear	 only	 against	 organizations	 and	 individuals	 that	 crossed	 the	 government’s	
“red	 lines”	 by	 calling	 for	 social	 reform	 and	 political	 liberalization.”	 Most	 organizations,	 managed	 to	 fly	 under	
the radar of state security by being apolitical, although their abilities to raise additional funds or to partner 
internationally were restricted by red tape and delays. 
While	 “politically-correct”	 organizations	 were	 allowed	 to	 operate,	 civil	 society’s	 influence	 at	 the	 policy	 level	
remained limited, and that hindered its ability to sustain impact on the ground and widen the scope of its 
influence. According to the Civil Society Index Report on Egypt released by CIVICUS, a global alliance of 
CSOs,	 in	 2006;	 “a	 long	 history	 of	 state	 centralization	 of	 power	 and	 limited	 political	 freedom	 has	 meant	 that	
CSOs have functioned in a highly inhibitive environment that is not conducive to unrestricted civil action. This is 
reflected in the level of autonomy enjoyed by CSOs, in the possible roles they can play and the scope of influence 
they	can	hope	to	have	on	policy	and	decision-makers.”
17	 For	 more	 information	 on	 Egypt’s	 Civil	 Society	 Law,	 please	 refer	 to	 The	 International	 Center	 for	 Not-for-Profit	 Law	 (ICNL)	 at	 
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/egypt.html
18	 Data	from	2007	Survey	Conducted	by	General	Federation	of	Associations
19	 According	 to	 the	 Foundation	Center,	 a	 foundation	 is	 “a	 non-governmental	 entity	 that	 is	 established	 as	 a	 nonprofit	 corporation	 or	
a	 	charitable	 trust,	with	a	principal	purpose	of	making	grants	 to	unrelated	organizations,	 institutions,	or	 individuals	 for	 scientific,	
educational,	 cultural,	 religious,	 or	 other	 charitable	 purposes.	 This	 broad	 definition	 encompasses	 two	 foundation	 types:	 private	
foundations	 and	 grantmaking	 public	 charities.”	 More	 information	 available	 at	 http://www.grantspace.org/Tools/Knowledge-Base/
Funding-Resources/Foundations/What-is-a-foundation
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The restrictive legal and regulatory environment has had adverse effects, particularly on organizations working in 
economic development, human rights and democratization.  Due to these restrictions, which worsened during the 30 
years of emergency law, many official trade unions and syndicates were infiltrated, elections rigged and establishing 
independent political lobby groups or trade organizations prohibited.  Civil Society Organizations were granted no role 
in reviewing government budgets nor did they have a place at the table in negotiating loans or terms of programs such 
as those of the Institute of International Finance (IFI). Access to information was exclusively controlled by the state, 
which made it increasingly difficult for CSOs to collect, assess, and report on government expenditures and activities20. 
In the period post-Mubarak, several attempts were made to draft a new Egyptian NGO law. A number of drafts 
were suggested by civil society organizations to guarantee autonomy and a law that best reflects existing structures 
and international best practice. The draft law that was issued by the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs in 
October 2012 and according to ICNL, this draft would reduce some restrictions on local NGOs but would place more 
restrictions on foreign funding. However, after the election of a new president, new amendments have been made to that 
draft that voiced the concerns of practitioners in the field. According to the Cairo Institute for Human Right Studies 
(CIHRS),	the	proposed	law	is	“oppressive	and	attempts	to	nationalize	civil	society	and	turn	it	into	a	governmental	
body”	as	it	“restricts	NGO	activities	to	development	and	social	care	only,	and	deems	human	rights	groups,	as	well	as	
law	and	constitutional	awareness	organizations,	“political	parties.”21
3. A Leap of Faith: Citizen Philanthropy and an Interfaith Movement   
Faith-based giving has always been central to the Egyptian philanthropic realm, but starting 2011, it witnessed 
a leap. While it is difficult to estimate if this leap was in the quantity of giving since no data is available; it 
appears to be based on the renewed centrality of mosques and churches in addressing needs in the community 
and providing humanitarian aid during a time of economic hardship for most citizens. A rewind to the period 
preceding the Revolution is instructive in that regard. A survey conducted by Marwa El Daly in 2006 at the Center 
for Development Services (CDS)22 confirms the relevance of religious giving in Egyptian society by revealing that 
the motive behind philanthropic giving for 45.8% of the respondents was to fulfill religious duties, followed very 
closely by 45.5% who said it was a way of being closer to God.  This same survey revealed that 62% of respondents 
had made some sort of contribution to charity (other than mosque or church donations), while 38% had not made 
any contribution.  The main form of charitable giving was in the form of cash donations, while volunteerism 
emerged as the smallest form of contribution. It should be noted, however, that statistics on volunteerism are 
likely to be underestimated, as respondents may find it difficult to account for informal forms of volunteering 
such as taking care of an elderly family member or helping a neighbor.
While mosques and churches have always been involved in the mobilization of resources and giving; their role was 
unleashed during and after the intense days of the Revolution. This came hand in hand with an interfaith citizen 
movement that called for solidarity of all Egyptians irrespective of religion to bring down autocracy and build an 
Egypt where citizens enjoy equal rights. With the Muslim Brotherhood coming into power this movement has been 
challenged and is currently undergoing a dialectic battle over definitions of full citizenship in the constitution and the 
role of religion in the new Egypt. The outcome of this dialectic is yet to be determined. 
A review of the intense days of the Revolution and the protests that followed present an example of the kind 
of role that can be played by religious institutions in citizen-led philanthropy. Al Qaed Ibrahim mosque in 
Alexandria,	Omar	Makram	mosque	 in	Cairo,	Martyrs’	mosque	 in	Suez	were	 all	 centers	 for	humanitarian	 aid	
as	clashes	broke	out	in	the	areas	surrounding	them.	Make	–shift	hospitals	were	established	within	to	provide	
assistance to wounded protestors. As needs for assistance intensified, there was a rise in the mobilization of 
resources to those mosques. Social media and word-of-mouth were the main means of passing on requests for 
money, medicine and food. The flow of funds to the Omar Makram mosque was so much at one point that it was 
suggested to allocate the funds to other areas. In a recent report (April 2012) by the Arab Center for Research 
and Policy Studies on the role of religion in the Revolution, 23the	author	describes	how	“Egyptian	mosques,	as	is	
the	case	now	in	Syria	and	earlier	in	Yemen,	were	places	for	organization	and	mobilization”	for	the	“disaffected	
20	 Yaroslav	Trofimov,	“Egypt	Opposes	U.S.’s	Democracy	Funding,”	Wall	Street	Journal,	June	14,	2011.	http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
10001424052702304665904576383123301579668.html
21	 “Draft	 NGOs	 bill	 ‘more	 repressive’	 than	 Mubarak	 era	 law:	 CIHRS,”	 Ahram	 Online,	 Feb	 7,	 2013.	 http://english.ahram.org.eg/
NewsContent/1/64/64268/Egypt/Politics-/Draft-NGOs-bill-more-repressive-than-Mubarak-era-l.aspx
22	 El	Daly,	Marwa.	Philanthropy	in	Egypt:	A	Comprehensive	Study	on	Local	Philanthropy	in	Egypt	and	Potentials	of	Directing	Giving		and	
Volunteering	towards	Development.	Cairo:	Center	for	Development	Services,	2006.
23	 Al-Anani,	Khalil.	 “The	Role	of	Religion	 in	 the	Public	Domain	 in	Egypt	after	 the	 January	25	Revolution.”	Qatar:	Arab	Center	 for	
Research	and	Policy	Studies.	April	2012.
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and	angry,	places	to	assemble	and	protest”	against	the	regime.	To	mobilize	the	“silent	masses,”	Friday	prayers	were	
used as an incentive to get people to midans and squares around the country. As hundreds, sometimes thousands 
gathered for Friday prayers, a unique solidarity was born that extended beyond prayers to keep the revolutionary 
fervor alive with some, and ignite it with many others. 
The centrality and significance of mosques emanate from their historical context, linking past to present. The Omar 
Makram mosque is named after an Egyptian national leader; Omar Makram (1750-1822) who fought against the 
French and who along with other Azhar scholars helped catapult Mohammed Ali to power in 1805. The Al Qaed 
Ibrahim mosque in Alexandria is named after Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mohammed Ali; it was built to mark the centenary 
of his death in 1948. Both mosques, thus, encompass within their walls a history of change and rebellion; the Revolution 
provided an opportunity for the revival of that role.  
As Friday prayers ignited revolutionary solidarity, so did Coptic churches hymn to the Revolution. In Shobra wherein 
the population is mostly Coptic (Ibrahim 2003), the Church of the Virgin Mary and the Archangel Michael played 
key roles in aiding families financially affected by the Revolution. The Church of the Virgin Mary and the Archangel 
Michael are responsible for Khalafawy, Mamalik Square and Ezzbet Al Nakhl areas. Most of the people carrying out 
philanthropic activities are volunteers who apply the concept of Ushur to their time as well as their wealth. The funds 
used comprise mainly of Ushur and the contributions of the church members geared towards certain causes. The funder 
and the final receiver are never made known to one-another. 
There is a wide realm of ongoing activities that the church carries out. These activities include helping the poor with 
their basic needs including clothing, shelter and food. In most cases, the beneficiaries are not given monetary aid but 
substance aid to ensure that the funds are geared towards their intended cause. In the case of clothing, church members 
donate their old clothes that are in good shape. The church also has a network of doctors that offer subsidized services 
for the poor. In addition, the church has established a medical center that has a wide range of clinics and offers services 
at a subsidized rate. The medical center is open to all people irrespective of their religion.
According to Father Fahim, the philanthropic practices of the church have not undergone significant changes post the 
revolution. The only significant change is that the number of people out of jobs has grown which requires more support 
from the church to the families in need. 
Both Orthodox and Evangelical churches carry out philanthropy and respond to humanitarian needs. Kasr Al Dubbara 
church is the most famous Evangelical church in Egypt partly because it has the highest number of Evangelist (protestant) 
church goers and partly because of its location near Tahrir Square and its role during the revolution. During the 
protests, Kasr Al Dubara church opened its doors to create a major field hospital to help the injured regardless of their 
religion or political affiliation. It also encouraged its youth to join the demonstrations, as opposed to the more reluctant 
Orthodox Church.  It also hosted prayer groups to pray for the country open for all Egyptians to promote a culture of 
understanding and religious tolerance.
3.1. Institutionalized Philanthropy and Mixed Responses  
Private institutional philanthropy had a growth spurt in the period from 2000 until the revolution. Most family and 
corporate foundations were founded during that period, which coincided with an economic growth spurt in the country 
that largely benefited its wealthiest citizens. Perhaps because of their relative newness, these organizations did not 
respond with the same fervor as other citizen groups to opportunities following the 2011 revolution. There were a few 
exceptions that demonstrated a shift in focus and geographic scope. Nevertheless, while some attempted to be responsive 
to the tides of change, others lagged behind as will be seen below.  
A number of trends are worth noting. A temporary shift from strategic programmatic philanthropy to humanitarian 
aid was witnessed; four out of the nine interviewed organizations affirmed that it was imperative to shift some of 
their focus and energy towards short-term charitable activities to fulfill the growing needs of the Egyptian people, 
in addition to maintaining their long-term development activities. Another trend was starting new programs to meet 
escalating needs on the ground. Those programs may not be sustained in the long term but were essential at the time. 
The Egyptian Food Bank, for example, established a program targeting workers in the months following the start of 
the revolution through which daily meals were packaged for workers whose livelihoods were adversely impacted by 
Egypt’s	economic	instability.
We found that some of the more established foundations in Cairo felt little need to alter their programs. Their stance 
was that targeted program strategies had developed over many years and they had expertise in specific sectors. This made 
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it difficult to alter their expenditures and activities during sudden and unexpected changes to the country.  Other 
foundations noted that their revenues had been reduced significantly because of economic contraction, making it 
harder to initiate new programs or respond to increased needs. Many in the sector refute the notion that they should 
fill the void left by inadequate state programs, arguing that post-revolution we should expect greater efficiency and 
accountability from governmental service-providers.
Conversely, we found among many of the newer and smaller organizations, especially those with a community focus, a keen sense of 
their obligation to do more and to reach more beneficiaries due to the conditions following January 25th. They believe that one of the 
finest outcomes of the revolution was the unleashing of citizen passion and talent directed toward social change within Egypt. 
Against that background, the following section features illustrative examples of how some foundations reacted to the 
political, social and economic changes that emerged during the Revolution and post-Mubarak. By exploring how those 
organizations responded to shifts in the environment within which they exist, the attempt is to throw light on the 
“mixed	responses”	of	the	sector	and	what	that	means	going	forward.	
3.1.1. The Sawiris Foundation for Social Development and Going beyond the Center
For the past 10 years, the Sawiris Foundation for Social Development (SFSD), a family foundation established by the 
Sawiris family in 2001, has launched hundreds of initiatives and projects in 24 governorates with a fund of around 
EGP	400	million,	all	of	which	was	directed	to	the	foundation’s	six	key	fields:	Training	for	Employment,	Health,	
Community Development, Microcredit, Scholarships and Cultural Awards. In the period following January 25, 2011, 
the Foundation did not alter its scope of work but used its ongoing and solidified scope to address issues that resulted 
from	 the	 “Arab	 Spring.”	Geographically,	 the	 Foundation	 extended	 its	 programs	 beyond	 the	 centers	 of	Cairo	 and	
Alexandria, areas that continue to have escalating needs, yet receive inadequate attention by funders. 
In response to rapid shifts in the region, SFSD has initiated a 2-year project to facilitate sustainable economic 
reintegration for Libya returnee Egyptian migrant workers and their family members. The project will provide 735 
Libya returnee Egyptians with necessary small-scale entrepreneurship training and loans in Sohag. 
Moreover, in light of the economic slowdown facing Egypt, SFSD partnered with the UNDP, the Rockefeller Brothers 
Fund (RBF), the United Nations for Women, and the British Department for International Development to implement 
a range of development projects in Upper Egypt. SFSD has contributed 27.6% (7.8 million EGP) of the total funds 
of the project to the rural development and off-farm employment component. SFSD Executive Director, Dr. Gannat 
El	Samalouty	stated	that	by	the	end	of	the	project	there	will	be	“more	than	1,000	young	men	and	women	trained	
and well-informed about different aspects of sustainable agricultural and rural development and ready to share their 
experiences	and	acquired	knowledge	with	at	least	2,000	other	farmers	in	their	communities.”	
The Foundation has also been quite proactive in consolidate its projects and programs in targeted sectors like health 
and education. The Gouna Technical Nursing Institute is one of its milestone projects in collaboration with faculty 
from the Lawrence Memorial/Regis College Nursing Program, USA. It was inaugurated in 2010 to provide excellence 
in nursing education and graduates are committed to working in an Egyptian hospital for two years after graduation. 
In 2010 and in Suez, the Foundation and the National Committee for the Control of Viral Hepatitis (NCCVH) of 
the Ministry of Health signed an agreement to establish a viral hepatitis center in the Suez Fever Hospital to improve 
the delivery of viral hepatitis prevention and treatment. The center started its services in 2012 and has been carrying 
out awareness programs about prevention methods. 
On	education,	SFSD	believes	that	investment	today	in	Egypt’s	talented	youth	will	produce	future	leaders	and	innovators,	
who will contribute to its sustainable development. To ensure that students of merit have a unique opportunity to pursue 
higher education in reputable institutions, SFSD offers a variety of scholarships including International, National and 
Specific scholarship programs. As of 2013, 422 scholarships from the three categories have been awarded, with a total 
budget	of	almost	LE	70	million.	This	comprises	19%	of	the	Foundation’s	portfolio	for	more	than	a	decade.
Most recently, in February 2013, the Foundation signed an agreement with UNICEF to establish 120 child-friendly 
community schools in the rural Upper districts of Assiut and Sohag. SFSD leadership gift of $2,250,000 USD 
(14,490,000	EGP)	over	4	years	(2013–2016)	will	help	ensure	the	most	marginalized	children	(about	3600	children)	
receive	a	quality	primary	education.	The	“Schools	 for	Egypt”	project	will	 also	develop	training	programs	for	300	
teachers and supervisors in addition to the ministry of education staff.
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3.1.2. Mansour Foundation for Development (MFD): Evidence-based Action and Transnational Philanthropy
A corporate foundation established in 2001, Mansour Foundation for Development espouses a think-forward 
approach	to	development	by	contributing	to	the	“welfare	and	socio-economic	development	of	the	Egyptian	society.”	
Two	main	 shifts	 took	place	 in	 the	 foundation’s	 strategies	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	Revolution;	 a	 geographic	 expansion	of	
its philanthropy (outside the center in Egypt, and transnationally to other transitioning countries like Libya) 
as well as an expansion in its knowledge ownership to allow for informed and evidence-based interventions 
in the areas within which they operate. 
During and after the intense days of the Revolution, MFD demonstrated responsibility in a twofold capacity; as an 
institution, on the one hand, and as individuals, on the other. The five main staff members voluntarily took a 25% salary 
cut in the six months following the revolution in order to stretch the resources of the foundation further and ensure the 
sustainability of its activities.  It is noteworthy that they did so voluntarily and without any indication from management 
that	 the	 foundation’s	 budget	would	be	 affected	 in	 any	way	 -	 in	 fact,	 until	 the	 time	of	publication,	 the	budget	of	 the	
foundation has not been reduced, even though company profits were cut. This decision emanated from the staff members 
themselves who felt it was their social responsibility to contribute financially at a time of great financial struggle.
MFD witnessed a shift towards humanitarian aid immediately following the start of the Revolution.  It contributed funds to 
the treatment of 25 critically injured citizens as well as supported some of the families of the martyrs who died in clashes with 
state security during the first 18 days of the revolution. In their aim to be strategic in their giving, the Mansour Foundation 
for Development also began supporting the Egyptian Eye Hospital to help them improve their services to all patients.
MFD’s	 team	 invested	 time	 and	 effort	 to	 understand	 the	 needs	 of	 protestors	 in	 Tahrir	 and	 based	 on	 their	 field	
research, they have tailored specific assistance packages to some of those injured in the revolution. They have also built 
communication	bridges	with	the	youth	and	have	engaged	them	in	their	activities	as	volunteers.	MFD’s	philanthropy	
also extended to Libya. During the Libyan Revolution, the foundation provided humanitarian aid that amounted to 
150 tons of supplies to 15000 refugees stranded in the Libyan city of Mossad, in addition to sponsoring a medical 
unit to work in the Misrata hospital.
More recently, in addition to the inauguration of Alziniya medical unit in Luxor in collaboration with USAID; 
and	the	ongoing	program	“hand	on	hand”	which	targets	disabled	athletics	children	in	Alexandria	and	unprivileged	
children	 in	Siwa,”	 it	 launched	an	 innovative	human	rights-based	illiteracy	eradication	program	in	Alexandria	and	
Marsa Matrouh soon to be expanded to other governorates, as well as develop a kit to allow the program to be 
replicated by others. It is significant that the program has benefited from the volunteerism of over 100 youth in both 
Alexandria and Marsa Matrouh.
3.1.3. Waqfeyat El Maadi Community Foundation (WMCF): Leading Waqf to the Future 
The	“Arab	Spring”	created	a	 fertile	 environment	 for	new	 ideas	 to	emerge	and	a	paradigmatic	 shift	 in	practices	of	
philanthropy from the philanthropy of old to innovating and thinking-out-of-the-box. Established in 2007, Waqfeyat 
al Maadi was set up to revive and modernize the institution of Waqf within the Egyptian society.  WMCF serves the 
area of Maadi and Helwan as well as its surrounding dwellings through the mobilization of strategic philanthropy 
with the vision of contributing to social change and social justice. WCMF has evolved since its inception from a 
flagship organization promoting Waqf to a fully integrated community foundation that embodies the spirit of the 
Maadi/Helwan area as well as reflects the needs of the community and the pulse of the street. The foundation has 
been active since the 25th January revolution in mobilizing funds along with lobbying on behalf of the families of 
the martyrs as well as those injured from the area. It also organizes political awareness workshops for community 
members to raise awareness about the parliamentary elections.
The foundation has a number of key programs. The first is on capacity building for civil society organizations, 
training for philanthropists and corporate social responsibility as well as beneficiaries on topics such as financial 
sustainability and strategic philanthropy. The second aims at establishing endowments or income-generating projects 
to empower people forever. The third offers grants to civil society organizations to start small and micro projects 
targeting charity-dependent beneficiaries. 
During the 18 days, the Foundation took it upon itself to become the hub for different groups to meet in a safe and open 
space	to	communicate	and	discuss	issues	around	the	revolution	and	the	way	forward.		Such	groups	included	the	“people’s	
committees”	(ligaan	sha3beyya)	that	were	formed	to	protect	the	streets	of	the	suburb	of	Maadi	and	its	neighboring	areas	
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during the most tenuous days of the Revolution.  Additionally, the foundation has hosted the families of martyrs and 
assisted them in lobbying for their rights and organized events to celebrate their lives and achievements.
3.1.4. The Alexandria Trust: Building Informed Citizenship 
Founded in 2011 by Egyptian businessman and philanthropist Salah Khalil as a direct response to the January 25 
Revolution, the foundation aims at developing a new generation of citizens across the Arab world who can serve as 
active and informed participants in their societies. In order to fulfill its vision, the trust offers access to outstanding 
teaching and thinking in the social sciences and humanities. Projects in scholarship and teaching, translation, media 
coverage of education, and new educational technologies are incubated.
The	potential	role	of	the	media	according	to	the	Trust	is	one	where	“the	media	plays	a	very	big	role	in	disseminating	
the need and benefits of philanthropy. If we are to affect a culture shift in philanthropic giving and thinking in the 
Arab	World,	the	media	will	be	a	key	driver	of	change	and	opinion.”	To	enhance	responsible	journalism,	it	launched	
a number of projects that are aimed at fostering independent journalism to provide balanced and accurate coverage 
of higher education, and to encourage a new generation of journalists who can influence key decision-makers; 
encouraging philanthropic investments in higher education, with the aim of fostering a fully developed, family- and 
philanthropist-centered system of support; in addition to using educational technology to bring both content and 
reach to the challenge of reform in higher education.
Furthermore, the Trust works in a variety of other areas such as mobilizing talent through juried prizes and 
opportunities	for	new	scholarship	in	the	social	sciences	(the	‘Mouseion	Prizes’)	as	well	as	transforming	training	and	
support for teachers, at university and secondary levels, so that pedagogy moves beyond didactic modes of instruction 
to more collaborative, learner-centered approaches. Furthermore, they maximize access to top quality content in the 
social sciences and humanities through translations into Arabic of seminal texts, and by ensuring that we reach into 
communities not well served by education services.
3.1.5. Educate-Me: An Education Initiative
Educate-Me is an initiative founded and run by several young entrepreneurs including Yasmine Helal and Amr 
El Salanekly. Educate-Me is a registered Egyptian Non Profit Foundation that strives to redefine Education via 
“[creating]	an	educational	approach	that	would	extract	the	hidden	potentials	of	children	without	depriving	them	
from	living	and	experiencing	their	childhood	to	the	fullest.”
“Educate-Me	belongs	to	the	school	of	thought	of	Sir	Ken	Robinson,	John	Holt	and	Albert	Einstein;	who	all	believed	
that children are naturally born learners who can best learn through indulging their curiosities. That development 
is not about memorizing curricula and scoring in standardized assessments; but rather about being able to fulfill 
your own dreams and aspirations and live the life you want, which only happens when you are given the very simple 
opportunity	to	choose.”
The	 organization	 currently	 serves	 children	 aged	 between	 six	 and	 thirteen	 years	 old	 residing	 an	 area	 called	 “El	
Konayessa,”	an	underprivileged	area	at	the	outskirts	of	Giza.	Since	its	inception	in	June	2010,	the	organization	has	
served 200 children in the age group mentioned. The activities of Educate-Me include providing financial support 
to children who cannot afford their formal education in order for them to attain. The support includes tuition 
fees as well as any necessary gadgets. They also offer a non-formal educational program that encourages creative, 
independent thinking in addition to the establishment of community development centers in the areas where they 
operate to serve the community as a whole. 
3.1.6. Nebny Foundation: Youth-Led and Targeting Philanthropy    
An example of youth-led and targeting philanthropy that found its starting point in the Revolution is Nebny 
Foundation, an independent foundation registered in 2011. Through a youth-led, locally driven approach, Nebny 
aims	at	promoting,	educating,	enabling,	and	empowering	youth	to	actively	participate	in	shaping	Egypt’s	economy.	
Its	approach	responds	to	“current	needs	of	Egypt’s	economy	and	youth	by	creating	employment	opportunities	and	
will	be	complemented	by	sustainable	mechanisms	for	 long-term	economic	growth”	as	mentions	the	foundation’s	
mission. The founding members of Nebny Foundation came together after forming strong friendship bonds in 
Tahrir Square during the 18 days of the revolution. Currently, the foundation has over 15,000 members on Facebook 
and continues to utilize social media to recruit volunteers for the events it organizes.
Dr. Mohamed Kenawy, of the newly established Nebny Foundation, noted that while they prefer to establish 
development programs it was also imperative to conduct some immediate charitable activities to win the trust of 
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community members. This led to a project for collecting, cleaning and selling clothes in the informal area of Manshiet 
Nasser. It met an expressed need of the community they operate within and they felt it right to respond in this way.
The	foundation’s	main	activities	were	initiated	as	a	reaction	to	the	Jan	25	Revolution.	A	three-day	festival,	“Egypt	Now,”	
to commemorate the revolution and stimulate tourism was organized.  The main objective for Egypt Now festival was 
to	create	an	event	that	captured	Egypt’s	essence	-	youth	for	freedom-	and	invite	the	world	to	support	Egypt	2011.	In	
addition,	the	festival	was	 intended	to	provide	an	example	to	the	world’s	developing	countries	 in	hope	that	 it	would	
turn	to	a	yearly	global	event.	The	foundation’s	choice	of	initiative	was	a	reaction	to	a	faltering	vital	sector,	tourism	that	
contributed to as much as 11% of the GDP back in 2010. As per the World Bank, an estimate of 14.5 million tourists 
entered the country in 2010 compared to a drop by an average of 30 - 45% during 2011 as per various governmental 
and industry-specific reports. According to Hossam Arafat, head of the Chamber of Tourism Companies, around 3 
million workers are employed in the tourism sector, a rough 13% of the job market; of whom 50% were laid off after the 
Revolution. The drop in the tourism sector coupled with an increasing unemployment rate has rung a worrying bell for 
the founders of Nebny who decided to react to the situation.
The	foundation’s	other	activity	is	the	creation	of	the	Center	for	Entrepreneurship	(C4E),	a	platform	for	the	launch	
and growth of early stage business in Egypt. C4E will mine, screen and select business ideas and will provide an array 
of services to entrepreneurs that will help them launch the right products to the right market/people using the right 
economical approaches and techniques.
3.2. Youth, Informal Philanthropy and the Egyptian Awakening  
The last three years witnessed a surge in the number as well as visibility of informal philanthropic initiatives within 
Egyptian society.  During the two years leading up to the Revolution, informal philanthropic initiatives started to 
gain momentum and spread, especially through social media and the internet. The first 18 days of the revolution 
witnessed the culmination of these informal initiatives, as a myriad of services emerged in Tahrir and other public sites of 
demonstration. Those initiatives continued to grow steadily post Mubarak. Given the popularity of internet and mobile-
driven social media access, one of the most prevalent forms of informal philanthropy in this period was the collection of 
donations through SMS, e-mail, Facebook and/or Twitter campaigns circulated amongst friends, family members and, 
anyone with access to social media via a smartphone or an internet-ready computer. 
The causes that trigger these donation campaigns have run the gamut, ranging from urgent need for specific blood types 
for the sick or wounded or financial contributions for operations and medicine for those in need to the less urgent, but 
nonetheless pervasive calls for contributions for engaged couples in need of financial assistance in order to prepare for 
the financial burdens of marriage.  In most cases, one contact person is listed at the end of the message and the money 
is managed and channeled through this individual. 
Examples of these informal philanthropy initiatives abound across the social media sphere, but perhaps the most 
prominent was an e-mail that was circulated to raise funds for political activist, Ahmed Harrara, who was injured and 
eventually lost both eyes - first during the 18 days of the revolution, and then in November 2011 in renewed clashes 
with	the	police.		The	e-mail	and	messages	on	social	media	sites	were	circulated	following	Harrara’s	second	injury	urging	
people to contribute towards financing a trip to Germany in order for him to receive medical care. The speed at which the 
information was disseminated and donations flooded in is due, in large part, to the virtual network that is made possible 
by	the	internet	–	effectively	creating	a	community	that	extends	far	beyond	the	boundaries	of	geography	and	allows	for	
a larger net to be cast.  But, this is also a network that is reliant on the consistency and availability of the technology. 
What happens when that access is denied or thwarted?
During the three days of the revolution in January, the Egyptian government cut off all Internet and mobile phone 
access, essentially isolating Egyptians from each other and from the rest of the world.  For those three days, activity 
in these online and mobile-based informal philanthropy initiatives ceased, although some creative supporters abroad 
were able to transmit some messages sent out via landlines. Ironically, that period brought even more people out 
to demonstrate as they replaced face to face contact for the severed phone contact. Once the lines of communication 
were	restored,	however,	and	once	Egypt	was	 ‘back	online’,	news	of	the	realities	on	the	ground	galvanized	a	community	
effort	 on	 a	 national	 scale	 that	 spurred	 an	 increase	 in	 informal	 philanthropic	 initiatives	 –	 ranging	 from	 provision	
of food and blankets to demonstrators to assistance of the wounded to donation drives for funds or urgently 
needed supplies for make-shift hospitals across the country.
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As mentioned, the role played by social media in allowing for the widespread penetration of information at warp 
speed cannot be overlooked.  One of the most successful and popular initiatives included the development of @
TahrirSupplies, a Twitter application which allowed donors to know what supplies were needed and when and where 
volunteers would be collecting medical supplies, food and blankets to the protestors in Tahrir Square.  At the time, 
Egyptian security forces were making it difficult for people to reach Tahrir Square and donors found it appealing to 
drop off the supplies at convenient locations throughout the city while relying on the youth groups in charge of this 
initiative to take the supplies to the protestors and to those in need.  
In this past year, many more informal philanthropic initiatives were developed along the same lines, with one of 
the most recent being a website and Facebook page developed and updated by volunteer doctors to alert donors to 
missing medical supplies during the November 9th, 2011 Mohamed Mahmoud Street incidents. The result of this 
initiative was the delivery of an abundance of medical supplies, surgical kits, oxygen cylinders and other medical 
equipment that fulfilled, and in fact exceeded, the need.  As a result, the volunteer doctors took it upon themselves 
to count, classify and record all the donations, and once the clashes had ended they donated all the remaining 
supplies to the Egyptian Medicine Bank.
Perhaps the most striking informal philanthropic initiative that took place last year was led by a diverse group of individuals 
and CSOs who have taken upon themselves the task of facilitating the treatment of those injured during the first 18 days of 
the revolution.  E-mail and SMS campaigns were launched to collect funds locally and through the Egyptian Diaspora and to 
secure the volunteer support of doctors in countries like Austria and Germany.  Egyptians living in these countries volunteered 
to host and mediate the treatment of some of the most critical cases as a way to give back to Egypt. Likewise, funds have been 
established for long-term rehabilitation of the injured in Egypt and for support to their families if they were breadwinners.
Throughout	this	study,	we	solicited	the	opinions	of	institutionalized	philanthropy	organizations’	staff	members	with	
regard to their perceptions on the rise and proliferation of informal philanthropic activities.  A majority claim to 
have noticed that it is on the rise and that, overall, it is a healthy phenomenon.  However, some also cautioned that 
there tends to be a duplication of efforts due to the lack of coordination among the different informal philanthropic 
initiatives and that this is an issue that needs to be addressed.  One way that has been suggested to deal with this 
duplication of efforts is to set up an online national database that connects that in need to those with the willingness 
and resources to provide assistance.  A database would allow people to post and list their needs and, in turn, would 
match them up with informal philanthropy initiatives that are aiming to address those very needs.  It would also ideally 
allow for progress to be tracked and create a consolidated space where informal initiatives can be concretized and 
perhaps even transitioned towards a more formal paradigm.
Below are illustrative examples of key initiatives that were launched as a response to the Revolution:
TahrirSupplies
An online community established in 2011 on Twitter, TahrirSupplies was launched by a group of youth. Their mission 
is	to	“communicate	the	needs	of	the	field	hospitals	in	Tahrir	to	the	public	-	as	requested	on	Twitter	or	over	the	phone.	
With donor generosity and effort, field hospitals and their storage rooms have grown from ruins into some of the well-
equipped	field	hospitals.”	According	to	one	of	the	volunteers	interviewed	for	this	scan,	@TahrirSupplies	“…started	
as	one	person’s	idea,	and	grew	into	a	collective	initiative.	We	all	watched	what	was	happening	to	fellow	Egyptians	in	
Tahrir and felt the need to supply field hospitals in Tahrir with all the resources, medication, and help they needed. 
We also realized there were many unable to physically be physically there in Tahrir, but who were just as keen to help 
by	donating	their	time,	efforts	and	required	supplies.”		Therefore,	the	@TahrirSupplies	initiative	was	born.		
A collective effort based solely on the efforts of volunteers, the initiative was ever-present throughout the course of the 
first	15	months	of	the	uprising	on	Twitter	and	Facebook	as	a	focal	point	for	gathering	supplies	and	keeping	the	“plugged	
in”	population	informed	of	need	and	drop	off	stations	for	supplies.		The	initiative	aimed	to	provide	any	and	necessary	
supplies	to	hospitals	–	makeshift	or	formal	–	as	well	as	blankets,	food,	water,	etc.	to	protesters	who	were	camped	out	in	
Tahrir	Square.	The	objective	of	@TahrirSupplies	can	be	summed	up	in	this	one	quote	from	one	of	its	volunteers:	“In	
the wake of the revolution, our Egyptian society has become more aware of the power of the people. Power that lay in the 
ability	to	change	and	the	belief	that	one	person	can	make	a	difference.	It	has	awakend	the	philanthropist	in	all	of	us.”
As a team, TahrirSupplies has exerted endless efforts to try and ensure that the supplies that are in excess after all 
protests and sit-ins in Tahrir are over end up in the hands of Egyptians who deserve and need them the most. They have 
done this by being in constant contact with the doctors on the ground and others trying to familiarize ourselves with 
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what they plan on doing with the supplies in the future. They have also relayed to them some of the suggestions from 
users and volunteers and donors in the hope that they would take them into consideration.  The fact remains though, that 
@TahrirSupplies never had ownership over the supplies sent through donors to Tahrir.  Supplies, once bought, are owned 
by the donor and they continue to be owned by the donor until delivered to the field hospital in Tahrir where ownership 
is transferred to the volunteers there. TahrirSupplies feel morally obliged to constantly check that the supplies are in safe 
hands at all field hospitals as well as to constantly check that they will always serve a good cause and will not be tampered 
with or resold. TahrirSupplies have excelled in using online social media technology via Facebook and Twitter to solicit 
donations from citizens for supplies needed by make-shift field hospitals during the Revolution.
Egypt Negma: Diaspora Philanthropy Taking Ideas to Action 
Egypt Negma is a social Entrepreneurship and Mobilization organization, founded as a response to the Revolution and 
based in Boston, USA. The organization was established by seven Egyptian-American and Egyptian professionals from 
the Harvard and MIT community who got together and asked the simple question: What can we do to move ideas to 
action on the ground, for a brighter future for Egypt?  As they thought about the social and economic needs on the 
ground in Egypt, they realized the need for an organization that supports innovation in order to help spur job creation 
and create a social impact.  The founders did not want to focus exclusively on any one particular sector or industry, but 
rather to promote innovative and entrepreneurial projects that respond to broad social and economic needs in Egypt. 
The NEGMA Conference, and later NEGMA, Inc., became an outgrowth of this initiative.
NEGMA	seeks	to	identify	social	innovators	and	entrepreneurs	who	are	working	to	solve	some	of	Egypt’s	most	significant	
challenges.  To support this vision, the NEGMA Conference has been established to help translate ideas into action for a 
brighter future for Egypt. The NEGMA Conference will be an annual conference designed to bring together individuals 
who are making an impact in social and economic development for the purposes of Networking, Entrepreneurship, Growth, 
Mobilization, and Action (NEGMA). In 2011, NEGMA, Inc. was incorporated as a nonprofit to support this vision.
NEGMA was established to fill an important space in the emerging entrepreneurial landscape in Egypt.  By engaging 
members of the Egyptian Diaspora with innovators and entrepreneurs, NEGMA seeks to create a permanent space for 
exchange between the Diaspora community and Egyptian counterparts.  Further, by sponsoring an annual Conference in 
which 10 Finalists compete for resources to help launch into action, NEGMA seeks to create a community of innovators 
and entrepreneurs that will be part of the NEGMA Alumni Network.
The NEGMA Conference seeks to accomplish the following goals over a 2-day period: provide an opportunity for 
10 NEGMA project finalists from a range of sectors to gain professional feedback on their proposals through hands-
on working groups; provide opportunities to network with like-minded individuals and funders to move ideas to action; 
build partnerships between Egyptian and Diaspora organizations interested in creating impact through sustainable 
development in Egypt; provide awards for best project proposals which will be presented at the conference in the 
‘Impact	 Egypt!	Competition’;	 in	 addition	 to	 improve	 the	 skill	 sets	 through	 capacity-building	workshops.	The	NEGMA	
conference seeks to be a fun and interactive platform that brings bright ideas for sustainable development and social 
entrepreneurship in Egypt to the fore, and helps launch them.
NEGMA	seeks	to	identify	social	innovators	and	entrepreneurs	who	are	working	to	solve	some	of	Egypt’s	most	significant	
challenges.  To support this vision, the NEGMA Conference has been established to help translate ideas into action for a 
brighter future for Egypt. The NEGMA Conference will be an annual conference designed to bring together individuals 
who are making an impact in social and economic development for the purposes of Networking, Entrepreneurship, Growth, 
Mobilization, and Action (NEGMA). In 2011, NEGMA, Inc. was incorporated as a nonprofit to support this vision.
So far, NEGMA has relied on individual donations and corporate/organizational sponsorships of the conference. They are 
considering expanding this model in the years to come, but probably for the short term this base will continue to be the 
source of funding, especially if they are able to continue to put on a few successful fundraising events throughout the year 
to bring the community together and further explain the vision and mission of the NEGMA initiative and project.
Through an extensive network of partnerships, NEGMA has been able to support their work and, in fact, maintain that 
“our	partnerships	have	been	crucial	to	our	success.”
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4. Financing Philanthropy and Restrictions to the Sector 
4.1. Financial Models and the Question of Sustainability 
Private philanthropic organizations and CSOs are limited by both convention and law from innovating in the ways they 
leverage finance for their work. Bureaucratic measures imposed by the law greatly limit access to international grants or 
credit; all organizations must apply for a license in order to raise funds from the public inside Egypt (with the government 
taking a percentage of the funds collected, rising as high as 30%). At the same time these organizations are curbed in 
their ability to embark on income-generating activities to achieve financial sustainability and independence. Without 
a new financing model, an independent, vibrant and sustainable civil society will be difficult to sustain in Egypt.24 
Although access to local grants is subject to government permits and consequently cumbersome for Egyptian philanthropic 
organizations and CSOs to obtain, access to foreign grants is even more problematic.  It requires prior approval from 
authorities and delays in receiving approval often extend over several months.  This is due to a regulatory framework that 
has	blocked	traditional	and	sustainable	means	of	giving.	Nonetheless,	as	estimated	by	Egypt’s	Center	for	Development	
Services, Egyptians still donate at least $1 billion to public causes annually. This could prove to be a strong force if 
directed strategically toward development and human rights organizations. However, the vast majority of these funds are 
currently channeled through charity and relief agencies connected to mosques or churches. Relief aid will always have an 
important place, but healthy philanthropic sectors are generally those where a balance in objectives is reached.
The Egyptian foundations interviewed for this scan showed great diversity in their financial models.  Despite 
the fact that all the surveyed foundations engage in some forms of grant making25, they work according to 
varying financial models depending on the type of organization and its mission. The most common financial 
models we found include:
•	 Family Endowment
 » Example: Sawiris Foundation for Social Development began in 2011 through an endowment by the Sawiris 
family members who make up the board of trustees for the foundation.  The foundation issues grants to 
encourage employment in Egypt. In 2012, grants totaled EGP 400 million. 
•	 Corporate percentage of Profit
 » Example: Mansour Foundation for Development operates through transfer of a varying percentage of their yearly 
profit.  Although in the past they mainly provided grants to NGOs to implement their activities, in recent years they 
have shifted to operating their own projects while providing mini grants for technical assistance to partner NGOs. 
•	 Ongoing Fundraising from the Public
 » The Egyptian Food Bank relies on year-round fundraising from the public to provide grants to NGOs to 
distribute and package their food to be delivered to the poor throughout the country.  So far they have reached 
approximately 17 million low-income Egyptians.
 » @TahrirSupplies relied solely on spontaneous funding from individuals either in cash or through donation of supplies.
•	 Ongoing Fundraising from the Private Sector
 » Nebny Foundation is the only operating foundation covered in this scan and it mainly raises support from the 
private sector to implement its activities. 
 » People’s	Development	Foundation	also	relies	on	private	sector	contributions	for	its	charity	work,	including	
Ramadan food bags as well as prepared lunch initiative.
 » NEGMA, because it operates in Diaspora, can host fundraising and networking events throughout the year to 
help support its programs and annual conference.
•	 Board of Trustees Contributions
 » The	Egyptian	Food	Bank	and	Injaz	rely	on	their	Board	of	Trustees’	contributions	to	cover	operational	costs	as	well	as	its	
advertising.		The	Board	of	Trustees	cover	these	contributions	as	part	of	their	company’s	and	their	personal	social	responsibility.
24	 This	section	is	based	on	information	contained	in	the	article	How	Can	the	U.S.	and	International	Finance	Institutions	Best	Engage	
Egypt’s	Civil	Society?	–	The	Brookings	Institution	–	written	by	Ehaab	Abdou	(Co-founder,	Nahdet	El	Mahrousa	&	the	Federation	of	
Egyptian	 Youth	NGOs),	Noha	Hussein	 (Director,	 Education	 Programs,	 Save	 the	 Children,	Washington	DC),	Mona	 Atia	 (Assistant	
Professor,	Geography	and	 International	Affairs,	George	Washington	University),	Homi	Kharas	 (Deputy	Director	and	Senior	Fellow,	
Global	Economy	and	Development,	Brookings	 Institution),	Amira	Maaty	 (Program	Officer,	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	 (MENA),	
National	Endowment	for	Democracy)	-	June	2011.
25	 Nebny	Foundation	is	not	yet	a	grant	making	foundation	as	its	still	in	its	inception	phase,	however	they	aim	to	move	to	grant	making	
in	the	coming	years.
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•	 Individual Endowments
 » Waqfeyat	 el	 Maadi	 Community	 Foundation	 relies	 on	 creative	 funding	 mechanisms,	 including	 ‘individual	
endowments’	to	set	up	income	generating	projects	that	empower	disadvantaged	populations.		The	foundation	
markets	different	forms	of	individual	endowments	including:	donor-advised	funds	in	the	endower’s	or	a	beloved’s	
name (minimum endowment of LE 50,000), individual grants to CSOs (a minimum of LE 6,000)- this grant 
is allocated as a revolving loan fund in the local CSO and is monitored closely by the foundation.  Collective 
Community funds invite a group of philanthropists to donate any amount of money to be placed in collective 
funds each at a value of LE 11,000.  This fund will be distributed in the form of grants to CSOs to revolve as 
income-generating funds for single mothers supporting orphans and as assistance to poor families.
 » People’s	Development	Foundation	has	set	up	a	micro-financing	unit	through	an	endowment	established	by	one	
of	its	board	members.	The	foundation’s	goal	is	to	expand	their	endowment	fund	in	the	coming	years.
 » The Alexandria Trust is presently exclusively funded and supported by its founder, philanthropist Salah Khalil. 
The Trust is actively soliciting other funding sources that will leverage his contributions.
In terms of financial sustainability, foundations that are based on Family Endowment and Corporate percentage of Profit 
models appear to be the most stable and the most institutionalized.  The remaining financial models mentioned above, 
despite achieving their goals, are faced with challenges.  Among these are the previously-mentioned regulations enforced 
by	the	Ministry	of	Social	Solidarity.	Public	donations	may	only	be	collected	seasonally	–	the	Egyptian	Food	Bank	has	
lobbied the Ministry for years to amend that law to allow for collection of donations to occur year-round.
The Waqfeyat El Maadi Community Foundation has also had to exert efforts to reintroduce and promote the endowment 
model after it essentially disappeared and lost its resonance within Egyptian society.  They have opened a new door for 
endowments to be made by Diaspora philanthropists but it continues to be challenging to institutionalize a legal means 
to	bring	these	funds	back	into	the	country	given	the	many	suspicions	around	‘foreign	funding’	of	NGOs	in	Egypt,	a	
problem that has only been exacerbated  in the post-revolution months.
The most recurring concern with regard to financing philanthropy and creating a sustainable funding model is the 
country’s	dire	economic	situation,	which	some	believe	has	caused	donors	to	give	less	than	they	would	have	in	the	
past.  Although funding from individual and corporate donors has not ceased, it has indeed slowed down, resulting 
in some foundations being unable to reach their funding goals for the year and many CSOs falling short of needed 
grants for their community work. 
The current political environment that saw political Islam emerge as a major force in the parliament is another oft-mentioned 
cause	of	concern.	Some	fear	that	new	legislation	will	be	introduced	to	create	a	‘House	of	Zakat’	(Beit	el	Zakat)	that	the	
public	will	be	forced	to	donate	their	funds	through,	a	kind	of	religious	‘tax’.	This	would	undermine	the	freedom	to	fund	
whatever initiatives they choose and decrease the funding sources for many secular and progressive organizations.  
Lastly, the ability of some foundations to access foreign funding has been constricted by fear of being attacked by 
the government and the media as part of the current wave of crackdowns and smear campaigns on CSOs and NGOs. 
Therefore, despite interest by external donors to support Egyptian society in its transition period, many CSOS have 
refrained from accepting any form of support to avoid potential political or legal battles. 
For example, a consortium of European and US foundations eager to work in partnership with CSOs beyond 
Egypt’s	 major	 cities	 had	 to	 shift	 the	 project	 to	 Tunisia	 in	 light	 of	 continued	 attacks	 by	 the	 SCAF-led	
government	on	‘foreign	funding’.
4.2. Restrictions to the Sector 
The constricted options for raising finance is negatively affecting the sustainability, strategic planning and expansion of 
philanthropic organizations and their CSOs counterparts operating in Egypt.  It has also created an unhealthy competition 
for funds between these two groups. Accountability shifts more toward the small pool of existing donors rather than 
residing with the beneficiary populations these groups are committed to serve. 
While the Egyptian uprising brought down the oppressive 30-year regime of Hosni Mubarak and has now achieved 
partial success in ending 60 years of military rule, it has also heralded a period of political strife and uncertainty that 
is impacting on investor confidence and citizen security. The past 20 months have resulted in greater instability, out-
migration of talented people, and concerns for the future. As a part of society, the philanthropic sector has been 
greatly affected by these challenges, including:
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•	 Social Challenges:
 » As a direct result of the uprising and ongoing revolution, a new layer of marginalized and underprivileged 
citizens	has	been	created	–	this	 includes	the	families	of	those	who	lost	their	 lives	during	the	more	violent	
days of the revolt, those injured or otherwise incapacitated due to violence and confrontation with police 
and security forces, as well as those day laborers who have suffered loss of income due to the cessation of 
employment opportunities.  These urgent circumstances have resulted in diverting philanthropic resources in a 
bid to respond to immediate needs, thus decreasing the resources available for more long-term and potentially 
sustainable programs and initiatives that may have been underway pre-revolution.
•	 Political Challenges:
 » In light of the unpredictability and volatility of the Egyptian political environment over past months, CSOs 
and the philanthropic sub-sector have found themselves in an uncertain state of legal limbo that affected 
productivity and the motivation to embark on new initiatives.  Although there is talk of amending the NGO 
law that governs the practice of philanthropy, there has yet to be any concrete information as to what these 
amendments may be and whether they stand to empower or curtail the development of civil society in Egypt 
in the years to come.
•	 Economic Challenges: 
 » As	Egypt’s	national	income,	spending	and	foreign	reserves	decrease	and	as	its	main	sources	of	income,	such	as	
tourism, continue to suffer, the average level of philanthropic and charitable giving is decreased.  Despite the 
fact that there are no confirmed statistics on this matter, there is overall anecdotal consensus among all those 
interviewed for this scan that the economy poses a huge challenge in the philanthropy realm, not only on the 
fundraising front but also on the delivery of targets to beneficiaries.
•	 Relationship Between Foundations (grantors) and CSOs (grantees):
 » Discussion with the foundations that offer grant support to CSOs revealed that in certain instances there is 
a dissonance in the understanding of roles and responsibilities between the two. The main point of confusion 
seems to be over the role Egyptian philanthropic organizations play as local grant makers. In many cases, these 
foundations need to better assert and explain their responsibility to provide transparent quality control over 
their grants as well as joining as partners in development.
 » It is somewhat worrisome to note that the Mansour Development Foundation and others have shifted away 
from grant making to mainly operating their own projects since 2009, having faced myriad challenges working 
with CSOs. The organization has opted, therefore, to take on the burden of implementing their own projects 
in order to ensure high quality and have chosen to offer partner CSOs mainly technical support to improve the 
quality of their work in the meantime.
•	 Individual Donor Fatigue: 
 » In the months following the start of the revolution a large number of initiatives were launched to collect 
money from individual donors for national projects, such as saving the economy, enabling a lesser 
dependence on foreign aid, building public universities, etc.  It was mentioned more than once in interviews 
that, although these projects are valid, they have appeared on the scene too abruptly and without proper 
preparation or planning. They often lack a clear financial target or strategy for fundraising.  This has 
proven to be distracting and an unsustainable method of funding innovation.  It would be helpful to 
produce some clear guidelines for the establishment of new funds, as well as a well-defined strategy for 
fundraising and sustaining these initiatives.
5. Conclusions
This scan of Egyptian philanthropic practices in the year following the January 25 Revolution has revealed that the 
philanthropic sector, while it struggles with challenges and obstacles, continues to be active and innovative at this 
critical	time	in	Egypt’s	history.		As	some	parts	of	institutionalized	philanthropy	have	been	transitioning	in	the	past	few	
years from a charitable role to a more strategic developmental one, it offers creative models of philanthropy worthy of 
emulation.  The sector is increasingly open to all strata of society, not just the wealthy. It reveals an increasing degree 
of flexibility and responsive to the needs of society, as new initiatives geared towards offsetting the negative impact of 
the revolution has emerged.
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The	Egyptian	philanthropic	sector,	like	most	other	sectors	in	Egypt,	is	currently	at	a	‘wait	and	see’	juncture	due	to	the	
confusing transitional period the country is contending with.  That being said, it is clear from the interviews conducted 
for	this	report	that	the	sector	is	ready	for	action	once	again	at	full	speed	once	the	‘dust	of	the	transitional	period’	settles.	
The hope within the near future that the economy will begin to stabilize, that an effective parliament will be in place, 
and that the laws governing CSOs will be amended in ways that are more enabling of the crucial work of civil society in 
the years to come. 
Ultimately, the hope and anticipation is that the transition period will move Egypt towards rebuilding a country that is 
more democratic, transparent and collaborative in nature and one in which institutions are able to ward off corruption. 
The philanthropic sector, as a critical component of civil society, is a major player in this journey towards democratization. 
This report has shown both the potential for a powerful local sector to emerge, as well as the obstacles in its way. 
New	legislation	to	ease	the	work	of	non-profit	associations	is	an	announced	priority	of	President	Mohamed	Morsi’s	
government.  Once that is in place, we expect that some of the currently restrained alliances between corporates, CSOs 
and foundations will have an opportunity to grow and flourish. With time, we also expect more robust partnerships 
between	CSOs,	foundations	and	government.	It	 is	only	through	the	true	collaboration	of	these	players	that	Egypt’s	
long-sought development can be achieved.   
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1. Introduction
In 2003, eight years before the breakout of the Revolution, former Libyan PM Mustafa Ahmed Ben Halim1 foresaw 
the downfall of Gaddafi. Ben Halim concluded his book Libya: The Emergence of a Nation and the Decline of a State 
2with an eloquent warning that there is no other way for the despotic regime but to respond to the will of the people 
and to quit maneuvers which were starting to backlash in its face: 
“I hope that the regime realizes that it has no choice but to reconcile and come to terms with the people and seek its 
protection. Peoples would always support their legitimate leaders but they would never ever defend their executioners.”3
Ben Halim ended his book with a quote by Caliph Omar Bin-Abdulaziz: 
“The people are lodging many complaints against you. Straighten up or quit. Salaam.”  
The	Gaddafi	regime,	however,	did	not	straighten	up	nor	resign.	It	was	ousted	and	the	‘straightening	up’	choice	has	now	
become in the hands of the free Libyan people who face a critical challenge underscored by Ben Halim: the need for a 
just legitimate leadership that represents the people. A more critical challenge is finding such leadership after decades 
of despotic rule. This would include the establishment of educational, constitutional and political institutions and 
parties which must all have an effective role in the democratic transition. Strictly speaking, the role civil society can 
play in state reconstruction must not go unheeded. 
This scan of the different philanthropic practices in Libya traces the historical roots of Libyan philanthropy and throws 
light on the status of civil society under Gaddafi. It then reviews the constant changes that occurred in civil society 
during the Revolution and delves into the revolutionary movement in relation to the civil society movement which 
produced several philanthropic foundations. The primary goal of these foundations was first to provide humanitarian 
aid to victims of the Revolution, then they grew into developmental foundations post Gaddafi. The study also touches 
on the pivotal role of youth and their views on the transitional period, and traces the beginnings and types of civil 
societies. It highlights philanthropic networking, presents a map of Libyan philanthropic foundations, explores 
philanthropic resources, and finally looks into the future of philanthropy in Libya as an outcome of the Revolution. 
2. Political Development in Post-Revolution Libya
The February 17 Revolution was an important landmark in the modern history of Libya. According to Dr. Abdul-
Hafeez	 al-Sallak,	 a	 founder	 of	Libya’s	National	Democratic	Movement,	 the	Revolution	was	 “an	 unexpected	 twist	
that	nobody	saw	coming.”	It	evolved	from	“a	peaceful	protest	against	an	armed	autocratic	regime”	crescendoing	into	
a	“tumultuous	storm	that	swept	turbulently	across	the	entire	country	and	ousted	the	regime	using	the	latter’s	only	
trump	card:	the	force	of	arms.”	The	origins	of	this	transformation	may	be	traced	back	to	the	set	of	political,	economic	
and social changes which have taken place in Libya throughout its history, from its establishment, to the Fatimid and 
Ottoman periods, then the Italian occupation and the monarchy era, ending with Gaddafi. In the study in hand, we shall 
focus on Libya under Gaddafi with a brief overview of the ensuing changes.
2.1. Libya under Gaddafi
In	1969,	Gaddafi	staged	a	coup	d’etat	and	overthrew	the	monarchy.	On	March	2,	1977,	he	dissolved	the	Republic	and	
proclaimed	the	Socialist	People’s	Libyan	Arab	Jamahiriya	(“state	of	the	masses”).	Gaddafi’s	idiosyncratic	Jamahiriya	
was	claimed	to	be	a	“direct	democracy,	governed	by	its	populace	through	local	popular	councils	and	communes	(named	
Basic	People’s	Congresses).	Geographically	 based	 congresses	were	 formed	 at	 the	 governorate,	municipal,	 and	 zone	
(lowest) levels where Libyans aged 18 and above, males and females, were brought together. The Libyan population 
was	divided	into	30,000	communes,	each	containing	100	men	and	women	living	in	the	same	district.	General	people’s	
congresses were held thrice a year.4 
Gaddafi used his pan-Arab anti-colonial nationalism to gain more power. In his first official speech, in September 
1969, Gaddafi attacked the old social system and called for a radical change in the social economic and political 
systems,	hence	breaking	loose	from	Libya’s	history	as	a	colonized	nation.	Gaddafi	decreed	that	Arabic	be	exclusively	
used in signage, tickets, cards, etc. Anyone looking to travel into Libya had to have their passport translated into 
1	 Born	 in	exile	 in	1921	 in	Alexandria,	Egypt	where	his	 father	sought	asylum	after	he	was	sentenced	 to	death	 for	his	activities	 in	
the	Libyan	national	movement.	He	was	appointed	by	Prince	Idris	as	Minister	of	Public	Works	in	the	semi-independent	Emirate	of	
Cyrenaica,	then	as	Minister	of	Transportation	in	Libya’s	first	government.	He	was	appointed	Prime	Minister	in	1954	until	1957	where	
he	resigned.	He	was	the	Private	Councilor	to	the	King	of	Libya	from	1957	to	1958.	He	has	been	living	abroad	since	1969.
2	 Ben	Halim,	Mustafa	Ahmed.	Libya:	Inbi’ath	Ummah	wa	Suqut	Dawlah,	Manshurat	al-Jamal,	Cologne,	Germany	(2003).
3	 Ibid,	p.	460.
4	 Al-Mashhad	al-Siyasi	al-Libi:	Su’ud	Quwa	Jadid	(The	Libyan	Political	Scene:	Rise	of	New	Powers).	Mogherbi,	Zahi	Bashir.	Al-Jazeera	
Center	for	Studies	(http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/EXERES/8653AABE-452B-4A42-A903-033DA048737F.htm).
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Arabic. A campaign was launched to acknowledge Arabic as a universal official language. Alcohol was banned under the 
Gaddafi	regime,	and	so	were	all	forms	of	entertainment	which	he	considered	as	‘pornographic’,	‘obscene’	or	‘indecent’.	
The Libyan Studies Center was established to write the history of Libya, depicting it as a cohesive nationalist pan-Arab 
Muslim society which fights against western imperialism.
The Gaddafi regime hailed socialism as the means to achieve social justice and apply Islamic teachings. Several 
symbolic actions were taken to gain a pan-Arab anti-imperialist image for Libya, such as canceling military agreements 
signed	with	the	UK	in	1953	and	the	USA	in	1954.	Also,	Gaddafi	called	for	an	all-out	jihad	to	“liberate	oppressed	
nations	all	over	the	world.”	He	declared	Islamic	jihad	to	retrieve	Palestine	as	a	“Muslim	duty.”	He	also	established	a	
jihad	fund	to	help	finance	armed	struggle	for	liberation,	maintaining	that	the	Palestinian	cause	is	“the	key	challenge	
to	the	integrity	of	Islam	and	the	Arab	World.”
In 1972, Gaddafi issued a law that banned political parties and ushered in an exercise of brutal and unremitting suppression 
as it made the formation of or affiliation to political parties an executable criminal act. In 1973, in the aftermath of 
the	declaration	of	the	Popular	Revolution,	hundreds	of	intellectuals	from	different	backgrounds—Islamist,	nationalist	
and	leftist—were	arrested.	The	political	scene	featured	only	state-run	organizations	such	as	the	Arab	Socialist	Union	
(ASU) and revolutionary committees, also known as the Basic Popular Congress (BPC). Mass arrests and executions 
of intellectuals and political activists within Libya and beyond continued in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s. 
Gaddafi first ridded of military dissidents in 1969, 1970 and 1975. Students suspected of opposing his regime were 
persecuted in 1967 and 1977. Anti-Gaddafi intellectuals were massively arrested in 1978. The 1980s were marked by 
extrajudicial assassinations abroad. In the first half of the 1990s, Gaddafi launched an armed campaign against Islamist 
militant groups and against the Muslim Brothers in 1998.5
2.2. The Political Scene in 2011
The Gaddafi regime continued its explicit crackdown on any attempts to create opposing political organizations 
as	expressed	in	Gaddafi’s	Green	Book—the	constitution	of	Gaddafi-era	Libya—in	which	he	sets	out	his	ideology	
and sums up his Third Universal Theory.
The rise of Saif-al-Islam Gaddafi and the calls he made in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century for economic, 
political and constitutional reforms created a schism in the opposition within Libya and abroad. Libyan opposition 
became divided into two parties: intellectuals and political activists from different backgrounds (Islamist, nationalist, 
leftist, liberal and secular) who called for making the best out of the present situation and striving to drive the regime 
to carry out economic, political and constitutional reforms; and another group of intellectuals and political activists who 
believed there was no hope in the existing regime and that the only way is to fight until its fall, but they did not set forth 
the way and time to do so. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, it became crystal clear that the regime was 
not serious in the reform discourse and that the ruling forces were adamantly holding on to their positions and would 
not accept any reforms. Many who attempted to communicate with the regime withdrew peacefully. This created a sense 
of disappointment, or rather despair among intellectuals and political activists regarding the future of Libya.
The February 17, 2011 Revolution took most analysts, decision makers, and political activists by surprise as it ushered 
in a new era, for a new young untraditional generation that is apt for using the tools of the Globalization, adopts a non-
exclusivist democratic discourse, willing to offer lives, and would spare no time or effort to turn discourse into practice.6
2.3. Political Development under the February 17 Revolution
On March 5, 2011 leaders of the Revolution met in Benghazi where they established the National Transitional Council 
of Libya. The newly formed council was made up of over 40 members representing all regions. The NTC was led by Judge 
Mustafa	Abdul	Jalil,	Muammar	Gaddafi’s	former	justice	minister	and	the	first	senior	official	to	have	announced	defection	
from the Gaddafi regime after tensions broke out. Born in Bayda7, Abdul Jalil was a pious honest man who strove for 
judicial independence under the Gaddafi rule. He was noted in news media for his strong stances against arbitrary arrests 
and	prolonged	detention	without	trial.	He	resigned	over	the	government’s	failure	to	release	300	political	prisoners	despite	
the fact that they have been acquitted by the courts in 2007. Abdul Hafiz Ghoga, a Libyan human rights lawyer and former 
president of al-Bir Charity Organization, was Vice Chairman and spokesman for the NTC in Benghazi. He was actively 
involved in legal representation for the families of those killed in the 1996 Abu Salim prison8 massacre in which Gaddafi 
5	 Ibid.
6	 Ibid.
7	 Capital	city	of	the	Jabal	al	Akhdar	District	in	eastern	Libya.
8	 Located	in	Tripoli
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forces killed 1200 political prisoners. The memory of the Abu Salim massacre provided a spark for the February 2011 
uprising	that	overthrew	Gaddafi.	The	arrest	of	a	leader	of	the	association	of	victims’	families	on	February	15	in	Benghazi	
led to protests that quickly spread when the government responded with force.
Opposition	forces	in	eastern	Libya—mainly	dissidents	and	overseas	exiles—joined	forces	to	form	a	new	leadership	
for the Revolution known as the Libyan Interim National Council. The Council formed military and judicial 
committees, and an executive board to act as an interim government for Libya led by Dr. Mahmoud Jibril, a US 
educated political scientist who was until last year the President of the Libyan Planning Council. Dr. Ali Tarhouni, 
former Libyan exile and Professor of Economics at Washington University in Seattle, was appointed Minister of 
Finance. Mahmoud Shammam, another exile who was educated and lived in the USA, was appointed Minister 
of Media and Communication. Seeking to develop a parliamentary framework, the Council brought together 
professionals, reformists, dissidents, Islamists, royalists and tribal figures. 
The social underpinnings of the Revolution were represented by Libyan youth below 30 years of age who marched 
in protests and formed the Voluntary Liberation Army which fought against the Gaddafi guerilla. They were trained 
by dissident soldiers and officers. Women played a proactive multi-faceted role in the resistance that included the 
production	of	documentaries	on	the	regime’s	brutality,	looking	after	children	and	the	wounded,	preparing	food	for	the	
combatants, and sewing up the independence flag.9 
3. The Regulation of Civil Society and Cooperation with the NTC 
The NTC promoted wide-ranging cooperation with CSOs, especially on the regulation of civil society. The Ministry 
of Culture and Civil Society held constant discussions with CSOs to develop a mechanism for registering the latter 
at the ad hoc local councils which represented the executive power in the different cities. Workshops were held in 
July 2011 to discuss a draft resolution concerning civil society in the transitional period until a new parliament was 
elected to enact a regulatory law for civil society. 
The Ministry of Culture and Civil Society seeks to organize training courses for civil society staff by national and 
international experts, or through the international bodies operating in Libya. They also plan to hold workshops 
on democracy, human rights, citizenship, and other concepts that would help shape up democracy in the Libyan 
society.	The	Ministry	attempts	to	use	the	headquarters	of	Colonel	Gaddafi’s	revolutionary	committee	as	training	
centers and forums for youths and civil organizations that would contribute greatly to city development. These 
state-funded centers will first be jointly run by civil organizations and the government, then state intervention will 
gradually disappear. The aim of these centers is to provide training and learning opportunities for youth and CSOs 
and to offer an integrated complex that is furnished with state-of-the-art technology. Such partnership between 
the state and civil society would support the democratic transition and boost community development to live up 
to	Libyans’	hopes	and	aspirations.10
Libyan Civil Society Development since the First Spark of Revolution
Civil	society	was	brought	to	life	in	Libya	in	March	2011,	after	the	eastern	area	escaped	Gaddafi’s	grip	and	the	creation	
of the National Transitional Council. Emerging CSOs principally supported revolutionary forces in eastern Libya, 
although they were unorganized and lacked a clear vision at the beginning. Libyans thought the Gaddafi regime would 
fall fast like Egypt and Tunisia. However, the persistence of the fighting which spanned a longer time than expected led 
CSOs in Benghazi to grow bigger and become more organized.   
Libya was thus introduced to CSOs, especially in liberated cities; first east in Bayda, Darna, Tobruk, Gubba and 
Ajdabiya, then west in Misrata. After the fall of Gaddafi, CSOs mushroomed across the country. Social development 
was the most wide-ranging outcome of the Libyan Revolution as Libya turned from a state that knew nothing of 
modern society into one that houses over 2000 CSOs only one year after the revolution.11
CSOs have played an undeniable role in the aftermath of the revolution. They helped rediscover the Libyan society, 
supported the internal and external fronts of the revolution, alleviated the grievances of war and proactively contributed 
to building a new Libya. Although Libya was only recently introduced to this concept, it managed to develop a dynamic 
civil society whose experiences surpassed its short-time existence. This is clearly manifested in the social development 
that occurred in Libya and the growth of its CSOs through philanthropy. 
9	 Ahmida,	Ali	Abdullatif.	The	National	Transitional	Council:	View	and	Challenges.	Aljazeera	Centre	for	Studies.
10	 Special	interview	with	Dr.	Attia	Ojali,	under-secretary	at	the	Ministry	of	Culture	of	the	NTC,	March	20,	2012.
11 Ibid.
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4. Philanthropy in Focus 
4.1. Philanthropy in Pre-Revolutionary Libya
Libya was first introduced to the Awqaf12 system, or religious endowments, after the Arab Conquest. Awqaf flourished 
during the Ottoman period spanning from 1551 to 1911 where a Waqf  was a key funding source for philanthropy. The 
main form of philanthropy and community service in general was the establishment of schools, sabeels13, hospitals and 
other charities. The endowment system was promoted by the Senussi Movement which was mainly founded on Senussi 
zaouias14; civil institutions whose agricultural endowments, according to Italian sources, amounted to 600,000 acres, 
and whose real estate returns in 1928 reached ITL 200,000.15
After the independence in 1951, Act No. 2 of 1957 was issued to regulate religious endowments in Benghazi. In 1963 
a decree was issued for Islamic zouais.16 
4.2. Philanthropy under Gaddafi
Gaddafi sought to control the mental state of the people through the state system and developed complex mechanisms 
to make this possible. His Green Book, which was an essential component of school curricula and the establishment 
of the World Center for Green Book Studies are a case in point. Gaddafi also used philanthropy and civil society 
to enforce his power and legitimacy nationally and internationally. In a 1994 paper, Rethinking the State: Genesis 
and	Structure	of	the	Bureaucratic	Field,	Pierre	Bourdieu	sees	the	modern	state	emerging	from	the	“culmination	of	a	
process	of	concentration	of	different	species	of	capital”	such	as	economic	capital,	informational	capital,	and	symbolic	
capital. Philanthropic foundations under Gaddafi fell under the symbolic capital category as he used them to polish 
his image. Despite violations within Libya, philanthropic foundations tried to promote their feigned advocacy of 
human rights and efforts to respond to the economic needs of the Libyan people in international conferences. 
In the 1990s Libya was subject to severe pressure for three reasons: first, the Lockerbie Crisis and the 1992 UN 
sanctions against Libya. Although these sanctions did not include a ban on oil exports, they led to the gradual 
decline of the oil industry for they banned the sale to Libya of pumps and other equipment used to load crude oil for 
shipments abroad. Secondly, oil prices went down, which meant less money. The third reason was the sudden rise in 
inflation rate which went from 42% in 1993 to 50% in 1994. 
Despite the depressing facts regarding the economic recession and in defiance of the rest of the world, Gaddafi 
developed projects such as the Great Man-Made River. The gap between the economic mismanagement and huge 
projects	has	quenched		people’s	expectations.	The	absence	of	social	justice	and	the	east-west	disputes	shook	Libya	to	
its core and deeply impacted it economically, socially, and politically.
Charities and civil society have played a political rather than a developmental role. Charity was derived from the 
state’s	 symbolic	 capital,	 especially	 under	 the	 leadership	of	Saif	 al-Islam	Gaddafi,	who	 emerged	 as	 an	 advocate	 of	
free market economy in coincidence with the establishment of the Gaddafi International Charity and Development 
Foundation (GICDF), known as GIFCA, which later had subsidiary societies. 
Civil society, however, became a political football that Saif al-Islam used to gain more power and popularity. GIFCA 
had minimal impacts in actual life through some charity work. In 2000, Saif al-Islam mediated release of western 
hostages held by the Abu Sayyaf Islamist radical group in the Philippines. In addition to charity, Saif-al-Islam 
founded	the	One-Nine	group—a	private	sector	conglomerate.	Hence,	charity	was	politicized	and	became	part	of	the	
symbolic capital used by the regime to tighten its grip on the country. Philanthropy had no role whatsoever in Libyan 
community under the suppression which marked the Gaddafi era, in addition to the marginalization and banning of 
community service and lack of CSOs. Civil society was severely repressed by the Gaddafi regime which constantly 
attempted to eliminate all forms of philanthropy and fought CSOs, endowments and even Zakat.
After seizing power, Gaddafi issued Law No. 10 of 1971 which elevated awqaf authority to a public institution that 
confiscated  all endowed property (real estate, lands, money). Enthusiasm for endowments waned as state control 
12	 Awqaf	(singular,	Waqf)	is	an	Arabic	word	meaning	an	inalienable	religious	endowment	in	Islamic	law,	typically	denoting	a	building	or	
plot	of	land	or	even	cash	for	Muslim	religious	or	charitable	purposes.
13	 A	sabeel	is	a	water	fountain	for	drinking	or,	if	large	enough,	for	washing	up	before	prayers.
14	 A	zaouia	is	an	Islamic	religious	school	or	monastery.
15	 Wild	Abah,	Abdullah	Sayyed.	A	Study	into	Transformations	in	the	Relationship	between	Endowments	and	Civil	Society	Organizations	in	
the	Arab	Maghreb.	Center	for	Arab	Unity	Studies,	Beirut.	(First	edition	2003)
16	 Al-Zuraiqi,	Jumaa.	The	Legislative	Framework	of	the	Endowment	System	in	the	Arab	Maghreb.	Center	for	Arab	Unity	Studies,	Beirut.	
(First	edition	2003)
35
increased, thus depriving Libyan philanthropy of one of its main sources.17 The Gaddafi regime adopted socialism 
as it nationalized the economy, banned political parties, and stifled civil society activities. 
CSOs were almost absent. Theoretically speaking, the number of CSOs throughout the past 42 years did not 
exceed 17, most of which were mainly involved in orphan care. The space in which these organizations operated was 
restricted by internal security as per the drastically restrictive Law No. 19 which stated that board meetings of any 
CSO must be attended by a representative of internal security who shall have almost full control of its activities. As 
a result, the number of CSOs shrank and their activities in Gaddafi-era Libya was brought to a halt. Volunteerism 
was negatively affected; there was an extreme lack of volunteers given the absence of active CSOs, except for the 
scout service and the Libyan Red Crescent.18
4.2.1. The Public Scout and Girl Guide Movement
The	Public	Scout	and	Girl	Guide	Movement	was	one	of	the	few	civil	society	bodies	which	escaped	Gaddafi’s	repressive	
policies and greatly attracted the interests of Libyan youth. It provided a perfect channel for voluntary work as it 
was one of very few institutions that welcomed young people and pursued different scout activities. This provided 
an immeasurably important boost to scouting given the recession in civil society activities. In the aftermath of the 
revolution, Libyans began to establish a real civil society. Scouts and girl guides became involved in CSOs created 
after the breakout of the revolution. Scouts are known for having great organizational and leadership skills, high 
degree of accuracy, teamwork abilities, strong interpersonal communication skills, in addition to their experience in the 
organization of workshops and exhibitions.19 
4.2.3. The Libyan Red Crescent Society
The Libyan Red Crescent Society provides another channel for community service and voluntary work which were 
banned by Gaddafi. Many young people from different areas volunteered at the Red Crescent where they acquired 
different skills. The Red Crescent Society had suffered the repression and corruption of the Gaddafi regime. However, 
it developed young volunteers who played a vital role during the revolution. Red Crescent volunteers were always on 
the frontlines, especially in eastern Libya, delivering humanitarian assistance and distributing food parcels in different 
frontlines in the south and also in Misrata and the western frontline. The Red Crescent has trained new relief teams and 
offered first-aid training courses to the public that included classes on the delivery of aid convoys and coordination with 
civil society to determine the needs of internally displaced persons, or refugees and injured fighters at the frontlines.20
4.3.The Philanthropy Revolution
The Libyan Revolution was par excellence a revolution of philanthropy in its wider sense. Philanthropy in Libya and 
beyond has taken up various forms including civic engagement, volunteerism and charitable giving, especially for 
youth. Young people aged 16 to 35 constitute the largest age group in Libya. One cannot separate volunteerism from 
philanthropy given the privacy of the Libyan society and Revolution, in general, and Libyan philanthropy, in particular. 
Volunteers have contributed greatly to the Libyan Revolution in all aspects, in terms of political management, armed 
battles and community service. Nevertheless, philanthropy was not limited to civil society. Members of local councils, 
revolutionary troops, and CSOs were all volunteers in different fields.
Characteristics of Philanthropy in Post-Revolution Libya
1. The Rise of Philanthropy from Scratch
Volunteerism rose from scratch in Libya and spread as a popular culture in a record time. Since the wake of the 
Revolution, it has become an integral component of Libyan daily life.
2. Philanthropy	for	All	Ages	and	Women’s	Participation
Post-revolution philanthropy was not limited to youth. It extended vertically and horizontally to all sectors of the 
Libyan	community,	including	women	and	elderly	people.	Libyan	philanthropy	is	also	marked	by	women’s	active	
involvement given that the Libyan society is a deeply conservative one. Several CSOs are led by women. Libyan 
women supported the Revolution through a multitude of political and civic roles in cities, such as Benghazi, and 
17	 Wild	Abah,	Abdullah	Sayyed.	A	Study	into	Transformations	in	the	Relationship	between	Endowments	and	Civil	Society	Organizations	
in	the	Arab	Maghreb.	Center	for	Arab	Unity	Studies,	Beirut.	(First	edition	2003).
18	 The	humanitarian	Forum	Report	on	youth	activities	in	post-Revolution	Libya	(November	2011).
19	 Ibid.
20	 Ibid.
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in remote rural areas such as al-Wahat and al-Jabal al-Akhdar. This proves that women involvement is not a seasonal 
behavior, but rather a continuous process that has wide-ranging effects on the Libyan community. 
	A	case	in	point	is	Hanaa	Habashi	(Naomidea)	who	won	an	American	prize	as	one	the	world’s	most	courageous	
women. Naomidea acted as the voice of the Libyan Revolution to the world through various means. She communicated 
with different TV channels, such as al-Jazeera during the Revolution where she described the suffering of the Libyan 
people.	She	also	gathered	information	on	the	location	of	Gaddafi’s	militia	and	presented	them	to	NATO	to	help	
and	protect	the	Libyan	people.	Naomidea	maintains	that	“the	role	of	women	during	the	Libyan	Revolution	was	
not limited to the preparation of food for the rebels. Women were the spark of the Libyan Revolution. I remember 
on February 15 the wives and mothers of the prisoners who were brutally killed at the infamous Abu Salim prison 
massacre in which 1270 prisoners were killed in 2 or 3 hours. The whole world knows of that massacre. Women 
transferred weapons from one place to another, others gathered and provided important information. Women were 
actively present in all fields: media, military, and humanitarian aid. However, they have been forced out of the scene21. 
3. Philanthropy Goes Beyond Community Service
Volunteerism in Libya was not exclusively limited to community service. It covered all political, military and 
economic aspects of life. Young volunteers provided the bulk of the rebel force and militia that fought against 
Gaddafi’s	guerrillas	to	free	their	country	from	his	grip.	Many	volunteered	 in	 local	councils	which	managed	
daily affairs in liberated cities and also in hospitals. 
This poses a challenge for CSOs which will have to contain the volunteer surplus in other fields, especially that many 
volunteers resumed their normal lives after the return of stability, particularly those who fought at the frontlines. 
These young volunteers will also need rehabilitation before being reintegrated into civil society.
4.4. The Phases of Philanthropy
Community development and the evolution of the concept of philanthropy in Libya went through two phases:
4.4.1. PHASE 1: March to May 2011 (Ad Hoc Phase)
The first phase may be considered an ad hoc phase that witnessed community response to the events taking place in Libya. 
The Libyan people, who suffered 42 years of oppressive rule by the late dictator Muammar Gaddafi, had to rediscover the 
concept of civil society and CSOs. At first, community service took up the form of charity donations by businessmen or in-
kind and money donations by ordinary people. These donations were earmarked to the support either the frontlines (food, 
medical supplies and sometimes weapons) or the internal front in liberated cities in eastern Libya, especially the poor and 
those who were displaced from areas close to battles such as Ajdabiya in the east and Misrata in the west. Thus, CSOs began 
to emerge first in Benghazi, then in Bayda and Derna, then throughout eastern Libya. 
Characteristics of Phase 1: The Development of Civil Society post Revolution
1. The Creation of Relief-Oriented Organizations 
Relief-oriented organizations, such as Nida al-Khair Society, emerged during the revolution. They focused on 
emergency	 response,	 providing	 medical	 and	 food	 supplies—and	 sometimes	 arms—to	 combatants	 and	 also	 to	
populations in dire need due to the ongoing conflict and halt of the economy. Many lived below the poverty 
threshold as they received no salaries, especially in eastern Libya. Huge numbers were displaced from western 
Libya—the	main	battlefield—in	addition	to	those	displaced	from	eastern	Libya	such	as	Ajdabiya	(10,000	refugees	
in Bayda alone)22. In the footsteps of Muhajirin and Ansar, the local population hosted refugees and asylum-seekers 
in their houses, especially in eastern cities, hence moving beyond traditional emergency response. Charities and 
CSOs in the east also provided emergency relief to the southern population, especially in Kufra oasis, then Misrata 
in the west through the sea, in addition to the aids provided to the Western Mountain combatants.
2. Voluntary Work
Individual and voluntary efforts clearly marked that period. Luckily, many individuals adopted community initiatives 
that helped boost Libyan civil society. Separate CSOs were formed that maintained strong (personal and family) 
relations with other bodies in a relatively small local community. Organizations were created by local activists and 
Libyan expats and exiles.  Other organizations were established by traders, businessmen and intellectuals to support 
21	 Interview	with	Hanaa	Habashi	with	Waseela	Awlamy.	 
http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/pages/308cd666-acff-41b6-924b-592c9018c6db
22	 Libyan	Humanitarian	and	Relief	Agency	(LIBAID)	Report,	June	2011
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the Revolution nationally and internationally. This proves that civil society is an integral part of any community, 
an insuppressible humanitarian urge and the backbone of volunteerism.
An example of such organizations is Volunteer Libya which was established by a group of young Libyans living in 
the USA, and the Voluntary Libyan Doctor Program which offers diagnostic medical services.
3. Inclusive Networking and Lack of Coordination 
The Libyan civil society emerged as a community reflex to the Revolution which turned into an armed struggle, or 
rather a regular war against the Gaddafi regime. There were organizations that shared the same but coordinated roles, 
which is natural in such circumstances. This happens in any ordinary society, but varies according to the development 
level, magnitude, nature and situation of each country. The Benghazi-based Libyan Civil Society Organizations Union 
was one of the first attempts at coordination between CSOs. It was founded by a group of organizations operating 
in Benghazi including Tadamun Society for Human Right, Attawasul Association for Youth, Women and Children of 
Free Libya, the Libyan Human Appeal Team, and Sanabel al-Hidaya society. Bayda has seen a similar attempt where 
I’tilaf	al-Khair	(Charity	Union)	was	created	as	a	local	association	of	CSOs	in	Bayda,	al-Jabal	al-Akhdar	District.	Such	
unions have partially succeeded in uniting civil society through the joint organization of training workshops and aid 
convoys such as those sent to combatants in Misrata and Nafusa Mountain.23
4. Fluctuating Funding and Dependence on Individual Self-made Efforts 
Libyan, especially eastern, cities have suffered an acute cash-flow crisis. Banks did not have enough cash as 
many withdrew large amounts of money in the wake of the Revolution while others transferred their money 
abroad. More importantly, the Gaddafi regime transferred huge sums to Tripoli and cut off remittances and 
salaries from the whole eastern area. Additionally, the Gaddafi rule was marked by extreme centralization 
where Tripoli was the center of money and power. This caused a severe cash-flow crisis in eastern Libya and 
liberated areas that had large impacts. The nascent CSOs were naturally affected as they depended entirely 
on individual in-kind and in-cash donations from local and expat Libyans. Their funds also came from 
in-kind donations (food and medicine) from neighboring countries and countries which recognized the 
National	Transitional	Council	(NTC)	as	Libya’s	de	facto	government,	such	as	Egypt,	Turkey,	Tunisia,	Qatar	
and the UAE. To survive the financial crisis, CSOs had to create a local network, establish relations with 
international bodies, and cooperate with the NTC. 
5. Types of Libyan Civil Society Organizations
•	Organizations established by the population of main cities
These are the organizations which emerged in the aftermath of the Libyan Revolution in liberated cities, 
especially in eastern Libya, Misrata and the cities of al-Jabal al-Gharbi (Western Nafusa Mountains) in western 
Libya. The majority of Libyan CSOs fall under this category and they vary in terms of magnitude, experience, 
capacities, fields of operation and services.  Despite their short existence and limited experience, many of these 
organizations are remarkably effective such as the Benghazi-based Attawasul Association for Youth, Women 
and Children of Free Libya and Sanabel al-Hidaya society, Lamsa Medical Charity Organization in Derna, the 
National Reform and Development Society in Tobruk, Zad al-Khair Society and the Libyan Association For 
Humanitarian Aid in Bayda, and finally the Misrata Charity. 
•	Organizations founded by expatriate Libyans
The Gaddafi regime did not allow anyone to hold counter political opinions, which drove a large number of 
Libyans to reside overseas, whether as fugitives, expelled, exiled or voluntarily. Many Libyans lived in Egypt, 
the UK, Switzerland, the USA and other countries. After the breakout of the revolution, many of them 
returned to their homeland, especially to Benghazi and eastern Libya in general, where they founded CSOs 
that may be classified into: 
 » Branches of foreign organizations founded by expat Libyans 
Organizations created after the Revolution as branches of foreign organizations established before the 
Revolution by Libyans overseas. They are marked by international expertise and wide knowledge of 
community service. A case in point is the originally Swiss Tadamun Society for Human Rights and the 
British al-Wafaa Charity. 
23	 Report	by	the	Charity	Union,	June.
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  Tadamun Society for Human Rights 
It is a human rights advocacy organization founded in 1999 by Dr. Ahmed Quweidy, a Libyan doctor 
living	in	Switzerland.	It	was	not	possible	to	establish	such	an	organization	under	Gaddafi’s	iron-fist	
rule. This drove Quweidy to live abroad. However, in the wake of the Revolution he left Switzerland 
and opened a branch for his organization in Benghazi which was one of the first CSOs to operate 
in Libya after the revolution. Tadamun depended mainly on young volunteers, especially females. 
It documented the violations and crimes committed by the Gaddafi regime before and after the 
revolution, especially in besieged cities. It also exposed critical cases such as the victims of the 1996 
Abu Salim prison massacre.
Tadamun opened a branch in Tripoli after its fall in the hands of the rebels and moved the main 
branch from Switzerland to Benghazi, thus becoming a completely Libyan organization.24
 » Libyan CSOs founded by expat Libyans
 These are relatively similar to the first type in terms of experience, knowledge of civil society, and available 
resources. However, these organizations were founded in Libya post Revolution such as the Libyan Human 
Appeal Team and the Libyan Humanitarian Relief Agency.
  Libyan Human Appeal Team
It is one of the forms of philanthropy at the time of crisis. It was founded by Libyan businessman Salah 
al-Bira only one week after the breakout of the revolution. Its aim was to provide financial, food and 
medical support for those who were displaced from battle areas, injured persons and combatants at the 
frontlines. It also aimed to send aid convoys to affected areas. After the end of military combats and the 
toppling of the Gaddafi regime, the Libyan Human Appeal Team provided medical supplies to injured 
combatants and offered them rehabilitation programs. It also supported the families of those killed in 
combat25.
  Lawyers for Justice in Libya (LFJL)
LFJL was established in response to the February 17, 2011 uprising in Libya by a network of Libyan 
international lawyers living in the Diaspora, with the aim of using their legal expertise to seek routes 
to the promotion of human rights, the establishment of the rule of law and the facilitation of a smooth 
transition	 toward	 a	 democratic	 and	 inclusive	 Libya.	 Collectively,	 LFJL’s	 members	 have	 expertise	 in	
international human rights law, the law of armed conflict, international arbitration, transitional justice, 
corporate law, finance law, and oil and gas law. LFJL also maintains a growing network of talented 
Libyan lawyers, currently in excess of 60 lawyers, working on the ground across all regions in Libya.
4.4.2. PHASE 2: June 2011 to date (Self-Rediscovery Phase)
This phase is a mature phase as compare to the ad-hoc phase. CSOs became more experienced in addressing the needs of 
civil society. Key indicators include:
1. Increased Coordination of Volunteerism and Relief Efforts
An important indicator is increased coordination of volunteerism and relief efforts, especially for convoys sent to the 
frontlines by CSOs in cooperation with local bodies in different Libyan cities, the United Nations and international 
relief NGOs operating in Libya. This phase also saw increased cooperation on the distribution of relief material over 
displaced persons and needy families in Libya as well as Libyan refugees in camps in Tunisia. 
An example of these collaborative efforts is the establishment of institutions such as Libya One, a group of 
independent national and international experts who joined forces in March 2011 in response to the Libyan crisis. 
As the situation in Libya became relatively stable, these institutions geared their efforts toward the reconstruction 
process and the promotion of democracy in Libya. Libya One offers its expertise in high priority fields such as 
media, communications and civil society. It has an office in Tripoli and another in Benghazi, in addition to expat 
Libyans who are willing to help. 
2. Various Community Service Channels and New Organizations
Community service in the self-rediscovery phase became no longer limited to relief efforts given the long span of the 
combats and stability of aid efforts, especially that the rebels took control of several cities. Numerous types of CSOs 
24	 Interview	with	Dr.	Ahmed	al-Quweidy,	Chairman	of	Tadamun,	January	2012.
25	 Interview	with	Bashir	al-Kabti,	Executive	Director	of	the	Libyan	human	Appeal	Team,	25	November	2011.
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evolved—though	older	models	of	charitable	relief	persisted—and	engaged	in	human	rights,	media,	youth,	environment,	
public health and women. Vocational unions for teachers, fishermen and even barbers were also established. The 
financial resources of these organizations differed from one city to the other, especially in eastern Libya.
Benghazi	and	Derna	had	the	lion’s	share	of	development	in	terms	of	quantity	and	as	well	as	quality.	Many	more	
specialized organizations emerged, especially in Derna, such as heritage preservation societies which reflect the 
qualitative development of civil society. Quantity-wise, the number of CSOs within 8 months reached 200 in 
Derna alone which has a population of 80,00026. Benghazi, the Revolution hub and one of the major cities in 
eastern Libya, saw similar development. It has a population of some 800,000 (i.e. 10-fold more than that of 
Derna) and houses more than 300 CSOs.27
3. Libyan Civil Society Networking 
Civil society networking is an important means to boost philanthropy and community service. Different forms 
of networking appeared in Libya, such as the Alliance of Libyan Civil Society Organizations and the Libyan Civil 
Society Organizations Union; in addition to local networks such as Etelaf Al-Khair (Charity  Coalition) in Bayda. 
Eastern Libya houses 3 networks while western Libya houses 10 networks. In this study we shall focus on the first 
founded and most active network: the Alliance of Libyan Civil Society Organizations.
4. Alliance of Libyan Civil Society Organizations
The Alliance of Libyan Civil Society Organizations is an example of collaborative philanthropic efforts. It is a 
national independent civil institution which coordinates among and provides consultation to member organizations. 
It was founded on 16 April 2011 amid the humanitarian crisis which unfolded in Libya. The constantly growing 
Alliance includes more than 15 CSOs and philanthropic foundations operating in different fields including charity, 
relief and humanitarian aid, rights advocacy and the environment. Its General Assembly, which is constituted by 
all member organizations, convenes annually to elect members of its Coordinator Council (12 organizations) 
which	in	turn	elects	a	chairman	every	month.	The	Council	sets	out	the	Alliance’s	general	policy	and	monitors	the	
performance of the Executive Director28.	More	than	half	 the	members	of	the	Alliance—51	organizations—are	
seated in Benghazi. Bayda comes next with 18 organizations, which means that the two cities house almost two 
thirds of the members. This concentration in a limited number of eastern cities poses a serious challenge for the 
Alliance which will have to carry out more expansions in western Libya and also within eastern Libya.29
4.4.3. The Philanthropy Map and the Libyan East-West Community Development Balance 
Animosity between eastern and western Libyan populations was one of the problems which the Gaddafi regime tried to 
stir. However, the uprising in western cities (such as Misrata, Ajdabiya and the Western Mountain cities) has aborted 
that	plot.	CSOs	boomed	in	eastern	Libya	which	managed	to	slip	Gaddafi’s	grip	in	the	early	days	of	the	revolution—
save for the peripheral oil towns: Brega, Ras Lanuf.  In contrast, heavy fighting flared and persisted in western Libya 
which became the main battlefield.  Subsequently, CSOs in the east gained more experience and civil society to grow 
through direct contact with international organizations. Operating in times of crisis has helped these nascent eastern 
organizations to accumulate wide knowledge and experience despite their short existence. This allowed activists to gain 
firsthand experience and helped develop effective community leaders.
Nevertheless, the gap still persists even after the fall of the Gaddafi regime and the liberation of the whole 
country. Western Libya was introduced to CSOs only after the military operations ended, especially in Tripoli, 
with exceptions such as Misrata which was introduced to these organizations earlier. Also, the needs of the eastern 
community differ from those of the western community. The latter suffers massive destruction of its infrastructure 
and community makeup in addition to the psychological and material impact of war on local communities. Thus, 
western Libya is more in need of reconstruction efforts. The eastern region was subject to slight partial destruction; 
its infrastructure is mostly intact and its civil society is stable. This led to a development gap between eastern and 
western Libya that is likely to persist for years. 
CSOs have taken great strides in western Libya due to the high needs, dense population and great funds which surpass 
those in eastern Libya, especially in Tripoli.
26	 Libyan	CSOs	database	–	Humanitarian	Forum.
27	 Ibid.
28	 Interview	with	Abdullah	al-Mutradi,	Executive	Director	of	the	Alliance	of	Libyan	Civil	Society	Organizations.
29	 Ibid.
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5. Funding Sources of Civil Society Organizations
Philanthropy took up different forms during the revolution. Naturally, funding sources of philanthropy varied given the 
revolutionary surge which re-introduced philanthropic giving to the Libyan community. Philanthropy in post-revolution 
Libya may be classified into: in-house philanthropy and overseas philanthropy.
5.1. First: In-House Philanthropy 
1. Individual Donations
Individual donations by all sections of society including businessmen, tribe leaders, employees, and middle-
class men and women, are a key funding source for philanthropy in Libya. These donations included in-
kind	and	in-cash	contributions	to	provide	relief	material	and	asylum	for	displaced	persons—even	in	ordinary	
people’s	houses—in	a	bid	to	repeat	history30. Philanthropic giving at that stage was driven by national and 
religious duty where it was considered by some as a form of sadaqa or Zakat, and by others as a national duty 
and huge community need. 
Philanthropy extended to include funding of CSOs, i.e. funding mediating institutions to provide relief aid. 
The role of these institutions developed as the revolutionary fighters advanced and eventually toppled the 
regime. They pursued various non-relief activities, such as youth action, the promotion of democracy, and 
human rights advocacy. 
2. Institutional Philanthropy
Libyan institutions and CSOs engaged in philanthropic giving. A considerable part of their funds came originally from 
individual donations; however, some of them became financially independent such as the Libyan Human Appeal Team. 
3. Corporate Philanthropy and the Role of the Oil and Gas Sector in the Transitional Period
Libyan corporate philanthropy is unorganized and limited given that private companies in Libya are weak and suffer 
the lack of laws addressing corporate social responsibility. However, this was not an obstacle for some companies, 
such as the Arabian Gulf Oil Company (AGOCO), an oil company based in Benghazi that established a subsidiary 
institution to fund CSOs and relief operations in June 2011. 
In an attempt to boost qualified youths that were marginalized in the past to be leaders in oil companies and the 
Libyan National Oil Corporation, the February 17 Coalition established the oil and gas sector to emphasize the 
social responsibility of oil and gas companies, especially those operating under long-term contracts. Another aim 
was to drive those companies to be effective players in social development in different fields including health, 
education and environment. Companies such as ExxonMobil and Petro-Canada were said to have invested some 
50,000,000 USD in corporate social responsibility programs. 
4. Philanthropy of Official Institutions
This type of giving was mostly in-kind donations where universities and local councils offered their halls to CSOs, initiatives 
and social activists for free. Schools were turned into offices for CSOs and houses for internally displaced persons.
5.2. Second: Overseas Philanthropy
1. Libyan Expat Remittances and Donations 
Donations and remittances by Libyan expats are an important source of philanthropy, especially at the time of war. 
Libyan	communities	living	abroad—especially	large	ones	in	Egypt,	the	UK,	Switzerland	and	the	USA—transferred	
large amounts of money and provided humanitarian aids needed by Libyans at home. 
Shortly after the Revolution started, the El-Ahrar television channel was founded by a group of Libyan journalists 
living in the country and beyond to counter Gaddafi state propaganda. It aimed to broadcast news and opinions on 
revolutionary Libya, thus sparking debate about post-Gaddafi politics. 
An expat Libyan businessman living in the Uk donated 25,000 USD to launch El-Ahrar TV channel. Its founder is 
Mahmud Shammam, a well-known Libyan expat journalist who edited the Arabic edition of Newsweek.  Mahmoud 
Jibril	of	the	National	Transitional	Council	(NTC)	is	the	head	of	the	station’s	executive	committee.
30	 In	Muslim	tradition,	the	Ansar,	the	Muslims	of	Al-Madinah,	gave	asylum	to	their	Muhajirin	brethren	(Muslims	who	left	their	homes	and	
wealth,	emigrating	to	give	support	to	Allah	and	His	Messenger)	in	their	own	homes	and	comforted	them	with	their	wealth.
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2. Philanthropy of Libyan Institutions Abroad
Many organizations founded by expat Libyans, such as the Swiss Tadamun Society for Human Rights and the 
British al-Wafa Society, moved to Libya right after the breakout of the Revolution where they pursued all kinds of 
direct and indirect philanthropic activities. 
3. International Bodies Operating in Libya 
Before the revolution, there were no international organizations, whether governmental or non-governmental in 
Libya. However, several of these organizations came to Libya to provide relief assistance and to develop community 
programs. Governmental bodies (such as USAID, UK Aid, the Turkish Red Crescent, Qatari Red Crescent and 
the European Union) and non-governmental organizations (such as Human Rights Watch, the Humanitarian 
Forum, ACTED, Freedom House, Islamic Relief Worldwide and the Arab Doctors Union) have made remarkable 
contributions to the Libyan society.
4. Foreign Companies Operating in Libya
Philanthropic giving by foreign companies operating in Libya is relatively weak compared to their magnitude. There 
are not many examples save for Wintershall AG, a German crude oil and natural gas producer, which supported civil 
society activities in al-Wahat area. 
6. The Role of Libyan Youth
Youth played a leading role in change as fighters against the Gaddafi regime. Some of them formed militia that led the 
war	against	Gaddafi’s	guerilla.	There	were	also	volunteers	who	provided	media	coverage	and	transmitted	it	to	the	world.	
Some created a media center, Libya Alhurra TV and others. Others helped send relief convoys to besieged cities, the 
frontlines and displaced persons. At a later stage, many of those either founded or joined CSOs.
Hence, volunteerism took up various forms during the Libyan revolution, after the fall of the Gaddafi regime 
and end of military operations where Libyans entered into a reconstruction phase. This change would drive 
volunteerism and youth action to take new turns. Libyans are now seeking to integrate those who remained within 
revolutionary militia into the army. Additionally, private media channels have emerged. This leaves only one 
choice for volunteers: full integration into civil society. 
As part of this study, seven focus groups were held in Benghazi (February 2012) and Tripoli (March 2012) to explore the 
views of Libyan youth on their civic participation and linkages between it and understandings of nationalism after Gaddafi. 
In both Tripoli and Benghazi, it was clear that the Revolution had engendered a rebirth of nationalist sentiments in Libya; 
Libyans were all united against Gaddafi and that brought about a unity that they had not experienced before. In Benghazi, 
participants highlighted the emergence of a newly found nationalism post-Gaddafi; one of the participants described this 
saying:	“Under	Gaddafi,	I	did	not	feel	Libya	was	my	country,	I	felt	like	a	stranger,	but	this	has	changed	now.”	
Participants underscored the emergence of a new ownership of their country and a sense of belonging that not only was 
leaderless	but	that	also	rejected	the	idea	of	a	leader.	One	of	the	participants	related	how	“Gaddafi	was	everywhere,	in	
the	university,	in	the	curricula,	at	home	and	in	the	neighborhood.”	They	now	reject	monolithic	leadership,	a	reminder	
of	the	autocratic	days	of	Gaddafi.	One	of	the	participants	said:	“there	are	people	who	are	trying	to	assume	leadership	
of the Revolution and the public refused them. The public has proven that they are up to the responsibility; they have 
established the NTC. In the 1950s and 60s, there were books that promoted the idea that no more revolutions would 
happen in the world. The Arab Spring has proven this wrong and now there are leaders everywhere, each Libyan is a 
leader	within	their	community,	within	their	family.	This	is	the	miracle	of	the	Arab	Spring:	each	person	became	a	leader.”
However, participants also underscored the persistence of some of the malaise from the old regime which included: 
politicized tribalism, lack of trust of the political leadership and among themselves, and a history of exclusion 
of Benghazi by the leadership on economic and political levels, an exclusion that persists by the NTC and that 
influences their cohesion as a nation. 
In Tripoli, participants also underlined the debilitating legacy left behind by Gaddafi. One of the participants summed 
it	up	saying:	“Gaddafi	asked	‘Who	are	you?”	or	‘man	antom?’	And	the	Libyan	people	responded	with	a	revolution.	Now	
the	question	is	not	‘who	is	the	Libyan?’	but	‘What	does	the	Libyan	citizen	need	or	want?’	Gaddafi	reduced	the	Libyan	
needs	into	housing,	gas	and	a	woman	to	marry.	This	mindset	needs	to	change.”	They	unanimously	highlighted	how	the	
NTC was mismanaging the transition and failing to present a break from the Gaddafi regime.
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Below are the major themes that emerged in the discussions: 
6.1. Sacrifice and Public Participation  
One of the significant remarks articulated by two of the participants in Benghazi linked sacrifice and public participation 
to nationalism. They argued that Benghazi, as compared to Tripoli, sacrificed more during the Revolution and as such 
it was more nationalistic than Tripoli. The more bloodshed of the indigenous people, the more nationalistic they were 
and	since	Benghazi	has	always	been	the	seat	of	revolt	throughout	Libya’s	history	and	during	the	Revolution	against	
Gaddafi, it was ahead of Tripoli regarding nationalism. 
In Tripoli, the issue of sacrifice was brought up as related to the Libyan diaspora returning to Libya post Gaddafi. Much 
criticism was directed to those who had fled the country under Gaddafi and came back after the fight was over but 
never	really	sacrificed	as	much	as	the	indigenous	inhabitants;	how	“nationalistic”	the	diaspora	were	was	brought	up	a	
number	of	times.	This	is	indicative	of	relativity	of	nationalism	in	people’s	minds	and	how	it	is	directly	linked	to	sacrifice	
and participation in the public space (protests, civil society, aid, etc.). This is also related to the bigger issue which is 
reconciliation and openness in Libya amongst the Libyans who were there and have been through the Revolution as 
supporters of Gaddafi and as fighters against the regime. Feuds between tribes and families remain a very sensitive topic. 
One of the participants from Tripoli related how his city Misrata was raided by the Tuareg tribe and that even after the 
revolution, there is a feud between both with very little readiness for reconciliation by the people in Misrata.  
6.2 .Trust
Nationalism implies an implicit sense of trust amongst the inhabitants of a nation. Public participation was featured in 
microcosms of the national public space such as the squares in Benghazi and Tripoli. Public space was marked by a unique 
sense of trust and solidarity among citizens of the nation. However, this solidarity is slowly getting diffused into the old 
fragmentation.	Participants	in	Benghazi	related	how	Gaddafi	used	the	“divide	and	rule”	method	to	solidify	his	power.	He	
planted the seeds of distrust within the people by instituting a police state. Mentioning Gaddafi or the regime in public 
was likely to get entire families imprisoned without trial. A culture of fear dominated the Libyan scene, as a result, and 
people could not trust one another. In the period post-Gaddafi, there was a spike in trust as people united against the 
regime. However, some of the residual fears are back in place especially for the older generation. 
Another element affecting trust is the spread of arms and weapons; one of the participants from Benghazi related how 
people were not really given a chance to bond, or build a sense of solidarity as such, because unlike other revolutions 
around the region where peaceful protests were allowed some time and people gained experience from mobilizing and 
organizing themselves, in Libya, they were not given a chance because the Revolution quickly became a war and so people, 
immediately,	were	forced	to	take	up	arms	and	fight.		He	said:	“We	benefitted	from	other	revolutions,	the	Egyptian	and	
Tunisian	on	how	to	organize	ourselves	peacefully.	Peace	didn’t	work	here.”
In	Tripoli,	dissatisfaction	with	the	NTC’s	management	of	the	transition	was	reiterated	by	the	participants.	This	lack	of	
leadership,	they	explained,	has	revived	part	of	the	old	distrust	of	Gaddafi’s	regime;	distrust	towards	the	government,	the	
diaspora and even among the Libyan people. The spread of weaponry is an example; 50% of the focus group participants 
acknowledged the fact that they had weapons at home and in their cars because they felt unsafe.  
6.3 .Politicized Tribalism 
Politicized tribalism is related to the trust issue but is also at the heart of the Libyan nationalist question. Historically, 
due to the absence of strong state structures, the tribe became an important instrument of maintaining order that 
supplemented the state apparatus in many roles. The tribe as an institution, however, slowly gave way to forms of 
nepotism and corruption. Its political role has now become more contentious than before. One the participants in Tripoli 
said:	“Use	the	tribes	in	good	things	for	they	are	part	of	your	culture,	your	family	but	not	in	politics.	Or	else,	don’t	
complain	if	they	hurt	you.”	The	politicized	role	of	the	tribe—especially	in	light	of	the	power	vacuum	and	the	NTC’s	
inability	to	provide	adequate	leadership—is	splintering	the	nationalist	unity	of	the	revolution.	
6.4. Gaddafi’s Legacy and a Culture of Exclusion 
On watching how their country was identified and equated with Gaddafi, expat Libyans felt excluded. This sense of 
alienation	was	articulated	by	a	participant	from	Tripoli	saying:	“Our	sense	of	nationalism	was	hurt.	When	I	traveled	
abroad,	people	identified	Libya	with	Gaddafi.	I	used	to	hate	Gaddafi’s	Libya.	I	used	to	hate	it	and	never	felt	it	was	my	
country.”	Their	revived	nationalism	was	short	lived	after	the	Revolution	because,	they	argued,	the	NTC	used	the	same	
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discourse as Gaddafi in response to calls for federalism. Freedom of expression implies acceptance of the other, however 
the NTC considered those calling for federalism as traitors.  
Gaddafi’s	legacy	of	use	of	force	was	underscored	as	a	threat	to	the	transition.	The	idea	of	making	change,	even	political	
change,	through	the	use	of	force	has	been	embedded	in	people’s	minds	throughout	the	42	years	of	his	rule.	This	would	
need to change to make a successful transition. Related to the use of force was a culture of exclusion; tribes favored 
their	own	people	and	appointments	were	made	based	on	one’s	tribe	and	not	on	merit.	This	culture	of	exclusion	was	
highlighted	by	one	of	the	participants	from	Tripoli	who	said:	“In	any	given	company,	most	employees	would	be	from	
the	same	tribe;	we	already	practice	federalism	and	exclusion.”	Those	divisions	are	starting	to	re-emerge	in	the	post-
revolution period.   
7. A Glimpse into the Future of Philanthropy in Post-Revolution Libya
Looking into the future of philanthropy and CSO funding is of paramount importance, especially as Libya departs 
from the state of war and instability into a reconstruction and stability phase. Libya has taken great strides in the 
transitional	period	including	the	election	of	the	General	National	Congress	(GNC)	which	will	draw	up	Libya’s	new	
constitution, the laws regulating political practices, economic laws and civil society laws. 
CSO funding sources and rules must be revisited amidst the current social and political upheavals in Libya. CSO 
autonomy and independence must be maintained away from legislative barriers. Before the revolution, both legislatures 
and civil society lacked experience to deal with philanthropic giving in general and CSO finding in particular. In this 
section, we shall review the funding sources that are most applicable to the Libyan society.
1. Awqaf (Religious Endowments)
Awqaf	 are	 an	 important—and	 historically	 the	 oldest—source	 of	 philanthropy	 in	 Libya.	 They	 are	 particularly	
significant since they are part of Arab Islamic culture which is part of the Libyan makeup. Endowment funds are 
a sustainable increasing source that can cover multiple philanthropic forms. An endowment can play a key role in 
supporting CSOs, especially at this critical stage of Libyan community service.
There are attempts by key players in Libyan civil society, albeit the Ministry of Culture and Civil Society  and the 
Alliance of Libyan Civil Society Organizations, to revive the role of endowments, though all plans are currently 
frozen. Endowments will later be apt to form a main funding source for the Libyan civil society.
2. Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate social responsibility is a new source for philanthropy that emerged in Libya after the revolution. It 
can play a central role in funding civil and philanthropic activities, given the investment flux and increase of 
multinational companies operating in Libya; in addition to national companies craving for recognition in the 
economic transition. Social responsibility has become part of corporate culture worldwide, though it needs Libyan 
legislative support.
Although there are no legal obligations nor clear incentives for corporate social responsibility, there are some 
attempts to urge companies to join the philanthropic community. A case in point is the Libyan International 
Telecom Company which sponsored CSOs monitoring the elections. 
3. Individual Donations
Individual donations will remain an important source of philanthropy. However, after the revolution, they are 
gradually shifting from emergency response to charity and development-driven activities. Indicators of such change 
include individual funding of CSOs assigned to monitor the elections.
4. International Organizations
The role of international organizations in Libyan community service is expected to grow, especially European, 
American, Turkish and Qatari organizations. After the revolution, many international organizations flocked to 
Libya and spent generously to fund community service. International support will be technical rather than financial. 
The European Union, for example, adopts a CSO support strategy where it offers them technical support and 
training. Recognizing that training and transfer of expertise is much more important than pouring money onto 
the Libyan civil society, the EU offered some 15 million euros to fund capacity-building programs in Libya in the 
fiscal year 2011/2012. 
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Philanthropy in Libya is not a casual product; it is not a mere outcome of the revolution, or fashion of the age; 
its roots are deep in Libyan soil, though subdued during the Gaddafi rule.
This study presents an analytical forecast of future trends and funding prospects for philanthropy. It also explores 
means for creating a sustainable philanthropic model and a free giving civil society that would create a new Libyan 
society as strong as its revolution.
Funding sources of philanthropy at the peak of the revolution were reviewed  as well as potential funds, especially 
that the Libyan revolution and civil society are still in transition. 
Transitional challenges and tough twists are a natural consequence of a revolution such as the Libyan Revolution. 
Many CSOs, for example, froze their activities due to lack of funds, especially after relief operations ended. 
However, many others survived that stage and so did several CSOs that emerged afterwards. In other words, 
philanthropy will be sustained and develop according to the progress of the Libyan Revolution as the country 
moves from turmoil to stability. 
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1. Introduction
This is a preliminary overview of the forms and practices of philanthropy in Tunisia and the changes brought about 
with the January 14 Revolution. By looking at shifts in Tunisian civil society pre and post Ben Ali, this paper 
explores changes in philanthropic practices that are critical to sustaining the energies of citizen mobilization of the 
“Arab	Spring”	as	well	as	a	dynamic	and	evolving	civil	society;	both	of	which	necessary	to	a	smooth	transition.
There is still scarcity in studies on Tunisian philanthropy practices and transformations, although philanthropy is a 
deep tradition in Tunisia as in all Arab countries. Comparative studies on civic engagement and philanthropy in the 
Arab world are also rare, except for some studies that lack adequate academic rigor and have imprecise data or do not 
cover the Arab region entirely.
This study offers an overview of civil society organizations in Tunisia, particularly those engaged in charitable work 
and developmental activities through funding and financial support. It seeks to present different models of those 
organizations and to present a close analytical reading of the tide of change which swept civil society in the aftermath 
of the January 14, 2011 Revolution, highlighting the role played by youths and their civic engagement initiatives in 
terms of current gains and future outcomes. 
Methodologically, the study draws on selected bibliographies, chiefly studies on philanthropy in the world and the Arab 
region. The WINGS/TPI study1 and other studies conducted by the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD)2 and the European Union were of great benefit.
Analytically, the study builds on a body of legal and statistical texts from different administrative and financial sources and 
references. It also relies on a field study that addresses a number of societies which proved important in that context, in 
addition to a comprehensive survey made through social networks on philanthropic practices brought by the Revolution. 
1.1. Scholarly Literature on Philanthropy
Scholarly literature on civil society practices is relatively recent and insufficient in the Arab region although associations 
in their modern sense date back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The first studies appeared in the region, 
including Tunisia and the Maghreb, in the 1980s and were mainly concerned with politics, the individual-state 
relationship, civil society and social movement concerns under prevailing authoritative regimes.3
Scholarly literature in the Maghreb region may be classified as follows4 :
•	 Historical/theoretical studies that seek to define civil society and trace its emergence and development in the region
•	 Studies on freedom of civil society practices
•	 Studies on civil society and democracy
•	 Studies on the position of civil society organizations in their external context and their roles and impact. These 
most probably focus on feminist movements, human rights societies, cultural specificity and advocacy groups
•	 Studies on internal issues in civil society organizations, especially governance and participation.
A glaring absence of attention to philanthropy in its different charitable forms can be detected in the whole Arab 
region. The WINGS/TPI study points out that this poses a major obstacle to the development of such philanthropic 
foundations. It also hinders the analysis of the different trends of philanthropy and charitable work and the examination 
of their impact on societies.
In addition to the scarcity in studies and information, research on philanthropy suffers from a confusion in concepts 
and fundamentally disparate references in outlining the parameters of philanthropy. The diversity of philanthropic 
foundations and experiences throughout the world adds richness to the field, yet it poses intriguing challenges for the 
classification and selection of adequate data collection and comparative study approaches. Most research studies and 
statistical analyses either draw on legal sources, or resort to cultural and social definitions springing from mainstream 
community concepts.5
1	 WINGS/TPI:	Global	Institutional	Philanthropy:	A	Preliminary	Status	Report	.
2	 Organisation	de	Coopération	et	de	Développement	Économiques.	Comité	d’Aide	au	Développement:	Fondations	philanthropiques	et	
coopération	pour	le	développement	2003
3	 Belaid	Habib	;Approches	Historiographiques	des	Associations	en	Tunisie	à	L’epoque	Coloniale.	In,	Hermes,	Histoire	en	Reseau	Pour	
Les	Medi	terrannees.
4	 Rabéa	Naciri	;	Les	organisations	de	la	société	civile	en	Afrique	du	Nord,	Algérie,	Maroc	et	Tunisie.	Version	provisoire.	In	Revue	de	
Littérature.	Maroc	2009
5	 WINGS/TPI:	Global	Institutional	Philanthropy:	A	Preliminary	Status	Report.	OPCIT
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1.2. Mapping Concepts and Definitions
The	term	‘foundation’	is	usually	associated	with	an	organization	that	is	engaged	in	philanthropic	practices.	However,	
the definition and use of the term differs from one country to another6	.	Its	Arabic	equivalent	(mu’assasa)	is	primarily	
used	to	refer	to	an	‘institution’	which	bears	other	meanings	in	the	social	sciences	that	may	not	reflect	the	voluntary	
nature of philanthropic foundations.
The	Arabic	Language	Academy	in	Cairo	defines	‘mu’assasa’	as	“any	organization	that	aims	to	gain	profit	by	production	
or	exchange,”	a	definition	that	applies	to	commercial	entities	rather	than	non-profit	organizations.7 The term is also 
widely used in western countries to refer to non-governmental and non-profit organizations that are not necessarily 
engaged in philanthropic activities, such as funding trusts, research laboratories and pressure groups.8
Many charities have developed into foundations of crucial importance in socio-economic life. This has caused a 
major concern for civil society as the financial arrangements could adversely affect the independence of civil society 
associations. Besides, tax exemption privileges granted to those associations may open loopholes for tax evasion.9 
Also, funds offered by major western grant-making foundations to support developmental projects in developing 
countries may be used as a cover for political intervention and economic exploitation.10
Charities,	in	western	terms,	differ	from	associations.	The	French	Act	of	23	July	1987	defines	charity	as	“a	legal	act	
through which one or more individuals or legal entities decide irrevocably to allocate property, rights or resources for 
a	non-profit	making	activity	of	public	interest.”	Hence,	the	European	charity	system	resembles	the	Islamic	Waqf11. 
In U.S. literature, the most frequently cited definition of a foundation is that developed by F. Emerson Andrews 
who	maintains	that	foundations	are	“non-governmental,	non-profit	organizations	with	funds	(usually	from	a	single	
source, either an individual, a family, or a corporation) and a program managed by (their) own trustees or directors, 
established to maintain or aid social, educational, charitable, religious, or other activities serving the common welfare 
through	the	making	of	grants.”
Based	 on	 Andrews’	 definition,	 foundations	 fall	 into	 five	 categories:	 public	 welfare	 foundations,	 private-purpose	
foundations, private or family foundations, industrial foundations and community foundations. The above classification 
applies	to	what	is	known	today	as	‘private	foundations’.	Public	foundations,	in	contrast,	normally	receive	their	funds	
from multiple sources, including private foundations and government agencies, as well as fees for services12 . 
The WINGS/TPI suggests six broad categories of institutional philanthropy: independent foundations, corporate 
foundations, community foundations, host-controlled funds, government-linked foundations and multipurpose 
fundraising institutions. Despite the general procedural nature of this typology, it does not apply to all countries. For 
example, it does not include family foundations, religious charities, or other new initiatives.
As	for	Tunisia,	the	term	‘foundation’	does	not	exist	in	legal	instruments	governing	civil	society	activities,	although	
some	of	them	bear	the	name	‘foundation’.	The	most	commonly	used	term	in	Tunisia	is	‘society’	or	‘association’	where	
the philanthropy landscape includes charities, aid groups, community groups and development groups.
This	study	employs	the	Gerhart	Center’s	definition	which	is	“the	institutionalized	pooling	and	distribution	of	private	
resources	with	the	goal	of	building	capacity,	sustainable	financing	and	expertise	for	long-term	societal	benefit.”
This scan covers legally-recognized philanthropic institutions established before the Revolution and still exist in the 
philanthropic landscape. It also covers associations that emerged after January 14, 2011, as announced in the Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Tunisia, until October 2011.
6	 Ibid.
7	 Rida	Khamakhim	al-Jamiyat	fi	Tunis	(Tunisia	1999),	p.	44.
8	 Fondations	philanthropiques	et	coopération	pour	le	développement.	OPCIT	P14.
9	 Ibid.
10	 Ibid,	also	check	Azmi	Bishara:	Civil	Society	Critical	Study	with	Reference	to	the	Arab	Community.	Center	for	Arab	Unity	Studies	in	
Beirut.	2000.	Pp.	278	et	seq.
11	 Warren	Weaver	U.S.	Philanthropic	Foundations	–	Their	History,	Structure,	Management	and	Record	(New	York,	Evanston	et	Londres,	
1967).	
-	Waldemar	A.	Nielsen	The	Big	Foundations	(New	York	et	Londres,	1972)	
-	Edward	H.	Berman	The	Influence	of	the	Carnegie,	Ford,	Rockefeller	Foundations	on	American	Foreign	Policy	(Albany,	1983).
-	Ellen	Condliffe	Lagemann	Philanthropic	Foundations:	New	Scholarship,	New	Possibilities	(Bloomington,1999)
-	Heather	MacDonald	The	Burden	of	Bad	Ideas	(Chicago,	2000)
12	 Organisation	de	Coopération	et	de	Développement	Économiques	(OPCIT).
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2. Historical Transformations in the Tunisian Philanthropic Landscape
2.1. Religious Origins of Philanthropy
Philanthropy is a deeply rooted social tradition in human behavior since early times and took up various forms. Since 
altruism, generosity and love for others are genuine human traits; religion is the primary source for charity work 
conceptually	and	procedurally.	All	the	world’s	religions	enjoin	the	faithful	to	give	to	be	charitable,	and	to	relieve	the	
pains	and	suffering	of	the	poor.	Judaism	includes	the	custom	of	tithing,	i.e.	reserving	one-tenth	of	one’s	earnings	for	
benefactions (tzedakah). Indeed, Biblical precepts clearly underlie philanthropy in laic Europe. In 1958, there was a 
call	by	the	World	Council	of	Churches	(WCC)	for	1%	of	industrial	countries’	income	to	be	channeled	to	developing	
countries. The Jubilee 2000 campaign to cancel Third World debt was a Christian initiative, based on the Jewish 
tradition of remitting debts every 50th, or jubilee, year.13
One	of	the	five	pillars	of	Islam	commits	Muslims	to	give	to	the	poor:	[And	in	their	wealth	there	was	a	due	share	for	
the	beggar	and	for	one	who	is	denied	(good)]	(Adh-Dhariyat	(The	Winnowing	Winds:	19)).	Zakat14 became a pillar of 
the Muslim social system that is always associated with salat (obligatory Muslim prayers). It was the primary funding 
source for Bayt al-Mal 15to equip armies and build forts, schools, hospitals, bridges and libraries16 . Other forms of 
Islamic philanthropy include sadaqah17 and occasional donations. Donations may include real estate, wealth, awqaf 
(endowments), and wasaya (bequests) dedicated to public and private welfare (studying, treating patients, supporting 
the needy, equipping armies, etc).18
The Tunisian community has never strayed from that tradition. Numerous charities have been established since 
the late 19th century, in addition to local civil society organizations and Sufi zawaya (institutions). A number of 
philanthropic associations are engaged in supporting minorities (French, Jewish, Belgian, Swiss, Maltese, British, 
Algerian, etc) living in Tunisia.19 
2.2. Philanthropy and the Historical Development of Charities in Tunisia
The first Tunisian charity was established in 1775 by orders of the then Husseini Bey to build the Tekiah foundation to 
shelter the poor and the disabled. It was funded by the returns of endowments or awqaf. On 19 March 1857, a royal decree 
was	issued	to	establish	the	Endowments	Society	(Jam’iyat	al-Awqaf)	to	consolidate	endowments	in	Tunisia.	In	1893,	the	
Jewish Charity was founded in the Jewish quarter (al-Harah). In 1905, a Muslim charity followed in Tunis. Other major 
Tunisian cities followed in its footsteps and founded their own charities.
The	first	legal	text	governing	those	societies	or	jam’iyat	dates	back	to	the	late	19th	century	when	Ali	Bey	enacted	a	law	to	
regulate the establishment of scientific, cultural and charitable organizations. This law allowed for the emergence of many 
societies that still exist to date. However, it imposed numerous restrictions. To establish an association, the founders had 
to get prior government license, get approvals from the Ministry of Interior and the French General Inspector. In addition, 
they were prohibited from all political or religious activities within the association.
With	the	rise	of	the	People’s	Front	in	France,	a	new	act	on	associations	was	issued	on	6	August	1936.	The	Act	included	
fewer restrictions where rejection became the exception rather than the rule. The founders were required to deposit the 
articles	of	association	along	with	the	license	at	the	Secretariat	General	of	the	Government	or	the	French	General	Inspector’s	
Office. The government could not reject the establishment of an association unless upon a justified decision maintaining 
that	the	said	association	poses	“a	threat	to	moral	standards	and	the	existing	political	system.”	
Whereas the 1888 Act allowed for the establishment of over 1400 associations in almost half a century, the 1936 
Law led to the establishment of 300 associations within 16 months only.20 Other factors helped give rise to the 
number of associations, such as demographic growth, the liberation movement which moved still waters, desires 
to walk in the footsteps of European associations working in Tunisia, and the spread of a cooperative mentality of 
interdependence within the community.21
13	 Ibid.	PP13	14
14	 The	almsgiving	required	of	all	free	Muslims	by	their	faith.
15	 State	treasury,	particularly	in	the	early	Islamic	Caliphate.
16	 Muhammad	Al-Tahir	Ibn	Ashur	al-Nidham	al-Ijtima’i	fil	Islam	2006.	P	179	–	186
17	 Voluntary	charity.
18	 Ibid.
19	 Fayçal	El	Ghoul	,	«	Les	sociétés	musulmanes	de	bienfaisance	dans	la	Tunisie	des	années	1930	,”	Cahiers	de	la	Méditerranée	[En	
ligne]	,	63	|	2001,	mis	en	ligne	le	15	octobre	2004,	Consulté	le	21	octobre	2011.	URL	:	http://cdlm.revues.org/index11.html
20	 Ibid.
21	 Ibid.
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It is noteworthy that the basic laws governing Muslim charities which emerged in different Tunisian cities were alike 
at that period; they all defined the activity scope, goals, and funding resources. Several articles were dedicated to the 
structure of the governing body and regulated conditions for involvement, membership fees, board election, and work 
mechanism of the board of directors. Most of these charities were marked by limited capacity in terms of receiving 
general grants and collecting membership fees. Besides, the acquisition of real estate was subject to royal decrees. For 
example, those charities received annual grants from the Social Welfare Department and local and regional public groups. 
French charities were given more support than Tunisian ones which strived to improve their financial status through 
multiple channels, i.e. fundraising or in-kind donations. Tunisian charities also sought to get a share of endowment 
returns and placed donation boxes in stores in the capital for daily fundraising.
The scope of involvement for those charities was broad. It included fighting poverty; helping the needy; supporting the 
society endeavors in that field; providing health services for the sick; providing jobs for the unemployed; and establishing 
popular restaurants for the poor, students coming from distant towns and market laborers.
The 1930s marked a dramatic turn in the history of Tunisia. It is during that period that philanthropy boomed and many 
successful charities emerged. Politics and philanthropy went hand in hand.The philanthropic landscape in general created an 
environment conducive for the national liberation movement and political awareness and vice versa. This eventually culminated 
in	Tunisia’s	independence	in	1956.	A	new	generation	of	young	nationalists	struggled	for	independence.
The 1959 Constitution (Chapter I, Article 8) guaranteed the right to association and assembly. The main Law No. 
154 on associations was issued on 7 November 1959, drawing on French Law of 1901 and Tunisian Royal Decree of 
1936.	It	allows	“two	or	more	persons	to	found	an	association	to	carry	out	activities	on	a	permanent	basis,	as	long	as	
its	purposes	are	not	commercial	and	do	not	include	the	generation	of	profit.”	This	definition	in	the	French	version	is	
similar to the definition stated in the French Law of 1901.22
This law did not differentiate between charities and philanthropic foundations. It organized associations into three 
different categories: regular association, national welfare associations, and foreign associations, but without any 
definitions for the first two categories; probably leaving that to the discretion of the administration. This new 
organization of associations falls within the policy of modernization pursued by the sovereign state, as it resembles 
the French law. It also came after the breakdown of the traditional structure of charity work and the dissolution of 
Awqaf Society according to the 18 July 1957 decree. In 1964, Tunisia entered into a period of obscurantism and 
became a single-party state where the ruling party dominated most recognized associations and monopolized civil 
work, including philanthropic activities.
The Tunisian Organic Law on Associations No. 25 of 1992 (issued on 2 April 1992) classified associations into: 
women’s	 groups;	 sports	 groups;	 scientific	 groups;	 cultural	 and	 arts	 groups;	 charity,	 emergency,	 and	 social	 groups;	
development groups; amicable groups; and public interest groups. This classification, which did not use the term 
‘foundation’,	was	later	canceled	by	Decree	88	of	2011	(issued	on	24	September	2011)	concerning	the	re-structuring	
of associations after the Revolution.
3. Legal and Organizational Contexts of Tunisian Philanthropy 
3.1. Framework of Philanthropy in Tunisia
The philanthropic structures in Tunisia fall under only two of the categories stated in Law No. 25: development groups 
and charities, emergency, and social groups; despite the comprehensive nature of public interest groups and given the 
fact that the other categories also may include charitable grantmaking. There is much confusion regarding those terms 
at the level of practice and distinctions between them remain vague. The Tunisian Ministry of Social Affairs has adopted 
a	typology	for	social	groups	consisting	of	7	categories:	cooperative	groups,	family	groups,	children’s	groups,	disabled	
groups, health and prevention groups, elderly welfare and development groups.
The	Tunisian	Union	of	Social	Solidarity	or	Union	Tunisienne	de	Solidarité	Sociale	(UTSS)	stands	out	as	a	model	of	
philanthropic associations falling under the cooperative group category according to the Ministry of Social Affairs. It is a 
non-governmental organization established as per the Law on Associations in the early years of independence. It operates 
through a nation-wide network and undertakes most emergency aid activities within Tunisia or as part of Tunisian relief 
efforts offered to sister countries in time of war and during catastrophes. Being engaged in governmental work, the 
UTSS has developed into an official body and a state-run national organization.
22	 Muhammad	Al-Haddar.	Dirasa	Hawl	Mawarid	al-Jam’iyyat:	Al-Waqi’	wal-Afaq—A	Study	on	the	Financial	Resources	of	Philanthropic	
Foundations:	Present	and	Prospective.	Tunisian	Cabinet.	Center	for	Information,	Training,	Studies,	and	Documentation	on	Associations	
(IFEDA)	2009.	P	17.
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The UTSS operates on three levels: social development programs, solidarity and social welfare, and self-development 
and income sources programs. It runs a network of warehouses in which in-kind humanitarian aid donations are stored 
over an area of 9500 m2 with a capacity of 9000 tons for each material category. In 2008, the UTSS established a 
new solidarity mechanism: the Charity Bank of Medicine. The Zakat Fund, an affiliate of the UTSS, is run by the 
independent National Zakat Council which is headed by the Supreme Islamic Council in Tunisia and has a bank 
account	separate	from	that	of	the	UTSS’.	The	Zakat	Fund	has	local	and	regional	branches.	Development	groups,	on	
the other hand, were not clearly defined by the law, but were rather broad and open to divergent competences as the 
developmental aspect applies to all fields. Chief among organizations in this category is the Tunisian Foundation for 
Community Development (FTDC) and the Association for the Promotion of Housing and Employment of Tunisia 
(APEL). The Tunisian Foundation for Community Development (FTDC) is a non-governmental development 
group established in 1986. It operates throughout the country with special focus on the deprived northwestern 
region (particularly the governorates of Silyana and Kasserine). The FTDC has been authorized by the Minister of 
Finance since 1999 to offer microgrants and is accredited by many international bodies. It seeks to achieve socio-
economic development for low-income communities, especially in rural and limited-resource areas and to promote 
the culture of sustainable development and self-dependence.
The foundation pursues different programs in the fields of health, education, literacy, and training, in addition to the 
protection of water and forest resources. In 2011, it forged a partnership with USAID to establish a regional training 
center with a capital of 500,000 USD. The aim of the center was to offer practical training to local rural communities 
in traditional industries, agriculture, and the preservation of water, soil, environment and natural wealth, especially 
forests. Further cooperation with USAID is expected to execute an integrated development project and another for the 
evaluation of heritage treasures and promotion of environmental tourism in the rural areas of Siliana.
The Association for the Promotion of Housing and Employment of Tunisia (APEL) aims to help local 
communities promote themselves and achieve self-development. It operates mainly in the disadvantaged northern 
and	northwestern	rural	areas	of	Tunisia.	APEL	seeks	to	achieve	integrated	and	sustainable	development	in	Tunisia’s	
poor mountainous regions by defining needs and stakeholders, setting development programs in cooperation with 
different public and private stakeholders. 
Non-governmental	 organizations	 operating	 in	 Tunisia	 are	 a	 third	 category.	 These	 fall	 under	 ‘foreign	 associations’	
defined	in	the	Tunisian	Law	on	Associations	as:	“Associations	that	have	the	characteristics	of	Tunisian	associations	and	
have their headquarters abroad; those which have their headquarters in Tunisia are also considered foreign if they are 
‘directed	by	an	executive	board	of	which	at	least	half	the	members	are	foreigners’	(Article	16).	No	foreign	association	
may	exercise	its	activities	on	Tunisian	soil,	without	having	prior	permission.”
Chief among foreign associations is enda Inter-arabe, a member of ENDA Third World (Enda Tiers Monde) seated 
in Senegal. It was founded in Tunisia in 1990 where its initial activities were mainly ecological projects by western 
funding. In the 1990s, enda inter-arabe organized a number of international conferences in Tunisia around the same 
themes as the major UN thematic conferences of that period. In 1993, enda launched an integrated economic and 
social development program in a poor suburb of Tunis that included outreach services such as vocational training 
for school drop-outs and raising awareness about health issues for women. In 1995, ENDA began providing 
microcredit and by 2000, decided to focus almost entirely on providing support to micro-entrepreneurs, essentially 
through financial services (particularly microcredit) and support to micro-enterprises (training, marketing, advice, 
etc).	In	2005,	the	Central	Bank	of	Tunisia	granted	enda	‘resident’	status	which	opened	up	access	to	loans	from	
Tunisian banks to finance its growth. 
Cooperatives are a key component of Tunisian philanthropy. They are associations based on the values of solidarity and 
mutual social and economic benefit. In Tunisia, they mostly provide occupational hazard insurance covering illness, 
delivery costs, accidents, and death. Such coverage complements benefits offered by the retirement and social security 
funds. Cooperatives date back to the early 20th century when the National Tobacco and Fuel Agency Staff Cooperative 
Society were founded in 1904 and the Cooperative Society for Support of Orphans of Education Sector Staff was 
founded in 1946. Cooperatives, outnumbering 40, fall into three categories: public sector cooperatives which include 
ministry cooperatives, quasi-public sector cooperatives which include cooperatives affiliated to public non-administrative 
institutions, and private sector personnel cooperatives. The cooperative sector includes over 2.8 million members. In 
2007, it ran a deficit of over 2.1 million TND, i.e. 1.5 million USD.23
23	 Annual	Report	of	Cooperative	Sectr.	Ministry	of	Finance.	Republic	of	Tunisia	2007
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3.2. Funding Resources for Philanthropy
In addition to government funding, the financial resources of philanthropy foundations can be divided into two categories: 
general and private resources24. General resources include self-generated resources, i.e. revenues coming from member 
subscriptions; income from investments in financial institutions; surplus loan proceeds from loans granted by development 
groups; returns from activities organized by or products promoted by the foundation; proceeds from rental and licensing 
of real estate and other properties; in addition to gifts, donations and cash prizes.
Private resources include revenues from services or quasi-commercial activities pursued by some foundations according 
to applicable laws; provided that the proceeds are not distributed over the members, do not create a form of dishonest 
competition, nor provide a means for tax evasion. The Tunisian Tax Department distinguishes between regular 
philanthropic activities that are not subject to direct taxation and commercial activities which must be authorized for 
taxation purposes. Certain categories of philanthropic foundations (sports groups, scientific groups, cultural and arts 
groups, etc.) benefit from these private resources. Development groups, namely economic groups, ecological groups and 
microfinance groups, are particularly concerned with private resources.
Microfinance groups are subject to the provisions of the Organic Law No. 67 of 1999. As at 2008, 32,456 loans have 
been granted including microcredit and loans to improve living standards by a maximum interest rate of 5%. The Law 
stipulates that associations must seek prior approval from the Ministry of Finance and secure the financial and human 
resources	necessary	to	complete	its	projects,	which	must	coincide	with	the	state’s	development	policy.	The	resources	of	
such foundations are as follows:
•	Receivables from program contracts and partnerships with public institutions and others
•	Donations by public and private institutions
•	Bilateral and multilateral cooperation funds
•	Microcredit refunds
•	Investment revenues
The Law on Associations bans associations from obtaining commissions or reimbursements from loan beneficiaries 
unless	otherwise	stipulated	in	the	Minister	of	Finance’s	decision.	However,	philanthropic	associations	may	benefit	
from government support. 
To promote philanthropic microfinance, the new law issued in the aftermath of the Revolution offers a differential 
taxation system:
•	Waiver of added values as commissions and micro-loan surplus
•	Waiver of registration fees for micro-loans 
•	Waiver of taxes for commercial bonds to support micro-loans
The Law also transfers taxation privileges from foundations licensed to grant micro-loans to microfinance organizations. 
This is consequent to the development of the legislative structure of microfinance which became confined to microfinance 
organizations. 
Current applicable laws in Tunisia do not include a clear definition for forms of government support to philanthropy, 
except	for	the	Law	on	Associations	No.	25	of	1992	(Article	9)	which	states	that	associations	“receiving	public	funding	
on	a	regular	basis	are	subject	to	regular	financial	control	and	auditing.”	According	to	the	Decree	No.	88	issued	after	
the	 Revolution	 concerning	 associations,	 “the	 state	 must	 allocate	 adequate	 funds	 to	 support	 associations	 based	 on	
competence,	projects	and	activities.	Criteria	for	public	funding	are	set	by	decree”	(Article	36).	
This decree bans associations from raising funds to support or finance political parties or independent candidates for 
national,	regional	or	local	elections,	without	prejudice	to	the	associations’	right	to	express	their	political	views	and	public	
stances. This comes within efforts to regulate political money, an issue that strongly surfaced in the aftermath of the 
Revolution and before elections of the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly.
The magnitude of public funds channeled to philanthropic activities was found difficult to determine due to the 
lack of an adequate database. Both public grantmaking foundations and associations do not voluntarily disclose 
their sources of funds and expenditures on a regular basis, which is against the provisions of relative laws. Official 
24	 See	Muhammad	Al-Haddar.	Dirasa	Hawl	Mawarid	al-Jam’iyyat:	Al-Waqi’	wal-Afaq—A	Study	on	the	Financial	Resources	of	Philanthropic	
Foundations:	Present	and	Prospective.	Tunisian	Cabinet.	IFEDA	2009.
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statistics show that public funds granted to associations between 2004 and 2007 surpassed 23.7 million TND 
(around 18 million USD)25 .
Government funding of philanthropy comes in the form of in-cash and in-kind grants as well as taxation and 
financial privileges. Chief among public funders of philanthropy in Tunisia is the NGO Trust Fund set up in 
1991 within the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development at the time in cooperation with USAID. The 
aim of the trust was to contribute to the funding of NGO projects by offering grants representing 30 to 50% of 
the total cost, with a maximum of 250 thousand TND (around 170 thousand USD). 
Tunisian taxation laws offer considerable direct and indirect tax exonerations for microfinance associations. Given 
that profit sharing is not among the aims of philanthropy, microfinance associations are not liable to the income tax 
applied to natural persons and companies. Transferred capitals of a given association would be subject to income 
taxation, similar to interests from bank investments. 
In 1955, custom privileges were notably granted to charities and associations including exemption from custom 
duties on goods imported to meet the basic needs of targeted groups, provided that these goods are distributed over 
the beneficiaries for free. These privileges include youth associations, educational groups, arts groups, scientific 
groups, and sports groups at the discretion of the Minister of Finance. 
Given the lack of statistics on private funds, tax laws offer substantial incentives for private institutions which 
support philanthropic activities. The Income and Corporation Taxes Act applicable since 1990 states that: 
“grants	and	aids	may	be	given	to	public-interest,	charitable,	voluntary,	voluntary,	scientific,	social,	or	cultural	
groups,	provided	that	they	are	offered	with	a	maximum	of	0.002	of	the	raw	number	of	transactions.”	It	also	
states	that:	“the	whole	grant	value	may	be	offered	to	community	associations	or	programs	upon	a	decision	by	
the	Minister	of	Finance.”
3.3. Philanthropic Organizations before the Revolution
IFEDA26 (Center for Information, Training, Studies, and Documentation on Associations) statistics show that the 
number of associations as at 2010 reached 9561, i.e. double the number in 1990. 
Figure (1): The Number of Associations in Tunisia from 1990 to 2010
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 Percentages are classified according to the typology adopted in the 1992 Law on Associations as follows:
•	Arts and Cultural Groups: 62.81%
•	Scientific Groups: 5.18%
•	Sports Groups: 13.40%
•	Feminist Groups: 0.25%
•	Public Groups: 1.35%
•	Charities and Aid Groups: 5.07%
•	Development Groups: 5.95%
•	Cooperatives: 6.9%
25	 Ibid.
26	 The	state-run	Center	for	Information,	Training,	Studies,	and	Documentation	on	Associations	(IFEDA)
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Figure (2): Categories of Associations in Tunisia as at December 2010
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On examining these statistics, we find that the trends of civil society in Tunisia was mainly cultural and artistic and that the 
percentage of charitable, community and development groups does not exceed 11%. This may be due to:
•	State monopoly on community work ever since the independence through the Tunisian Union of Social 
Solidarity (UTSS), an organization that is subject to the Law on Associations and dominates philanthropic 
activities.	Although	an	independent	body,	the	UTSS	is	actually	run	by	the	state	and	the	‘former’	ruling	party	
in terms of the choice of facilitators and organization of activities. After the Revolution, the UTSS witnessed 
protests	by	staff	members	and	its	depots	“were	looted	by	citizens	who	used	to	receive	financial	and	in-kind	
assistance	from	the	Union,”	UTSS	Director-General	Jameleddine	Abdellatif	told	Tunis-Afrique-Presse	(TAP)	
news	agency	on	26	January	2011,	pointing	out	that	“foodstuff,	blankets,	clothes	and	other	assistance	stored	in	
the	Union’s	depots	to	be	distributed	to	underprivileged	families	were	ransacked.”
•	State monopoly on donations under the former regime, as they were channeled to the National Solidarity 
Fund (also known as the 26-26 Fund after its postal account number or as FSN27). FSN is a public-service 
institution affiliated to the President of the Republic and aims at fighting poverty by promoting disadvantaged 
areas	(often	referred	to	as	«shadow	areas»).	It	is	funded	essentially	by	donations	from	Tunisian	citizens	and	
private companies that were received at public and private institutions, schools and universities on 8 December 
of every year (now known as the National Solidarity Day). 
•	Absence of an institutional system as no family, private or public associations existed in Tunisia ever since the 
independence, unlike other world countries. 
•	Lack of incentives to establish Islamic charities, which comes in line with efforts by the post-independence 
political	regime	to	fight	structures	that	may	shelter	“extremist	activities.”	That	trend	was	nurtured	by	western	
campaigns	to	combat	“terror	financing.”	Some	Arab	cable	channels	have	called	for	barring	Zakat	beneficiaries	
from using it as a mechanism to disguise and enable support for terrorist acts.
•	Leaving the establishment of associations to the discretion of the Ministry of Interior has stressed the margin 
of initiative under complete political obscurantism and an outdated regime of centralized governance. 
•	The rise of individualism and selfhood at the expense of social solidarity due to the rapid pace of social changes, 
economic woes, in addition to the identity problem especially in underprivileged communities.
4. The Tunisian Philanthropic Landscape Post Ben Ali
4.1. The Political, Social and Economic Scope
On	January	14,	2011,	youth-led	protests	 toppled	the	Tunisian	government	and	ushered	 in	the	“Arab	Spring”	which	
swept other Arab countries. This unexpected wave of outrage, which achieved what seemed to be a far-fetched dream, 
was the culmination of earlier waves.28
27	 The	postal	account	number	of	the	National	Solidarity	Fund	whose	activities	were	frozen	after	the	Revolution.
28	 In	2006,	in	the	coastal	town	of	Soliman,	south	of	Tunis,	armed	clashes	took	place	between	security	forces	and	a	group	of	young	men	
said	to	be	linked	to	extremist	groups.	Many	believe	that	the	Soliman	incident	reflected	shattered	hopes	for	reform.	The	year	2008	was	
marked	by	the	Revolt	of	the	Gafsa	Mining	Basin.	The	social	mobilizations	which	shook	this	poor	area,	located	close	to	the	Algerian	
border,	represent	a	youth-led	uprising	that	was	unable	to	grow,	but	it	signaled	an	upcoming	tide.
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The Tunisian Revolution was launched from deprived underprivileged areas29. It was an inevitable consequence of 
repeated failures in over half a century, which led to increased rates of unemployment, social exclusion, and inequality; 
political obscurantism; crackdown on freedoms; provocatively open corruption; broader scale of marginalization; 
and a common feeling of despair. Youth have been the primary victim in this deteriorating climate.
The Tunisian Revolution was marked by spontaneity and young spirit. It had no political or ideological purposes and no 
leader. Its basic demands were employment, dignity and freedom. Its weapon was modern communication technology. 
Besides the streets and squares, its battlefield was social Internet networks which overcame censorship and media 
blackout. At its zenith, the Tunisian uprising received support from elite advocates, syndicators and opposition parties 
which were dazzled by the final outcome; and it was the youth who paid for it in blood.
Many factors played a role in fomenting and sustaining the uprising, but economic hardships were particularly 
pivotal.	However,	development	has	taken	the	backseat	and	politics	was	placed	high	on	top	of	the	elite’s	priorities	
after the downfall of the regime. But demands persisted chaotically at times, more quietly at others. Growth 
rates diminished, local and external investments declined, unemployment and poverty increased, prices of staple 
products went up and services deteriorated, a high level of insecurity prevailed, tension erupted at the Tunisian-
Libyan borders, and inappropriate social behaviors appeared in the community. Yet, Tunisia was able to hold its first 
ever free, fair and transparent elections to form the Constitutional Council that would draft the new constitution 
and manage the country during the interim period. Critical political and developmental issues have been opened 
for serious discussions as of the end of 2011.
A philanthropic boom has enveloped Tunisia after the toppling of the regime and ouster of the Tunisian President on 
January 14, 2011. This was manifested in the great surge of solidarity shown during the security breakdown which 
afflicted	the	country’s	streets.	Spontaneous	popular	committees	were	formed	to	protect	neighborhoods.	This	coincided	
with fund-raising campaigns to collect donations and foodstuffs for those who lost their source of living or whose work 
has been affected by the deteriorating security conditions. 
Unorganized philanthropy continued after the wave of refugees who fled unrest in Libya into the Libyan-Tunisian borders. 
The locals offered refugees shelter, medical treatment, food and education with the support of international bodies, such 
as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Red Crescent, and local voluntary groups 
formed for that purpose. The Revolution has given great impetus to the spirit of solidarity, volunteerism and giving and 
paved the way for numerous associations to operate freely. After long years of crackdown on religious activities which 
are not under state control, the number of religious charitable associations increased. Religious occasions and festivities 
such as the holy month of Ramadan and Bairams were a perfect chance for philanthropic practices. Philanthropy played 
a momentous role in areas afflicted by rain floods last fall.
Local development groups figured prominently to serve deprived remote areas in the aftermath of the Revolution 
which was originally sparked by imbalance of development, social injustice, and spread of corruption. Besides the 
philanthropic drive, these groups also aimed at promoting citizenship and participation. Some Tunisian businessmen 
living abroad founded associations to promote local development and improve living standards in Tunisia.30
The flourishing of civil society organizations during the transitional period has led some western countries and many 
NGOs to partner and support them.31 The transitional period has strongly affected the work of many associations 
which were closely connected to the former regime, especially those associated with ministries and public institutions. 
The	activities	of	the	National	Solidarity	Fund—the	official	public	body	which	benefited	from	donations—were	frozen	
due to suspected misuse of resources. A new Law on Associations was enacted to allow more freedoms and limit state 
intervention. It also regulates the relationship between associations and political parties and bans them from sheltering 
political money. Another law was also issued for association microfinance. 
29	 Protests	broke	out	in	the	town	of	Sidi	Bouzid,	then	moved	to	other	parts	along	the	western	Tunisian	strip	which	is	the	poorest	despite	
its	natural	and	human	resources,	such	as	Kasserine.
30	 Such	as	the	Dignity,	Development	and	Democracy	(DDD)	Organization	established	in	Brussels	in	March	2011	by	the	initiative	of	
Tunisian	businessmen	living	in	Tunisia	and	abroad.
31	 Besides	political	associations,	especially	democracy	watchdogs	which	monitored	elections;	the	French	Embassy	in	Tunis	co-hosted	
the	First	Tunisian-French	Civil	Society	Forum	with	the	Tunisian	associations	“Sawty,”	“Amal,”	“enda	Inter-Arabe”	and	the	associative	
network	Randet.	Also,	the	British	Embassy	nurtured	newly	established	associations.	A	web	portal	for	associations	(www.Jam3ity.org)	
was	officially	launched	upon	the	initiative	of	the	British	Council	in	Tunis	in	partnership	with	the	Global	Change	Makers	and	the	Euro-
Mediterranean	Human	Rights	Network	Tunisian	team.	The	portal	aims	to	promote	the	Tunisian	civil	society	by	developing	a	digital	
communication	network	for	Tunisian	associations.
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4.2. Development in Numbers, Categories and Geographical Distribution
From January to end-September 2011, 1044 new associations were established in Tunisia all subject to the 1992 Law 
on Associations, given that the new Law on Associations was issued end of September 2011. This strikes a record 
considering the annual rate of associations in the past 20 years which never exceeded 220 associations annually. This rate 
has declined substantially in the past 5 years, reaching 82 in 2010 and 148 in 2009.
These associations may be classified as follows: 453 cultural and arts groups, 182 charitable and social groups, 129 
development groups, 144 advocacy and citizenship groups, 63 cooperatives, 58 sports groups, and 15 feminist groups.
Figure (3): Development of Annual Number of Associations in Tunisia from 2007 to 2010
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This classification shows that cultural, arts and scientific groups still lead the philanthropic landscape in Tunisia. 
Charitable, aid and community groups have made remarkable progress as they came in second place. Associations which 
are active in citizenship issues, social rights, political rights, economic rights and public freedoms, as well as development 
groups have flourished at the expense of sports groups. This relates to the transitional period which increased public 
concern after a period of political obscurantism under the former regime. It also relates to the social demands stirred by 
the Revolution and the major economic decline in the country.
On looking at the geographic distribution of associations in Tunisia during the transitional period, it was found 
that they are located mainly in Grand Tunis which includes the capital and neighboring governorates (over 
41%); then in the south-eastern region which includes Sfax, the second major governorate in Tunisia (over 
19.6%) ; then the coastal region (over 16.5%).
Although the number of associations is more in economically privileged areas, namely the capital and the 
coast, the year 2011 witnessed a substantial increase in newly established associations in deprived areas, the 
bedrock of the Tunisian Revolution, namely the mid-west which includes the Governorate of Sidi Bouzid, the 
north-west region, and the south-west region. It is noticeable that community and charitable associations are 
densely located in major cities and villages. Coordination networks have also been established in Jerba Island in 
southern Tunisia, Ben Guerdane at the Tunisian-Libyan borders and other areas.
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4.3. Tunisian Philanthropy in the Transitional Period
Charitable associations established after the Revolution have a remarkable Islamic orientation which appears in their 
names. Their mission statements are usually Quranic verses or hadiths (sayings of the Prophet Mohammad) that 
call for solidarity, cooperation and love among Muslims and the entire humanity. Their activities merge charitable 
cooperativeness with religious awareness-raising with the aim of promoting the culture and teachings of Islam. Some 
associations	are	actively	engaged	in	da’wah	(invitation	to	Islam)	and	preaching	by	organizing	forums	and	classes	at	their	
headquarters, cultural institutions or in mosques featuring ulama from Tunisia and beyond.
Other associations either join networks by launching joint programs and initiatives, or introduce themselves on 
Internet social networks (Facebook, Twitter, etc). For example, the Association Nour Walegh Djerba page links to other 
associations such as Al-Mawedda, Al-Ihsan, and ISR-ASSO (Initiative and Self-Reliance Association). Networking 
among charities extends beyond Tunisian borders; the Tunisian Islamic Al-Khayr Charity, for example, is associated 
with	Al-Mahabba	Fillah	Group	which	designed	the	Tunisian	charity’s	logo	for	free.	Several	charities	fund	their	activities	
from Zakat and sadaqat money and use farming seasons and religious occasions to raise funds. They address the 
religious conscience of Muslims through their social media pages, calling them to donate. Some charities receive 
donations	in	mosques;	others	use	the	“electronic	sadaqa”	mode32.
Islamic finance was brought into the limelight after the Revolution. On 28 February 2011, the Tunisian Association 
of	Islamic	Finance	was	established.	It	is	described	by	its	officials	as	“a	scientific	non-profit	association	concerned	with	
scientific	research	on	Islamic	finance	and	seeks	to	educate	field	experts	and	train	those	interested	in	Islamic	finance.”	
The association believes that establishing a Zakat association and promoting Islamic finance products, such as Islamic 
bonds, would secure large funds to address social problems33.
Throughout 2011, these charities intensified their activities on religious occasions, especially the holy month of 
Ramadan and Greater Bairam. Religious charity activities increased even more during the Libyan Revolution where 
great numbers of Libyans and foreign workers fled the violent clashes. 
Most charities stress their neutral stance and refrain from political involvement, maintaining that politics corrupts 
philanthropy whose aim is to please God and serve noble human values. Yet, philanthropic interest in politics surfaced 
as some post-Revolution charities offered their open support to certain political parties, indirect support by calling to 
vote for Islam, or posted links to some parties on their Facebook pages.
Such	committed	emphasis	on	gearing	philanthropic	efforts	to	charity	in	pursuit	of	God’s	blessing	is	a	reaction	to	former	
social policies which were considered to serve the purposes of the ruling regime and to subject poor communities to the power 
of the state. After the Revolution, several charities took their philanthropic efforts beyond Tunisian borders to Muslim areas 
afflicted with famine, such as Somalia, a duty springing from human solidarity and Islamic charity.
Major philanthropic activities in Tunisia during the transitional period may be classified into ongoing activities and 
emergency activities. The aim of ongoing activities is to offer regular aid, sponsor needy orphans and widows, and help 
integrate unemployed people into the labor market or curb unemployment rates. Emergency activities are conducted in 
times of catastrophe, natural disasters (fall floods) or crisis such as the great number of refugees who fled to Tunisia 
during the Libyan Revolution. Many charities own warehouses for storing foodstuffs, blankets and basic relief items. 
Charity caravans are also dispatched to remote deprived areas. The presented relief material comes from philanthropist 
contributions and alms, in addition to grants from the Ministry of Social Affairs.
Some economic institutions, business enterprises and communication corporations sponsor charitable activities 
through their product marketing campaigns where part of the proceeds are directed toward philanthropic activities.34
32	 For	example,	the	Tunisian	Dar	ElKhir	Association	defined	this	kind	of	sadaqah	(voluntary	charity)	on	its	facebook	page	drawing	on	a	
Saudi	e-charity	website	(www.esadaqa.org)	that	aims	to	“train	charities	on	resource	development	within	KSA.”	The	website	defines	
“hidden	sadaqah”	or	“secret	sadaqah”	and	takes	“offer	charity	for	the	sake	of	Allah”	as	its	logo	statement.
33	 The	Association	holds	that	a	comparative	study	conducted	on	zakah	in	six	Arab	Islamic	countries	shows	that	zakah	practices	differ	
from	one	country	to	another.	In	Sudan,	zakah	money	which	directly	deducted	from	high	salaries	amount	to	2%	of	Sudan’s	domestic	
product.	Studies	held	in	Egypt	have	shown	that	17	billion	Egyptian	Pound	(EGP)	(around	3.4	million	TND)	may	be	collected	from	
zakah	money.	However,	no	studies	have	been	conducted	in	Tunisia	in	this	regard.
34	 A	case	in	point	is	Tunisie	Telecom	which	launched	the	“Chain	of	Support”	initiative	during	the	holy	month	of	Ramadan	2011	by	
contributing	20	millimes	for	each	purchase	of	a	new	mobile	phone,	recharge	or	bill	payment	operation	without	deducting	the	said	
amount	from	the	client’s	credit.	The	proceeds,	which	exceeded	1	million	TND	(around	700,000	USD)	were	used	as	a	charity	fund	
distributed	over	14	philanthropic	 foundations:	L’association	Aoufia	 (Fidèles)	 for	 those	martyred	or	 injured	during	 the	Revolution,	
Association	d’Assistance	aux	Grands	Handi	capés	a	Domicile,	SOS	Children’s	Villages	in	Tunisia,	National	Institute	of	child	protection,	
Sebil	Association	for	Child	and	Mother,	Amal	Childhood	and	Family	Association,	Children	of	the	Moon	Association,	Isma’ny	Association	
for	Public	Hospital	Patients,	the	Red	Crescent	Office	in	Dehiba,	Tataouine;	24	elder	care	associations;	the	Tunisian	Family	Support	
Association,	Saqf	 lil-Jami’	Association,	Mashreq’	Shams	Association,	and	 the	Tunisian	Union	 for	Parents	with	Mentally	Disabled	
Children	(Mala’ika).
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However, although important, these initiatives have been subject to criticism and accusations of commercial 
benefit dressed up in philanthropic disguise35. Regardless of the validity or invalidity of these claims, such stances 
reflect the controversies of corporate philanthropy where there is a standing risk of using charity initiatives 
to achieve certain financial or publicity gains. Same is the case with tax exemption which could be a target per se 
whereas it is an incentive for securing funds for philanthropy which is a guarantee for social stability and equality.
Equally important are new development associations. They have the following properties:
•	Most of them do not disclose their religious drive as many other charities.
•	They are concentrated in large villages and internal cities. A great number of them emerged in the firing points 
of the Tunisian Revolution, namely Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine.
•	They are small associations seeking to contribute to developmental projects within the local communities  
in which they operate.
•	They are run by the local elite, i.e. university professors, doctors, lawyers, employees and university students.
•	They secure funds from self-efforts or through cooperation agreements with banks and economic institutions.
•	Several associations were established to operate on unemployment, especially in deprived areas which were 
underprivileged before and even after the Revolution.
•	Most of these associations are headquartered in concerned areas. A number of them have their headquarters in 
the capital, although their field of operation is internal areas.
•	Some associations take upon themselves hard missions in reaction to the marginalization of civil society in 
internal areas in the past.
•	Some associations emerged during the transitional period, where they established cooperation relations with 
banks and economic institutions to develop major initiatives and projects in deprived areas.
•	A number of development associations join local networks that raise support and unite efforts to achieve 
their goals more effectively. A case in point is what happened in Kasserine, one of the areas which sparked 
the Revolution.
5. Conclusion
Philanthropy is an established tradition in Tunisia, like all Arab countries. However, studies on the subject are scarce. Also, 
research literature suffers from obscure concepts and fundamentally disparate references for outlining the parameters of 
philanthropy. Most research studies and statistical analyses either draw on legal sources, or resort to cultural and social 
definitions springing from mainstream community concepts. 
The	term	‘foundation’	is	usually	associated	with	an	organization	that	is	engaged	in	philanthropic	practices.	However,	
the definition and use of the term differs from one country to another. The Western concept of charities is different 
from the concept of associations in Tunisia. According to the French Act of 23 July 1987, the, the European charity 
system resembles the Islamic Waqf. Hence, this study suggests a procedural definition for philanthropy: legally 
recognized voluntary action for the mobilization of energies and financial resources to be used in projects and 
initiatives	that	aim	to	address	people’s	problems	at	all	levels,	help	those	with	special	needs,	and	build	capacities.	The	
ultimate goal is public good and fair and comprehensive development.
Philanthropic giving is an established tradition in Tunisian society, manifested in civil and voluntary associations and Sufi 
zawaya. The first law on associations was issued in the late 19th century. It allowed for the emergence of many associations 
that still exist to date. The scope of their involvement included fighting poverty; helping the needy; supporting the 
Endowments	Foundation’s	endeavors	in	that	field;	providing	health	services	for	the	sick;	providing	jobs	for	the	unemployed;	
and establishing popular restaurants for the poor, for students coming from distant cities and for market laborers.
The 1959 Constitution guaranteed the right to association and assembly. The main Law No. 154 on associations was 
issued on 7 November 1959, drawing on French Law of 1901 and Tunisian Royal Decree of 1936. This law did not classify 
charities and philanthropic foundations. It organized associations into three different categories: regular association, 
national welfare associations, and foreign associations. The Tunisian Organic Law on Associations No. 25 of 1992 classified 
35	 A	case	in	point	is	the	“Give	me	my	bus”	initiative,	an	agreement	between	the	Ministry	of	Education	and	l’Epi	D’Or	pasta	company	to	
provide	buses	to	take	children	in	remote	rural	areas	to	their	schools.	A	huge	media	campaign	was	launched	during	the	holy	month	of	
Ramadan	2011	which	is	marked	by	higher	consumption	of	pasta.	As	the	outcome	of	the	initiative	was	not	announced,	some	newspapers	
fiercely	attacked	the	company	and	accused	it	of	using	charity	money	to	its	profit	based	endeavors.	According	to	the	classification	of	
the	Tunisian	Organic	Law	on	Associations	of	1992,	noting	that	the	new	law	on	associations	was	enacted	in	September	2011	in	the	
aftermath	of	the	Revolution.	In	addition	to	endowments	traditionally	known	since	the	time	of	the	Prophet	Muhammad	(pbuh).
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associations	into:	women’s	groups;	sports	groups;	scientific	groups;	cultural	and	arts	groups;	charity,	emergency,	and	
social groups; development groups; amicable groups; and public interest groups. This classification, which did not use the 
term	‘foundation’,	was	canceled	by	Decree	88	of	2011	concerning	the	re-structuring	of	associations	after	the	Revolution.
Philanthropic structures in Tunisia fall under only two of the categories stated in Law No. 25: development groups 
and charity, emergency, and social groups; despite the comprehensive nature of public interest groups and given 
the fact that also the other categories may include charitable grantmaking. The financial resources of Tunisian 
philanthropy are either regular resources or private resources. Regular resources include grants, gifts, donations, 
returns from activities, income from investments in financial institutions, and proceeds from rental and licensing 
of real estate and other properties. Private resources include revenues from services and quasi-commercial activities 
or micro-loan surplus as per applicable laws.
Current applicable laws in Tunisia do not include a clear definition for forms of government support to philanthropy, 
which comes in the form of in-cash and in-kind grants as well as taxation and financial privileges. Tunisian taxation laws 
offer considerable direct and indirect tax exonerations for associations. In 1955, custom privileges were notably granted 
to charities and cooperatives including exemption from some custom duties. According to the Decree No. 88 issued 
after the Revolution concerning associations, the state must allocate adequate funds to support associations based on 
competence, projects and activities. Criteria for public funding are set by decree. The decree bans associations from 
raising funds to support or finance political parties or independent candidates for national, regional or local elections. 
Given the lack of statistics on private funds, tax laws offer substantial incentives for private institutions 
which support philanthropic activities.
Trends of philanthropic work in Tunisia are mainly cultural and artistic and that the percentage of charitable, 
community and development groups does not exceed 11%. This may be due to state monopoly on community 
work and donations ever since the independence, absence of an institutional system, lack of incentives to establish 
Islamic charities, leaving the establishment of associations to the discretion of the Ministry of Interior, and the rise of 
individualism and selfhood at the expense of social solidarity.
A philanthropic boom has enveloped Tunisia after the toppling of the regime and ouster of the Tunisian President on 
January 14, 2011. This was manifested in the great surge of solidarity shown during the security breakdown which 
afflicted	the	country’s	streets.	Spontaneous	popular	committees	were	formed	to	protect	neighborhoods.	Unorganized	
philanthropy continued after the wave of refugees who fled unrest in Libya into the Libyan-Tunisian borders.
Local development groups figured prominently to serve deprived remote areas in the aftermath of the Revolution which 
was originally sparked by imbalance of development, social injustice, and spread of corruption. The transitional period 
has strongly affected the work of many associations which were closely connected to the former regime, especially those 
associated with ministries and public institutions.
During the first ten months of 2011, 1044 new associations were established in Tunisia, all subject to the 1992 Law on 
Associations, given that the new Law on Associations was issued end of September 2011. This strikes a record considering 
the annual rate of associations in the past 20 years. Cultural, arts and scientific groups still lead the philanthropic landscape 
in Tunisia. Charitable, aid and community groups have made remarkable progress as they come in second place. Although 
the number of associations is more in economically privileged areas, namely the capital and the coast, the year 2011 
witnessed a substantial increase in newly established associations in deprived areas. Community and charitable associations 
are densely located in major cities and villages.
Charitable associations established after the Revolution have a remarkable Islamic orientation. Their activities merge 
charitable cooperativeness with religious awareness-raising with the aim of promoting the culture and teachings of 
Islam. Some associations either join networks by launching joint programs and initiatives, or introduce themselves on 
the Internet and social networks (Facebook, Twitter, etc). Several charities fund their activities from Zakat and sadaqat 
money.	Some	charities	receive	donations	in	mosques;	others	use	the	“electronic	sadaqa”	mode.	Islamic	finance	and	its	
new products (such as Islamic finance bonds) were brought into the limelight after the Revolution. 
Most charities stress their neutral stance and refrain from political involvement, maintain that politics corrupts 
philanthropy whose aim is to please God and serve noble human values. Yet, philanthropic interest in politics 
surfaced as some post-Revolution charities offer their open support to certain political parties, indirect support by 
calling to vote for Islam.
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After the Revolution, several charities took their philanthropic efforts beyond Tunisian borders to Muslim areas afflicted 
with famine, such as Somalia, a duty springing from human solidarity and Islamic charity.
Some economic institutions, business enterprises and communication corporations sponsor charitable activities 
through their product marketing campaigns where part of the proceeds are directed toward philanthropic activities. 
However, although important, these initiatives have been subject to criticism and accusations of commercial benefit 
dressed up in philanthropic disguise.
New development associations are equally important in the philanthropic landscape. They do not disclose their religious 
drive as many other charities. They are small associations run by the local elite and operate mainly in large villages and 
internal cities. These associations seek to contribute to developmental projects within the local communities in which they 
operate. They secure funds from self-efforts or through cooperation agreements with banks and economic institutions.
The Revolution has created opportunities for philanthropic giving and widened the scope of civic engagement. A new civil 
society is emerging, which requires a democratic environment and a new republic based on equality, freedom and justice. 
This would create a backbone for social coherence that stands aloof from political and ideological interferences. 
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